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Abstract 
The autobiographical prison writings of four South African women - Ruth First, 
Caesarina Kana Makhoere, Emma Mashinini and Maggie Resha - form the 
focus of this study. 
iii 
South African autobiography is burdened with the task of producing history 
in the light of the silences enforced by apartheid security legislation and the 
dominance of representations of white histories. Autobiography with its promise 
of 'truth' provides the structure within which to establish a credible subject 
position. In chapter one I discuss the use of authenticating devices, such as 
documentary-like prose, and the inclusion in numerous texts of the stories of 
others. Asserting oneself as a (publicly acknowledged) subject in writing is 
particularly difficult for women who historically have been denied access to 
authority: while Maggie Resha's explicit task is to highlight the role women have 
played in the struggle, her narrative must also be broadly representative, her 
authority communal. 
As I discuss ih chapter two, prison writing breaks the legal and 
psychological silences imposed by a hostile penal system. In a context of 
political repression the notion of the truth becomes complicated, because while it 
is important to be believed, it is also important, as with Ruth First, not to betray 
her comrades and values. The writer must therefore negotiate with the 
(imagined) audience if her signature is to be accepted and her subjectivity 
affirmed. The struggle to represent oneself in the inimical environment of prison 
and the redemptive value in doing so are considered in chapter three. 
iv 
The institution of imprisonment as a means of silencing political dissidence 
targets the body, according to Michel Foucault's theories of discipline and control 
explored in chapter four. Using the work of Lois McNay and Elizabeth Grosz I 
argue in chapter five that it is necessary also to pay attention to the specificities 
of female bodies which are positioned and controlled in particular ways. I argue, 
too, using N. Chabani Manganyi, that while anatomical differences provide the 
rationale for racism and sexism, the body is also an instrument for resisting 
negative cultural significations. For instance, Caesarina Kana Makhoere 
represents her body as a weapon in her political battle, inside and outside 
prison. 
The prison cell itself is formative of subjectivity as it returns an image of 
criminality and powerlessness to the prisoner. Following the work of human 
geographers in chapter six I argue that space and subjectivity are mutually 
constitutive, as. shown by the way spatial metaphors operate in prison texts. The 
subject can redesign hostile space in order to represent herself. As these texts 
show, relations of viewing are crucial to self-identification: surveillance 
disempowers the prisoner and produces her as a victim, but prisoners have 
recourse to alternative ways of (visually) interacting in order to position the 
.. 
dominators as objects of their gaze, through· speaking and then also through 
writing. 
Elaine Scarry's insights into torture are extended in chapter seven to 
encompass psychological torture and sexual harassment: inflicting bodily 
humiliation, as well as pain, on the body, brings it sharply into focus, making 
speech impossible. By writing testimony and by generating other scenes of 
dialogue through which subjectivity can be constructed (through being looked at 
and looking, through having the message of self affirmed in the other's hearing) 
it is possible to contain, in some way, the horror of detention and to assert a 
measure of control in authoring oneself. For Mashinini this healing dialogue 
must take place within an emotionally and ideologically sympathetic context. 
v 
For those historical subjects who have found themselves without a legally 
valued identity and a platform from which to articulate the challenge of their 
experience, writing a personal narrative may offer an invaluable chance to assert 
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Introduction: Breaking Silences 
Prison discourse operates within a certain obscurity which is as keenly guarded 
as the prisoners themselves. For the prisoner this enforced silence is sinister 
because it carries a particularthreat, both in the silence itself (that is, in the 
danger that is allowed to continue under cover of the protective silence) and in 
the breaking of the silence, for the consequences of speaking out are weighty 
and promise further abuse. 
A recent report by Human Rights Watch on prison conditions in South 
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Africa suggests ·that even in the 'New South Africa' an ominous veil obscures the 
reality of abuse behind locked doors, and that prisoners have recourse to few 
and ineffective means of having their experiences heard and adjudicated without 
fearing vicious reprisals (Brown, et al, 1994). Prisoners are frequently assaulted 
by warders (sometimes fatally); privileges are removed arbitrarily and punitively 
in a manner which contravenes not only the 'standard minimum rules for the 
treatment of prisoners' (adopted by the 'First United Nations Congress on the 
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders' held in Geneva in 1955) but 
the South African prison regulations themselves, as set out in what was originally 
the 'Prisons Act' of 1959, renamed the Correctional Services Act and amended 
as recently as 23 June 1993. The violations of prisoners' bodily integrity occur in 
the shadows and the cost of speaking up - to be heard beyond the heavily 
guarded walls of the prison - is great. 
Cynthia Brown, Bronwen Manby and Joanna Weschler of Human Rights 
Watch write that most prisoners whom they interviewed were reluctant to give 
their testimonies for fear of being victimised as a result (Brown, et al, 1994, 39). 
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Those that. did participate said that they had previously been penalised for 
lodging complaints: 
In Barberton, a prisoner complained that he had been transferred to the 
maximum prison from the medium after going on a hunger strike to protest 
the failure to respond to his requests for a transfer. His books and writing 
materials were confiscated, and he spent some time in the isolation cells. 
On January 22, 1993 he was assaulted by a warder, in front of a superior 
officer, while asking about his security classification. The prisoner made a 
complaint about this treatment, and was told that it was up to the 
commanding officer of the prison to decide whether to bring in the police 
to lay a charge against the warder concerned. At the date of our visit, one 
month later, no action had been taken other than to take a statement from 
the prisoner for the purposes of the disciplinary committee. (Brown, et al, 
1994, 38) 
The prisoner's initial attempts to be heard, from within the penal system, were 
not simply unheeded but punished. Similarly harsh treatment was meted out to 
prisoners claiming political status who went on a hunger strike to demand their 
release along with those identified for amnesty in 1991. In an attempt to 
pressurise the prisoners to end their hunger strike, prisoners were forced to go 
naked for an entire (autumn) night, after which they were locked in the mortuary 
of the prison hospital. The two prisoners who spoke to the researchers were 
released only after 18 and 27 days of hunger strike respectively. Even on 
release, accusations of maltreatment brought by the prisoners were absorbed by 
the bureaucratic labyrinth: 
As a result of this treatment of hunger-striking prisoners, the doctor who 
had been responsible for their treatment was investigated for malpractice 
by the South African Medical Council. In March 1993, the council found 
that there was insufficient evidence to justify a finding of malpractice. 
(Brown, et al, 1994, 41) 
By hearing, then dismissing, the prisooers' claims in the inquest, the official 
investigation gags the prisoners more thoroughly than had there been no 
hearing, for it invalidates.their charges and suppresses the power of their 
critique. 
The most powerful way to condemn a prisoner to silence, of course, is 
through death in detention. While the numerous deaths in detention during the 
years of apartheid rule are legend (the death of Black Consciousness activist 
Steve Biko being perhaps the most widely known) recent incidents are as buried 
in obfuscating officialese and public complacency as the earlier ones. Evidence 
from Prison Conditions in South Africa (Brown, et al, 1994) suggests that the 
official procedures for dealing with an unnatural death in detention (as provided 
for in the Inquest Act) are seldom carried out in full and even when they are, the 
procedures do not ensure impartiality and state accountability. While the law 
demands that an autopsy be carried out, the forensic pathologists are always 
state employees and the requisite inquest is conducted informally, in camera 
(Brown, et al, 1994, 51). The family may appoint an independent doctor, but the 
autopsy may proceed before such a doctor is appointed, which is the case in 90 
percent of inquests (1994, 52). 
Brown, Manby and Weschler argue that inquests are unlikely to expose 
abuse of prisoners and point to the inquest following the death in detention of 
Carol Anne Meyers as a case in point. {Further details of Meyers's detention are 
not provided.) According to Brown, et al, the judge ruled that her death 'was 
caused by "irresponsible and inhuman" conduct of prison officers applying 
restraint under Section 80' (which entitles prison officials to confine unruly 
3 
4 
prisoners but not for the purposes of punishment). Brown, et al, report the 
outcome of the case in this way: 
Meyers died as a result of injuries incurred from being kept in a 
straitjacket for twenty-three hours by warders in Pollsmoor prison. She 
had been placed in a straitjacket after she had threatened to commit 
suicide. The court found that prison regulations had been disregarded in 
applying the restraint, and also that warders had regarded the restraint as 
a punishment [which is illegal]. Both officers involved were promoted after 
the death occurred. (1994, 36) 
The struggle to be heard which prison narratives represent goes beyond 
the attempt to secure a fixed presence which theorists of autobiography have 
critiqued. 1 For the prisoner whose personal and political self has been violated 
through the horror of detention, the process of articulating (and publishing) her 
story may promise a means of validating her story and thus the integrity of her 
subjectivity. To the extent that the horror results from its concealment and the 
sheer powerlessness of the prisoner to speak out, autobiography may offer a 
way of reversing that violation and of objectifying the horror by exposing it to 
public viewing. 
'From her position as writer, Caesarina Kana Makhoere urges that it is 
'important to hear a person's plight' (1989, 73). That is, it is important to be 
heard; the convention of the prison narrative might offer the form when other 
(official) channels have proved biased and hostile. For in telling her story the 
prisoner's control of reality- that is, the representation of reality- is in some 
way reasserted, therapeutically. Her violated and starved body is no longer 
1 See for example Elizabeth Bruss (1976), Jacques Derrida (1974), Leigh Gilmore (1994) and 




condemned to being hidden. When the wounds are exposed (along with the 
wrongfulness with which they were inflicted) healing begins. 
Theorists of autobiography have argued that it is impossible to recapture 
the past simply and accurately. This does not detract from the power of this 
healing mechanism. For while the ability to claim the status of the truth provides 
the authenticity without which the narrative cannot do its restorative work, what is 
at issue ultimately is representational control of reality, not reality itself. 
Language does not have the power radically to undo abuse, for it cannot 
deny the fact of it. What it does offer is a restoration of sorts, although this 
promise of restoring sanity, truth and wholeness will be broken (Laub 1992), 
because the world which is represented through language (and thereby affirmed) 
is a world which has been violated. The truth, as a phenomenon encompassing 
notions of justice and righteousness (as opposed simply to verifiable fact), 
cannot be restored simply through a commitment to attempting an accurate 
representation of events. Nevertheless, Laub argues, there is healing potential 
in the attempt to represent traumatic events 'truthfully': 
Yet it is this very commitment to truth, in a dialogic context and with an 
authentic listener, which allows for a reconciliation with the broken 
promise, and which makes the resumption of life, in spite of the failed 
promise, at all possible. (Laub 1992, 91) 
What is repossessed through the act of writing is a semblance of authority 
in the construction of self and world. However, the contexts within which prison 
narratives are written differ; the freedom to break the silence is not safeguarded, 
nor is control in representing the world necessarily within reach. When Ruth 
First published her account of being detained in South African prisons, it was not 
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long after she had left the country without a passport, never to return. Even 
while writing she did not believe herself to be free from the pervasive power of 
the South African intelligence network and certainly many fellow activists whom 
her narrative might have incriminated were not. It was her conviction that 'it was 
not the end, that they would come again' (1965, 144). Emma Mashinini, too, is 
unable to shake off a debilitating fear that she is being followed, that anything 
she says would be heard and reported. Her autobiography, Strikes Have 
Followed Me All My Life: A South African Autobiography (1989), was written in a 
similar context in which political opposition was repressed. The Nationalist 
Government's change of approach which resulted in the release of Nelson 
Mandela and the unbanning of resistance organisations in South Africa was to 
occur in early 1990. 
After discussing the bombing in May 1987 of Khotso House (the offices of 
various anti-apartheid.organisations) Mashinini reflects on the violent nature of 
apartheid repression: 
This is the kind of violence which surrounds the apartheid regime. This is 
the kind of society we live in - a society where children disappear, where 
mothers go from prison to prison to try and find their children, where some 
of those picked up by the troops or the police are as young as eleven 
years old.... The horror of South Africa is that the life of a black person is 
very cheap. (123) 
The struggle against political obscurity is a markedly physical struggle. 
The debilitating fear which is instilled in dissidents such as Mashinini is a fear of 
physical reprisal. The regime's response to political opposition is to whip, detain 
or even to kill off activists or suspected activists. (The word 'activist' itself attests 
to the centrality of physical expressions in political opposition.) 
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Word and body are profoundly interrelated: it is considered appropriate for 
the state to respond to political opposition with physical confinement. Equally, 
the struggle for political recognition is a bodily struggle. The converse is also 
true: oppositional writing offers itself as a powerful response to the physical 
subjection of detention. The fight for control over representations of history is 
waged on the level of the body. Slick criminological discourses cannot hide this. 
The war against opposition in apartheid South Africa certai.nly was a war about 
bodies - where they lived, where they ate, who they slept with, how they 
behaved. Detention without trial was one of the key instruments of repression in 
South Africa, for it attempted to smother spoken resistance (even that which 
might have surfaced in the controlled environment of a legal trial). 
Detention without trial has a long history in South Africa and in fact has not 
yet been outlawed (although this is likely to change once it has been dealt with 
by the recently established Constitutional Court). It was supported by a series of 
statutes which formed part of the state security legislation. The so-called 90-day 
detention clause (section 17 of General Law Amendment Act 37 of 1963) 
provided for the detention without trial of people thought to have committed or be 
about to commit a political offence, or anyone who was thought to have any 
information regarding an offence. The statute was alarmingly vague in· its 
definition of such an offence (based on the Suppression of Communism Act 44 of 
1950) and granted vast discretionary powers to the police with respect to the 
conditions under which detainees could be held. From 1965 onwards detainees 
could be held for 180 days in solitary confinement (under section 215 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act 56 of 1965). No courts had jurisdiction over detainees 
held under this provision. Thereafter, the Terrorism Act (83 of 1967) placed no 
time limit on detention without trial. 'Section 6' detainees could be held 
indefinitely until they had answered questions to the satisfaction of the security 
police who had full discretion. In 1982 all security legislation was brought under 
the Internal Security Act (74). Don Foster and Diane Sandler, writing in 1985, 
argue that the detention of political dissidents forms a part of the 'highly 
repressive state measures'. 
Oppositional writing may go some y.;ay towards withstanding such 
measures, by breaking the silence enforced on dissidents in detention where 
abuses go unchecked and where s/he who has been violated is unable to resist. 
But the horror of detention could almost be said to speak for itself; the force of 
written testimony lies simply in exposing the fact of (bodily and political) abuse to 
the harsh light of day: 
The woman lies on the wet cement floor 
under the unending light, 
needle marks on her arms putthere 
to kill the brain 
and wonders why she is dying. 
She is dying because she said. 
She is dying for the sake of the word. 
It is her body, silent 
and fingerless, writing this poem. 2 
2 




1. Subject-Positions in South African ~utobiographies and Prison 
Narratives. 
South African autobiography is burdened with the task of producing history in the 
light of the silences imposed on lived history and oppositional ideology by 
Verwoerdian apartheid. In addition, I have said that prison writing counteracts 
other, more threatening, silences (such as the ban on public disclosure of prison 
conditions enforced by the Prisons Act of 1959). 3 
The autobiographical model commonly ascribed to in western literary 
traditions, therefore, does not adequately accommodate trends in 
autobiographical texts produced in South Africa. It must be said, however, that 
descriptions of common characteristics are best proposed with great 
circumspection. Judith Coullie draws attention to Paul de Man's 'denunciation of 
the continued use of generic categories in analysis' (Coullie 1991, 3). I, too, am 
reluctant to indulge in too many generalising pronouncements on the nature of 
autobiography in South Africa, both because of the specific scope of this thesis 
and because I believe thatthe urge to sort literary texts into categories based on 
similarities results all too frequently in overlooking significant differences. In 
addition, categories tend to recreate themselves by imposing significations on 
texts, in what becomes directed reading. Coullie is circumspect when she 
suggests common features in South African autobiographical texts: 
While generalisations carry thei( own·dangers,.it can be observed that 
. introspective, highly personal autobiographical writing in contemporary 
South Africa is so uncommon (there are some notable exceptions) as to 
3 See Don Foster with Diane Sandler and Dennis Davis (1987, 172). 
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be almost definitive of the genre in its absence. It seems to me that this i~ 
indicative of the fact that a great many South African autobiographical 
works have a political agenda. (1991, 15) 
The proliferation of texts and documentaries attests both to a desire to contribute 
one's story (and that of the group with whom one identifies) to the annals of 
history and, as Coullie comments, to the current desire on the part of the reading 
public for access to accounts of experiences previously obscured (through white 
domination of the media and educational institutions within South Africa and 
through the cultural boycott of South Africa internationally): 
Autobiographical texts by South Africans are being published in ever 
greater numbers in South Africa and abroad in response to perceptions of 
greater interest amongst a wide range of readers. Experiences of South 
Africans have acquired particular topicality of late. (1991, 2) 
Many of the autobiographies published recently in South Africa imply (or 
declare) that they are representative of a history larger than that of the individual 
author. A glance at the titles and subtitles of the four narratives which form the focus 
of this study bears this out. The 'me' and 'my' of Emma Mashinini's title (Strikes 
Have Followed Me All My Life) quickly gives way to the indefinite article in her 
subtitle (A South African Autobiography) so that her account is offered as typical or 
at least indicative of South African experience more broadly (1989). Caesarina 
Kana Makhoere's title elides her presence entirely in favour of her context: No 
Child's Play: In Prison Under Apartheid (1988). Ruth First's title is il')triguingly 
specific, even clipped, and the Bloomsbury edition represents the vertical figures 
of the title dramatically within prison bars. The stark 117 Days indicates both the . 
focus of her narrative and, by implication, the particular horror of that time, 
whereas the subtitle (which does not appear on the cover) is suggestive of a 
documentary-like representation, with its reference to legislation: An Account of 
Confinement and Interrogation under the South African Ninety-Day Detention Law 
(1965). First too, then, draws on what Coullie describes as 'features of 
I 
journalistic practice' commonly employed in South African autobiography in 
establishing the trustworthiness of her tale (1991, 15). First is not consistent in 
this, however, for in the narrative itself she weaves in representations of 
complicated self-scrutiny along with reports of the experiences of others, 
italicised to distinguish them from her own. 
Maggie Resha asserts, first, her African identity in her title: 'Mangoana 0 
Tsoara Thipa Ka Bohaleng: My Life in the Struggle (1991 ). Resha translates and 
explains the Sotho proverb-well into the narrative-which gives her book its title. 
'The mother grabs the sharp edge of the knife to protect her child' is 'the story of the 
bravery of a woman' (123). Her identity as an African mother and woman is thus 
privileged, and Resha's point in the text is that the mothers are not simply to be 
subsumed by the broader concerns of history (or passed over).4 She is writing a 
history of the women, the brave women (such as herself): 
The story I want to tell here is the one about the contribution of the women 
to the anti-pass law campaigns of my time, since their story is very 
special, and because no story of the liberation struggle can be complete 
without highlighting their particular participation. (110) 
Resha thus points to an anxiety which is returned to throughout this thesis and 
which provides the rationale for its focus on women, particularly. For where 
4 See Dorothy Driver (1990) and Desiree Lewis (1992) for a fuller discussion of self-construction 
as 'mother' in autobiographical texts by black women. 
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women have not had access to authority and where their experience of detention 
has been harrowing in ways not experienced by men, it seems that their turning 
to writing is that much more remarkable - and fraught with difficulties and 
anxieties - than a subject who is assured of his/her right to speak. 
But Resha's bold focus on women is difficult to maintain when the task of 
representing a broader history demands to be addressed (although this task of 
'documenting' history may also appear to provide a certain legitimacy to a narrative 
which also includes, less obviously, the stories of women). For the 'documentary' 
task all too quickly eclipses the focus on women. For instance, in her brief subtitle 
Resha appears to be foregrounded, herself, but in fact she has circumscribed her 
life's story within that of 'the struggle'. The reader might expect that she will primarily 
be concerned with representing (anti-apartheid) history. Her text bears this out, for 
on a number of occasions she explicitly draws the reader's attention to the history-
producing function of her book which gives only brief account of her childhood in the 
Eastern Cape and her nursing career before concentrating energetically on her 
involvement in the ANC alongside her husband Robert. His story becomes a central 
part of the book, with its inclusion of his writing (about the Rivonia Trial particularly) 
and the letters and speeches of others about him. 
The role of writing is not simply to highlight her part in the liberation struggle, 
but to record the events, and the many sacrifices made, for future generations: 
For us, who are former residents of Sophiatown, it is important that we 
write the story of the township, so that coming generations should not be 
given distorted history about the resistance of their people. The whole 
history of South Africa has been so distorted that one cannot be surprised 
when, in a few years time, the white regime, which is well-known for its 
deception, will be writing books that Sophiatown was moved because the 
Africans wanted to move, like they have said that African men like to live 
in compounds without their families, and that they want to carry passes. 
1 
We want the younger generations to know of the sacrifices and sufferings 
of men, women, and children who woke up one morning to find the 
township looking like a place under siege. (Resha 65) 
In his article, 'The Ontological Status of Self in Auto-biography: The Case of 
Bloke Modisane's Blame Me On History', Thengani H. Ngwenya writes that 'self-
13 
analysis in black South African autobiographies is intricately linked with historical 
documentation' (1989). One reviewer of Resha's autobiography suggests that 
her book is specifically read as 'history'. In his article, 'Living History', printed in 
the monthly magazine, Learn and Teach, Saul Molobi says this of Resha: 'It is 
said that some people make history, and others write it. Maggie Resha does 
both' (1992, 3). The distinction is not one many theorists of autobiography would 
support, but it indicates an acceptance of personal narratives as 'history'. 
Molobi stresses another point in praise of Resha: her book is 'also 
important because it is not a selfish account of one person. It is also the story of 
dedicated people such as "Uncle JS" and Lillian [sic] Ngoyi, who did not have the 
chance to write about their life in the struggle' (1992, 3). Molobi's disapproval of 
individualised testimony is striking and confirms what J.U. Jacobs argues with 
regard to prison memoirs, many of which include the 'stories' of other prisoners: 
'the authors' singularity has been subsumed into the depersonalised plurality of 
political prisoners and ... their authority is communal' (1991 a, 195): Resha's 
authority is based on her representativeness, but she uses her position as 
spokesperson to highlight the role of the women particularly whom she fears will 
be forgotten. 
Margaret Daymond quotes the African saying, 'I am because we are, and 
since we are, therefore I am', Which, she argues, 'offers a very different basis for 
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selfhood from the singularity, the uniqueness, that is emphasised in western 
cultural traditions' (1993, 25). When writing-· as a woman - into what could be 
a fearful void of scepticism and indifference, and thus claiming an uncertain 
subject position, the task of representing history itself may appear to carry 
greater weight and legitimacy than an individual's story which may seem more 
likely to be dismissed. Resha highlights the gravity of her task in this way: it is 
'important that we write the story of the township' so that younger generations 
will know of the sacrifices made. In her own bid to be heard, Resha constructs 
herself and those who are part of the group of men and women of whom she 
writes as forebears and in so doing represents succeeding generations as 
unaware and in need of teaching. 5 Resha's emphasis of this role bespeaks an 
uncertain relation to authority which necessitates that her self-construction takes 
place, first, in the context of a larger story and, second, within a community. 
Sindiwe Magana conceives of her task similarly, announcing it boldly in her title, 
To My Children's Children (1990). For in the perception of having greater 
legitimacy, a greater assertiveness is also made available. 
For Audre Larde, an African American poet and writer, writing or 
speaking(out) is represented as a moral obligation: 
I have a duty to speak the truth as I see it and to share not just my 
triumphs, not just the things that felt good, but the pain, the intense, often 
unmitigating pain .... If what I have to say is wrong, then there will be some 
woman who will stand up and say Audre Larde was in error. But my words 
will be there .... 6 (emphasis added) 
5 
See Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1988) for an incisive critique of the unacknowledged interests 
which accompany literary representations of others, even in what appear to be oppositional texts. 
6 
Audre Larde· is quoted by Mari Evans (1984, 261). 
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A second feature of the act of writing emerges in her statement, for it implies that 
writing promises a stable presence. There is a strong sense of personal 
investment in her 'words', which act as a form of proxy: if 'what I have to say is 
wrong' then people will say 'Audre Larde was in error'. But she is not disturbed 
by this possibility. It makes her more defiant. She cannot be dismissed nor can 
her (previous) presence be glossed over, for her words will 'be there' to testify to 
her existence. 
The corollary to the thought that 'words' can stand for presence is that at a 
time prior to speaking, a presence existed to give a context to what was said. 
Autobiographical writing ascribes to itself this presence most assertively, 
promising in its very name the immediacy of firsthand disclosure of life 
experience. There is a certain investment of 'truth' in the notion of firsthand 
experience, if only in the claim to have 'been there'. 
However, the suggestion (implicit in the convention of autobiography) that 
a writer has access to her/his life in order to represent it in language has been 
refuted by critics of autobiography.7 Poststructuralist notions of selfhood and 
representation have called into question readers' expectations that_ a firsthand 
account of a life could reproduce that life, making accessible an unfiltered and 
immediate presence. The complications of representation mediate to produce a 
new text which is inevitably removed, to some degree, from the life that was. 
Nancy K. Miller (1988), however, has argued that to insist on the unreliability of 
autobiography is to re-enact yet another silencing for women autobiographers who 
have historically been denied access to authority. 
7 See, for example, Sidonie Smith (1987) and Leigh Gilmore (1994). 
It seems crucial to recognise that all experience is necessarily articulated 
in a posterior interpretative moment: Sidonie Smith describes autobiography as 
'an interpretation of an earlier experience that can never. be divorced from the 
filterings of subsequent experience or storytelling' (1987, 45). In describing 
autobiography as an 'act' as opposed to a form, Elizabeth Bruss stresses the 
moment of writing rather than the earlier moment which is the subject of the text. 
For writing produces the life (in print); it does not merely arrange events in 
sequence. Autobiography can never be a simple linguistic ordering of the 
substantive or 'factual' content of a life story. Rather, it is an act of ascribing 
meaning ('now', at the moment of writing) to an earlier moment or to a younger 
self. Smith describes autobiography in this way: 
[It is] an interpretation of life that invests the past and the 'self with 
coherence and meaning that may not have been evident before the act of 
writing itself. (Smith 1987, 45) 
Gayatri Spivak expresses a similar thought: 'No one can quite articulate 
the space she herself inhabits. My attempt has been to describe this relatively 
ungraspable space in terms of what might be its history' (1990, 68). Taking a 
lead from Spivak, the aim of this thesis will be to consider the historical and 
political significance of the act of writing a 'personal history' of imprisonment and 
of constituting oneself as a linguistic subject after the brutal silencing of 
detention. Ultimately the text must stand as a document separate from its 
author, 'susceptible to a history larger than that of the writer, reader, teacher. In 
that scene of writing, the authority of the author, however down-to-earth, must be 
content to stand in the wings' (Spivak 1987, 268). 
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It is for this reason that I choose not to dwell on the banal debate over 
whether or not autobiographers are able to represent the past accurately. It is 
assumed that an author is unable fundamentally to know and 're-present' herself . 
(or make herself present again). Francis R. Hart has argued that the 
'unreliability' of autobiography is 'an inescapable condition' (1970, 492) in 
reading autobiography. This is not to refute the role of truth in autobiography, for 
it distinguishes the autobiographical narrative from other stories which can easily 
be dismissed as 'a fiction'. For the subject whose access to (political) authority 
and credibility is not assured, the truth acts as a guarantee of sorts. But the truth 
asserted in personal narratives is a negotiated truth, as dependent on the 
expectations of the reader as on the integrity of the author. 
What interests me is the particular significances and difficulties 
surrounding the act of representing oneself in language and of constituting 
oneself as a political subject. In relatior:i to African American women writers 
Houston Baker draws attention to the political significance (and difficulties) of 
constituting oneself as subject: 
The quest for subjecthood in what seemed to turn-of-the-century black 
women writers a new era of freedom was not a simple matter, and the 
search for an effective historical embodiment of the black-woman-as-
subject was equally problematic. Standing under the whiteman's historic 
burden of concubinage and the silence enforced where such matters were 
concerned, black women creators were hard-pressed for a credible 
subject position. (Baker 1_991, 32; emphasis in original) 
Two issues arising from his statement require further discussion for the purposes 
of my project. First, the category of 'black-woman-as-subject' must be seen to be 
fixed only in the sense that it represents a designated political category of which 
individual subjects are free to invoke membership. One can never apply enough 
caution when dealing with the possible essentialism of category-assignment. 
When the constructedness of subject categories is acknowledged those terms 
are immediately freed for deeper, more fruitful analysis which is less dogmatic 
and repressive of identity and meaning. As chapter five will argue at great 
length, bodies, or at least the ways in which they are read and positioned in 
culture, provide the. rationale for politically distinct categories of identity. 
Although arbitrarily invoked and linguistically constructed, bodily differences are 
accorded great significance as indicators of psychical and political identity. 
It seems more useful to read gender in terms of the positions taken up by 
, 
or allowed to the subject as opposed to anything more positivistically verifiable. 
Specifically concerned with the question of 'self in relation to feminism, Sandra 
Kemp puts forward 'a view of gender not as anatomy, but as a position from 
which one might speak. (So, "hegemonic"/"marginal" may be more useful terms 
than "male"/"female")' (Kemp 1990, 100). Monique Wittig's controversial 
definition is similarly relational. For her the distinguishing feature of women's 
identity and experience is a relationship of disempowerment and obligation 
which can be verified through reference not to biology but material conditions of 
oppression, that is, not genital differences between women and men, but the way 
women's bodies are positioned in service of men's desire: 
For what makes a woman is a specific social relation to a man, a relation 
that we have previously called servitude, a relation which implies personal 
and physical obligation as well as economic obligation ('forced residence,' 
domestic corvee, conjugal duties, unlimited production of children, etc.), a 
relation which lesbians escape by refusing to become or to stay 
heterosexual. (Wittig 1981, 53) 
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Although not concerned in the same way with relations of power and material 
conditions, Jacques Lacan speaks of gender as determined by one's position as 
subject or object of desire, that 'as is true for all women ... the problem of [Dora's] 
condition is fundamentally that of accepting herself as an object of desire for the 
man' (1982, 68). 
These formulations seem helpful in that they free identity from rigid 
configurations based on a system of exclusions and inclusions determined with 
reference to anatomy. They draw attention to the fact that it is not sexual 
difference as such, but the meanings attributed to sexual difference that bear the 
rationale for the marginalisation of women. 
Even here I think one should be cautious about assuming a universally 
experienced disempowerment among women. One cannot be too vigilant in 
qualifying categories and in insisting, as Gayatri Spivak does, that 'the colonized 
subaltern subject is irretrievably heterogeneous' ( 1988, 284 ). While categories 
may be usefully invoked, they obscure a multitude of differences. For example, 
Ellen Kuzwayo's glib, surprisingly dismissive reference to 'the home-help' (1985, 
135) and 'the peasant community' (148) cannot sustain her assertive use of the 
category of .'black women' who, as an apparently unified class, have resisted 
apartheid with strength (241 ). 
Judith Butler discusses critically the 'identity politics' which creates a 
subject in order to arrive at emancipation: 
The question of 'the subject' is crucial for politics, and for feminist politics 
in particular, because juridical subjects are invariably produced through 
certain exclusionary practices that do not 'show' once the juridical 
structure of politics has been established. (1990, 2) 
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It is necessary always to ask of political categories, what difference is being 
overlooked, who is being excluded? A deep suspicion or at very least a 
circumspection in considering any social category is essential. 
There is a fundamental distinction between the conservative gestures through 
which categories are socially entrenched and the process of ascribing to oneself an 
empowering position as subject. The desire to achieve self-definition and political 
recognition on the part of a marginalised subject cannot be equated with an 
oppressive denial of autonomy justified in terms of difference. What is called for, 
then, is a commitment to interrogating categories and relations. As Jane Gallop has 
proposed, identity 'must be continually assumed and immediately called into 
question' (1982, xii). Discursive categories are not rendered meaningless when their 
inner workings have been demystified. 
To interrogate categories need not be to shatter a potentially empowering 
oppositional stance. Butler goes on to say of the category of 'women' that the 
'assumption of its essential incompleteness permits that category to serve as a 
permanently available site of contested meanings' (1990, 14) making space for a 
radical questioning of social dominance which depends upon totalising linguistic 
gestures. But for the embattled subject who feels the insecurity of her access to 
an authoritative subject position, the luxury of self-scrutiny and of interrogating 
identities may be unavailable, or too dangerous an indulgence. 
-
Caesarina Kona Makhoere, author of No Child's Play: In Prison Under 
Apartheid, relies to some degree on an unquestioned unity between herself and 
her comrades in her prison narrative (1988). It is significant, for example, that 
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the plural pronoun 'we' is commonly used in preference to the singular 'I'. Their 
shared identity as black women prisoners (more so than as fellow activists) 
marks the strength of their resistance. Disunity or even difference from her self-
identified group threatens to undermine the authority of ~er own position as 
subject. 
Nancy K. Miller has called for caution in applying postmodernist reading 
strategies to texts by women because 'women have not had the same historical 
relation of identity to origin, institution, production that men have had': 
The postmodernist decision that the Author is Dead and the subject along 
with him does not, I will argue, necessarily hold for women, and 
prematurely forecloses the question of agency for them. (1988, 106) 
Miller's caution is worth hearing for it draws attention to the contexts of power 
relations within which writing takes place. But there is a danger in establishing a 
different set of reading methodologies which proscribe careful analysis of 
linguistic constructions for fear of re-enacting the disempowerment of a 
marginalised subject. First, I do not believe that criticism empowers or 
disempowers. Second, the historical tensions within which a writer such as 
Makhoere encodes her challenge to hegemony are of great relevance for 
oppositional politics which are not crippled by critical rigour. A sympathetic 
reading will recognise the particular constraints and struggles which produce a 
text of this nature. 
Baker understands the 'quest for subjecthood' for the 'black-woman-as-
subject' as a 'quest' for recognition, that is, for 'an effective historical 
embodiment' of herself as subject, and for a 'credible subject position' (1991, 32). 
For Makhoere the battle for recognition as a political subject must be waged from 
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within an (undivided) community, constructed self-consciously in her narrative. 
Her text cannot indulge in acknowledgements of vulnerability or self-doubt which 
would distinguish her from the body of the oppressed; personal concerns are 
dismissed as individualistic. There is a certain poignancy in this (although at 
times the text encourages little else other than indignation). When the struggle 
for recognition is urgent (the 'possession' of self insecure), probing questions 
which may expose vulnerabilities and precarious solidarities are all the more 
threatening to incipient articulations of subjecthood. It has to be said that my 
own expectations of an autobiographical text, as a white middle-class academic, 
are influenced by having read, for the most part, in a western tradition where 
notions of selfhood shun dogmatism in favour of post-Freudian scrutiny of 
subjectivity. 
The writer's own (complicated) relation to articulated selfhood and 
authority has been the focus of this discussion. A second focus is integral to the 
conceptualisation of writing as a means to political recognition: the role of the 
intangible 'reader' or 'critic' whose imagined presence grants recognition to the 
writer in becoming a ('credible' or 'authentic') subject. The authorising role of the 
reader will be discussed at length in the following chapter. For the purposes of 
this discussion it is important to note that the process of asserting oneself as a 
subject in language, a subject of history, is not unambiguously empowering. The 
'contract' between writer and reader, in which the reader is appealed to (as Jean-
Paul Sartre puts it) renders the writer dependent on the reader for the completion 
of his/her creation of identity: 
Since the creation can find its fulfilment only in reading, since the artist 
must entrust to another the job of carrying out what he has begun, since it 
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is only through the consciousness of the reader that he can regard himself 
as essential to his work, all literary work is an appeal. (Sartre 1967, 32) 
Stated differently, the power of entering language carries with it the 
disempowering facet of being exposed to judgement by the other to whom one 
addresses oneself and in whose terms one articulates one('s)self: 
What I seek in the Word is the response of the other. What constitutes 
me as subject is my question. In order to be recognized by the other, I 
utter what was only in view of what will be. In order to find him, I call him 
by a name which he must assume or refuse in order to reply to me. I 
identify myself in Language, but only by losing myself in it like an object. 
(1967, 63) 
For Michel Foucault, too, control does not ultimately rest with the author: 
[T]he agency of domination does not reside in the one who speaks (for it 
is he who is constrained), but in the one who listens and says nothing; not 
in the one who knows and answers, but in the one who questions and is 
not supposed to know. (1978, 62) 
The subject in language is vulnerable, appealing to a capricious reader for 
acknowledgement. 
For those who have remained outside of the discourse of published 
literature, and whose experiences as part of a group or class have been 
excluded from formal, written history, autobiography may present a feasible 
option to assert a hitherto unacknowledged subjecthood and to challenge the 
prejudices and exclusions of received 'textbook' history. For detainees whose 
histories and identities have been violated through the discourses of 
imprisonment, writing may promise a means to regain self-identity and release 
themselves from the horror of detention and isolation. Ann Rosalind Jones, 
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writing about autobiographical texts, suggests that the writers are promised an 
opportunity to resist the 'assignment' to 'a negative position in culture' (as 
'criminals' for the purposes of this discussion) by becoming 'subject[s] in 
discourse' as opposed to remaining 'subject[s] of discourse' (1986, 132). But in 
so doing, they enter a sort of double bind by relinquishing their texts to 
patriarchal scrutiny, and by declaring their participation in that discourse and in 
what Sidonie Smith calls the 'ideology of individualism' (1987, 52). Smith quotes 
Julia Kristeva, who argues that an autobiographer 'raises herself to the symbolic 
stature of her father' (Kristeva 1977, 28) when she 'opts for the scenario of public 
achievement' and 'justifies her claim to membership in the world of words' (Smith 
1987, 52). 'She assumes the adventurous posture of man' (52) which then 
allows the assumption that (all) women may do so. 
Having said this, it is necessary to move away from the paralysing sense 
of futility, both as writer and critic, which may accompany a discussion regarding 
the unavoidably fraught arena of language. To recognise, as critic, the interests 
and contradictory postures assumed by writers is not to undermine the 
significance of the act of writing, nor necessarily to negate the potential 
challenge within the text. Houston Baker rejects what he sees as a nihilistic 
critical approach: 
Rather than taking refuge from the logical paradox thus presented in 
paralyzing skepticism or solipsistic idealism, we can simply take the 
stance 'nevertheless it moves'. That is to say, while we will have to 
qualify all claims to the absolute, and certainly to absolute and objectively 
valid 'truth', we may nevertheless note that our phenomenological 
investigations move us beyond the tedious cleverness of skeptical 
'reading' that takes comfort in a commitment to absolutely 'nothing'. (1991, 
60) 
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As to the inevitable ambiguity of language and the impossibility of ever securing 
authority, I would suggest that a more helpful analysis would not ignore but move 
beyond the fallibility of the articulating subject to explore the tensions and 
challenges of that position, of speaking 'as one who is both of the prevailing 
discourse, and on the outskirts of it' (Smith 1987, 49). Possibly the most 
engaging task of a critic might be to analyse attempts to negotiate apparent 
expectations, desires, tensions and contradictions within any given text, and to 
comment on the significance for the critical institution. 
In the movement towards articulating a self-history and coming into 
'constitutionality' where previously there was silence, the tensions are likely to be· 
immense, the promise of recognition only problematically fulfilled, if at all. 
Gayatri Spivak's work deals in part with the process - and difficulties - of 
coming to 'constitutionality', that is, articulating oneself as a subject, and the fact 
that entering language brings with it the added burden of becoming part of 
society whose discourse further marginalised women. Writing {or language more 
generally) produces the subject as·much as she produces her text. 8 By 
establishing herself as a subject through the act of writing the autobiographer 
occupies the ambiguous position of being both subject and object, creator and 
creation in language: 
Trying to tell the story she wants to tell about herself, she is seduced into 
a tantalizing and yet elusive adventure that makes of her both creator and 
creation, writer and that which is written about. (Smith 1987, 46) 
8 See, for example, Spivak's interview with Elizabeth Grosz in The Post-Colonial Critic: 
Interviews. Strategies. Dialogues (1990, 1-16). 
Autobiography offers a writer the opportunity of exerting control over her public 
identity, although in Sartre's terms this can only ever be an 'appeal' to an 
unknown and unknowable readership to continue the process of creating her 
identity. The writer merely 'sets up' the 'landmarks' for the reader, who 'must go 
beyond them' (Sartre 1967, 31 ). 'In short,' he argues, 'reading is directed 
creation'. Smith suggests that for women writers the relationship to a reader is 
'particularly troubled' (Smith 1987, 49), more especially so when risking the 
'public self-disclosure' which autobiography entails (48). In Sartre's terms, one 
might say that the 'appeal' is that much more urgent as the risk, or the cost, of 
disclosure is that much greater. 
Elizabeth Bruss has also pointed out that one's identity 'is composed not 
I 
only by acts of self-perception but by "other-perception" as well' (Bruss 1976, 
13).
9 
But the 'other' is never a single, coherent entity. Particularly where the act 
of writing is in itself transgressive of social laws, a writer's consciousness of the 
multifarious disapproving responses is all the more likely to be acute. This may 
be particularly true for women prisoners, criminality being a slur which further 
marginalises women, specifically, making it all the more difficult to adopt a 
credible subject position. Smith argues that the urgency of her appeal is 
apparent in the 'speaking posture' of women writers (52): 
[T]he autobiographer reveals in her speaking posture and narrative 
structure her understanding of the possible readings she will receive from 
a public that has the power of her reputation in its hands.... Often, 
projecting multiple readers with multiple sets of expectations, she 
responds in .a complex double-voicedness, a fragile heteroglossia of her 
own, which calls forth charged dramatic exchanges and narrative 
9 
Bruss quotes H. Phillipson Laing's term, 'other-perception', explained in Interpersonal 
Perception (1966, 5-6). 
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strategies.... Always, then, she is absorbed in a dialogue with her reader, 
that 'other' through whom she is working to identify herself and to justify 
her decision to write about herself in a genre that is man's. (48, 50) 
The 'historical bases for [the] right to subjecthood' clearly had to (and has to) be 
fought for, despite the limitation of doing so through language. Houston Baker 
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discusses the decision to write arrived at by seventeenth-century slave narrators, 
and in particular Frederick Douglass, who was, says Baker, 'quick to realize that 
it was only through engagement with the public, symbolic order that he would be 
able to venture statements that would come legitimately to be defined as in/on 
the slaves' liberational behalf (Baker 1991, 14). However, when discussing the 
movement of 'Black Power' in the United States as part of a challenging, 
alternative form of writing and ·criticism for Black Americans, Baker questions the 
potential of (specifically) historical discourse to incorporate alternative 
narratives, and to be changed by them. He asks, '[h]ow many historical facts, 
examples, out-of-print texts will suffice radically to alter the rhetorical power 
ratios between Afro-American's traditions [sic] and those of a white, theoretically 
dominant cohort?' (1991, 18). 
Can the text under focus, then, or any text, act as a potent challenge to 
that which has been received as fact, or history, in its articulation of an 
alternative 'history', based on personal experience when it is constrained by the 
conventions and demands of truth-producing discourses? Joyce Sikakane's A 
Window on Soweto seems to integrate almost imperceptibly a documentary-like, 
informative narrative of life in Soweto and a narrative which involves the author's 
own experience. The two are often not clearly distinguishable which raises 
important questions about the techniques or strategies necessarily adopted in 
'history-producing' texts of which I believe autobiography to be a part. The role 
of personal memory seems to work both to authenticate and to bring to the 
narrative a necessary vitality and interest not often expected in strictly 'historical' 
documents. 
William L. Andrews, writing about nineteenth-century slave narratives in 
the United States, speaks of the need for 'authenticating devices' in 
autobiography and of the pressure on autobiographers to 'invent devices and 
strategies that would endow their stories with the appearance of authenticity' 
(1986, 2) because the 'skeptical public would believe nothing but documentable 
fact in a slave narrative' (5). Similarly, the degree to which an autobiographiccil 
narrative of a black South African woman might be received as a credible and 
even historical account might depend on the extent to which it mimics a piece of 
historical writing. The task of a critic would then be, in part, to consider the 
constraints placed on the writer, and to see those constraints as an aspect of the 
writing itself, for they are utilised by the writer and incorporated into the narrative 
project in an effort to have her history heard and believed. 
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2. The Dynamic of Interrogation in Prison Narratives: the Position of the 
Reader in the Reconstruction of the Subject 
In a challenging indictment of the structures of law and language, Phyllis Naidoo 
asserts, 'Yes, laws make criminals out of mothers and babies' (Schreiner 1992, 
101 ). For those denounced as criminals, law - as opposed to being a language 
of entitlement and security - becomes a brutally 'impartial' language through 
which the self is rewritten in its own harsh, criminalising terms. Paul Gready 
writes: 
[Through] interrogation, legislation, the political trial and prison 
regulations the prisoner was rigorously and violently rewritten. The 
written self created was unrecognisable and unwanted and a testimony to 
powerlessness. The word became a duplicitous lie beyond the prisoner's 
control. ( 1993, 492) 
And yet, by way of challenge, language may equally offer a means of 
countering the alien and ravaged version of self that the language of 'Law and 
Order' has thrust forward. In particular, autobiography provides a model - an 
admittedly limited one, constrained by its own convention and language, but a 
model nonetheless - to counter-write that which is forcibly imprinted through the 
'vocabulary' of imprisonment. Those interrogated are made to defend a 
criminalised identity, through means both aggressive and subtle, threatening 
confusion and self-alienation. For some, such as Emma Mashinini, the foreign 
version of the self is (almost) internalised even while it is despised and rejected. 
For a writer such as Caesarina Kana Makhoere (who is only interrogated, in the 
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narrow sense of the word at the beginning of her detention, before being 
sentenced) her resistance armoury is (almost) never allowed to slip. 
To take up the pen is to pursue the promise (which can never be 
satisfactorily fulfilled) that a new assertion of self will be acknowledged. Gready 
speaks of the 'rival "powers of writing"': 
While prisoners had little or no control over the manner in which they 
were captured and fixed in official writing, other written forms, from 
scratched messages on cell walls to the writing of autobiographical 
accounts, provided a way of regaining control. (1993, 492) 
It seems necessary to temper Gready's enthusiasm for 'the rival powers of 
writing' with a bit of poststructuralist pragmatism; that is to say, that while one 
acknowledges that there is undoubtedly power in the written word it is ill-advised 
to assume that oppositional writing works only to re-empower, for it may also 
position the subject inflexibly, oppressively. (For example, Emma Mashinini tries 
desperately to erase the scratches on her cell wall because they represent the 
horror of her supposed criminality.) As to the notion of the 'power of writing', 
Michel Foucault offers this word of caution: 'the turning of real lives into writing is 
no longer a procedure of heroization; it functions as a procedure of 
objectification and subjection' (1977a, 192). This is exemplified in the writing on 
the wall, classic signifier of prison existence, which both releases the prisoner 
from the confines of enforced a-literacy and produces her as criminal. 
The subversive potential of language does not lie in dogmatic assertions 
of authority but through invitations to new and challenging meanings. While 
language is the locus in which supremacy in power relations is played out, so too 
may it be an instrument with which to undermine hegemony. Such challenge 
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may be extracted, as an elixir, in the process of interpretation. When the text is 
read 'against the grain' its potential to unsettle meaning is released. However, 
some texts stand more obviously as a challenge: it is in the marginality of the 
scratches on the prison walls, its 'otherness' that its offence to the totalising, 
criminalising discourse of the prison, and hence its subversive power, is located. 
For J. U. Jacobs the prison confession itself provides the form for a 
restructuring and a reas~erting of the self. There are significant similarities 
between prison confession and writing: autobiography involves a self-
interrogation of sorts. There is a disclosure of the writer's 'real' self to another 
mimicking confession itself, where the all-important notion of 'the truth' marks the 
specific value of the exchange (as opposed to fictional narratives which may 
have value as entertainment or philosophy). Using Dennis A Foster, Jacobs 
lays bare the parallels between autobiography's confessional stance and the 
scene of interrogation in prison, arguing that a confessional narrative 'involves a 
narrator disclosing a secret knowledge to another, as a speaker to a listener, 
writer to reader, confessor to confessor' (Dennis A Foster 1987, 2): 10 
In each of these South African prison memoirs the first-person narrator 
recounts the deconstruction of his own world and language by a whole 
range of physical and psychological stressors, up to the point where the 
compulsions to confess provide the very means of restructuring the self, 
and the interrogator's devices for destroying the language of the victim 
become the victim's strategies for self-creation. (Jacobs 1992a, 125; 
emphasis added) 
10 Because of the double meaning of 'confessor' I have chosen to use the term 'confessant' to 
indicate the listener, reseiving 'confessor' for the speaker only. 
However, it is only the interrogator or listener (imagined, at.the moment of 
writing) who has the power to accept the authenticity of the account and thereby 
to validate the emerging articulation of self. Herein lies the crux of this 
discussion. Writing (autobiographical texts, that is) is in effect an appeal as 
much as it is an assertion of self. The latter is dependent on the (imagined) 
response of the other actor in the textual dynamic: the reader. What follows is 
an exploration of the positioning of the reader in the writer's project of giving her 
own account of herself to counteract the ravishing of her history and person 
while in prison. 
At one point in the, interrogation of Ruth First two distinct levels of 
interrogation become apparent, the first involving her Security Branch 
interrogators, the second, her readers. This double-telling is structured into her 
very sentences: an addendum appears after a comma or in parentheses to mark 
that information which she conspiratorially offers us, the readers, which is kept 
from the prison interrogators: 
I 
Who wrote articles in Fighting Talk under the pseudonym XXX, they 
wanted to know. I did, I said. (Though I had not.) 
'What about sabotage?' I was not involved in sabotage and I could tell 
them nothing about it, nothing at all; this had been something in which I 
had not got involved. 
Who had I met most frequently at meetings? A and E. and L., I said. (All 
out of reach of the Sec1.:1rity Branch.) 
Where had I been to meetings: In my house, in my motor-car parked in 
some quiet place, in the home of D. (long settled abroad). (1965, 121) 
The security police are not blind to the rationale behind her choice of 
names, but are caught up nonetheless (as is the reader) in the game of 
uncovering the 'truth' of her thinking as she reports on her experience: 
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Viktor looked interested at this point only. I was engaged in the collection 
of information. For writing purposes. I needed to interview the veteran 
Congressmen with whom I was banned from communicating in normal 
circumstances, and I had made regular attempts to meet them at the 
underground headquarters and interview them about their lives of political 
struggle. (121) 
We are told that the dynamic set up as the prisoner reveals information to the 
interrogators is one which captures their interest and attention despite their 
suspicion that they are being taken for a cleverly thought-out ride. When asked 
what she had been doing at Rivonia, First begins to report on her alleged 
activities (always keeping abreast of the interrogators, though, so as not to 
incriminate herself or any other of her comrades). Here it is not clear whether 
her explanation of her activities is directed at the reader or the prison 
interrogators until attention is drawn to the conscientious presence of Swanepoel 
who 'went on making notes all the while' - a detail clearly directed towards the 
reader. 
Perhaps the most striking example of this double-voicedness, where First 
sets up the reader as yet another interrogator t9 whom she has to direct yet 
another truth, is found later on in her account of the interrogation: 
Why had I fled to Swaziland during the 1960 State of Emergency after 
Sharpeville? one of the detectives demanded to know. 'Because you 
would have arrested me without preferring a charge or bringing me to trial, 
like you did to 1,800 others,' I said. The Security Branch knew very well 
that I had spent emergency months in Swaziland; they did not know that I 
had come back to live underground in Johannesburg during the second 
half of the emergency, and I did not tell them. (125) 
There is a certain thrill in discovering as reader that the information offered is 
privileged and that 'even as we speak' the Security Branch does not know. This 
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impression (as reader) of being party to a secret, revealed under circumstances 
which make it of particular value, is much like the atmosphere that pervades 
during interrogation: the more clandestine and difficult to extort, the more alluring 
and interest-awakening is the tale·. Although the reader is to some degree 
imagined as a sympathetic listener and an accomplice in the task of fighting the 
oppressive order of which the prison authorities are a part, s/he must 
nonetheless be lured into sympathy by being offered privileged and intimate 
information. The. writer cannot afford to be apathetic in. convincing the reader of 
her bona fides. (Her very identity rests on the reader's belief in her.) The 
suggestion, then, that the reader is set up as (or willingly becomes) confessant 
or interrogator of sorts is hard to refute. 
No memoir makes this ambivalent relationship of writer to readership quite 
as disturbingly clear as Breyt~n Breytenbach's The True Confessions of an 
Albino Terrorist. Breytenbach explicitly acknowledges 'the faceless addressee, 
shifting from "Mr lnvestigor" [sicJ through "Mr lnvesterrogator," 11Mr Interrogator," 
"Mr Confessor," and "Mr Eye" to the initialized "Mr. I" - the shifter of the first 
person singular' (Schalkwyk 1994, 26). David Schalkwyk recognises the 
disturbing implications this has for the South African reader/investigator who is 
positioned 'as [an accomplice} in the master-slave dialectic writ large in South 
African society, and exemplified in the relationship between detainee and 
interrogator, the latter itself concealing and containing the "terrorist" of the title' 
(Schalkwyk 1994, 26). 
First, too, cannot trust her audience, although her text seems to include 
her audience as allies. In an interview with Jack Gould of the British 
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Broadcasting Corporation she acknowledges having removed a paragraph from 
117 Days listing the extent of her involvement for fear that it would 'give 
something away' (First, qtd. in Pinnock 1993, 195). She is thus still having to 
conceal. Exposure to this hidden, diverse audience is (still) too risky. Her written 
text .does not reflect the extent of her knowledge at the time of her arrest: 
When she was detained she knew, in her own admission, 'a helluva lot, 
really an awful lot' about the underground movement.. .. She also knew 
beforehand about the Closely-guarded plans concerning the escape from 
prison of Harold Wolpe, Arthur Goldreich, Jassat Moolla and Mosie 
Moolla. (Pinnock 1993, 194) · 
This is certainly not made explicit in her riarrativ~. First seems to draw the 
conclusion that Harold Wolpe had escaped only when Anne-Marie Wolpe is 
brought into Marshall Square Prison: 'If Anne-Marie had been taken, Harold must 
have got safely away' (20). Thereafter her account immediately defers to an 
italicised third-person account of the escape, with retrospective hindsight. Her 
narrative does suggest that she would not divulg·e anything that she thought the 
Security Branch might not know, which suggests that she was withholding some 
information at least. But she does not, in fact, make her readers privy to this .. 
informaJion, although her narrative sets up her readers as allies in her bid to 
outwit her interrogators by trying to glean how much they knew of her 
involvements. What the readers are not told, however, is the extent to which the 
Security Branch are right in identifying her as a key potential informer. In an 
I 
interview with Walter Sisulu in September 1992 Donald Pinnock ascertains that it 
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was 'by pure chance' that First was not present at the Rivonia house11 when the 
raid took place: 
f As described by Sisulu] she had been party to the decision to purchase 
the farm and other properties with funds from outside the country and was 
involved with the development of the underground movement which used 
the Rivonia house as its base. According to Joe Slovo she knew 'almost 
everything'. (Pinnock 174) · 
The interviews took place in 1992, almost 30 years after First's detention, at a 
time when Nelson Mandela was released from prison and the African National 
Congress (ANC) was unbanned.- First's text, however, was first published in 
1965, a matter of months after her release from detention and decision to go into 
exile. For First, to write freely is dangerous and .. in fact, impossible when her 
readership is not equally sympathetic. (At the time of the interviews the 
readership, of course, was still not equally sympathetic but with a different 
political climate in South Africa it was not as dangerous to speak freely.) 
The 'presence' (or influential awareness) of a reader (albeit imagined, 
constructed) at the scene of writing in response to whom the text is articulated 
has been explored by acclaimed literary theorists, such as Jean-Paul Sartre, 
M.M. Bakhtin and Jacques Derrida, who have mooted that there is no other way 
of writing. The addressee is so integrally part of language as articulated that 
, even when apparently addressing herself the writer does so 'via' the other. 
Bakhtin concludes that 'every word is directed toward an answer and cannot 
escape the profound influence of the answering word that it anticipates' (Bakhtin 
11 
The house, legally owned by Arthur Goldreich but bought with organisational funds, was used 
as a meeting place by leaders of the African National Congress who were arrested and charged 
with treason in the famous 'Rivonia Trial' of 1964. 
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1981, 279; emphasis in original). This 'contradictory environment of alien words' 
or expectation of an antipathetic and adversarial response is manifest not 'in the 
object' (of the reader him/herself) but in the 'consciousness of the listener with 
his apperceptive background, pregnant with responses and objections' (281 ). It 
is the writer's awareness of a potential readership that is significant. 
In the case of memoirs, one may ask whether 'the other' need necessarily 
be considered present when the person being addressed is identical to the 
person who is articulating. Jacques Derrida argues that even in cases where 
'the addresser is the addressee' one writes via an other, the listener. During a 
discussion printed in The Ear of the Other Pierre Jacques asks about the notion 
of the 'addressee': 'What happens when Nietzsche writes, finally, to himself?' 
Derrida replies: 
When he writes himself to himself, he writes himself to the other who is 
infinitely far away and who is supposed to send his signature back to him. 
He has no relation to himself that is not forced to defer itself by passing 
through the other . . . . When he writes himself to himself, he has no 
immediate presence of himself to himself. There is the necessity of this 
detour through the other .... (1985, 87) 
The place of the other, the listener, is thus of crucial importance because the text 
is constituted and the identity of the autobiographer secured with his/her 
agreement. However, it is important to stress that this 'place' is not occupied by 
a real readership but rather an imagined one which has not yet (nor ever will) 
come into existence. Stephen Clingman has developed Sartre's notion of a 
'virtual public' (which Clingman calls a 'listening public') in his discussion of 
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Nadine Gordimer. Clingman's conception of audience is not dependent on a 
literal 'potential reading public': 
[Rather, it is] a kind of listening public, waiting in implicit silent judgement 
on everything the writer [writes]. It [is] a hitherto oppressed world against 
whose significance, causes and values the significance, causes and 
values of all writing now [has] to be measured. Thus the virtual public can 
make silent. historic demands on the writer. becoming a presence and a 
problem he cannot ignore. (Clingman 1984, 170; second emphasis added) 
It is not a matter of the writer's writing 'directly for' but rather 'towards or in favour 
of her virtual public' ( 170). In the case of texts of confession, as Jacobs 
describes prison testimonies, the 'presence' of a confessant is perhaps more 
'real' and the moment of defending the 'truth' of oneself that much more anxiety-
inducing as the confessor finds herself exposed to the throbbing heat of the 
spotlight, while the identity of her confessant remains ever veiled, i,magined, 
protected from scrutiny. 
The task of asserting a new self (in writing) to contest the criminalising 
'vocabulary' of the state security system is both undermined and made all the 
more urgent by the overwhelming seff:..doubt which that system induces. Emma 
Mashinini feels tremendous anxiety that her father, in particular, and her friends 
would think of her as a criminal. She feels 'shame at having been a prisoner' 
(1989, 94) even on her release and has a pressing need to undo the discrediting 
of herself. In writing there is the imagined promise (which cannot be confirmed) 
of securing an identity in opposition to the criminalised self that is presented and 
supported by the full force of law. But can autobiography, with its own promise 
of 'truth' as experienced and recounted, ever contest that jaundiced and 
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damaging version·of herself effectively, and what impact does this ha've upon the 
notion of 'the truth'? 
Differing versions of 'the truth' emerge in oppositional writing, particularly 
that which involves personal testimony. 'The truth' becomes fundamentally 
unsettled, unfixed through the experience of imprisonment: not only is it 
profoundly mistrusted and feared, it also seems to shift endlessly according to 
the demands of the interlocutor. The concept of 'truth' becomes thoroughly 
problematic, even alienating, as a signifier of the pernicious, unrecognisable 
version of the prisoners' lives which is thrust upon them by the interrogators. 
'The truth' constitutes the predetermined story which they are (sometimes 
brutally) bullied into accepting or 'offering' as fact. In Emma Mashinini's account 
' " 
we read that 'always they wanted the truth, when I had no more truth to tell. 
don't think they ever really understood that in fact there was nothing to give 
away. But they always tried to find it, this nothing' (75). 'The truth' is 
synonymous with what the interrogators expect to hear, that she is guilty as 
, defined by the politically antagonistic penal system. The 'truth' is also that 
account or story which, if accepted and owned, seems to hold the promise of her 
release: Mashinini speaks of the 'emotional battery' (as opposed to physical 
abuse) to which she is victim when a Security Branch policewoman cajoles her, 
'"If you tell the truth and nothing else you will be able to go back to your children 
in good time"' (76). 
For First it is slightly more complicated, however, because she 
purposefully lies to protect herself and her comrades. The Security Branch are, 
in a sense, quite right not to believe her and her narrative, .as I have said, does 
not try to conceal this. Her integrity and .commitment to justice are not. 
undermined oy this representation of (narrowly defined) dishonesty. T.here is 
another notion of 'truth' underlying the narrative which is not breached by these 
admissions of falsehoods. Information is purposefully avoided in the interests of 
a .. higher 'truth' which encompasses notions of justice and honour (in respect of 
her comrades particularly). A slavish obedience to avoid lies in any given 
utterance does not amount to a commitment to truth. 
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If Jacobs is right in reading the 'confession' of autobiography as a mimicry 
of interrogation in form, the prisoner/writer's alienation from 'the truth' raises 
further complexities for the writing of autobiography as the construction of a 
narrative which promises to submit to the requirement that it be corroborated by 
an outside 'truth'. Gready speaks of the 'tyranny of objectivity' which exacts 
'factually insistent narratives' - evidence from outside the moment of articulation 
(Gready 1993, 490-1 ). For those subject to interrogation, 'the truth' is the story 
of the detainee's guHt which is presented by the interrogator to the detainee for 
verification. Anything which differs from what the interrogator has settled on as 
the truth, regardless of the apparent sincerity of the speaker, is rejected as 'lies'. 
In 117 Days Ruth First is told by her interrogator, "'And if you teli me anything it 
must be the truth, or I will know"' (141 ). The interrogator's claim that he has 
greater insight into the prisoner's truth of herself (that he 'knows' more) would 
undermine the conviction of even the most confident of confessors, particularly 
when accompanied by the. other ways of breaking the prisoner down explored at 
a later point in this dissertation. 
The notion of the 'truth' as it operates during interrogation is, quite simply, 
that which the interrogator demands to hear. The extraordinarily difficult task of 
the detainee is to find a path that will be tolerated by the interrogator as 'truth' 
(and be rewarded with release) while at the same time remain faithful to her own 
sense of integrity. Ruth First writes: 
I had to convince him, my present interrogator, that I really had told the 
truth, the whole truth - 'And if you tell me anything it must be the truth, or 
I will know' - and he then personally had the power to effect my 
release .... I was practising deceit but searching myself not to make it self-
deception. ( 1965, 141) 
'The truth', then, could be understood. to be that which, once agreed to, will bring 
an end to interrogation although, as is suggested in the final chapter on torture, 
extracting 'the truth' may not be the only point of interrogation as very often the 
interrogators already know the facts. It is clear from this passage that another, 
more powerful understanding of truth and deception is at work: in trying to 
remain 'true' to her comrades and her cause (for that is the ultimate 'truth') First 
must 'deceive' the interrogators, and this without deceiving herself. 
Emma Mashinini's book Strikes Have Followed Me All My Life: A South 
African Autobiography is not exclusively a prison narrative but the second half of 
her book is dominated by her account of her detention as a result of her work as 
a prominent trade unionist. (She was head of the Commercial, Catering and 
Allied Workers Union of South Africa at the time of her arrest in November 
1981.) The isolation of detention and the hostility of the interrogation experience 
are harrowing for Mashinini. Her account sheds light on the interrogatory 
dynamic involved in self-construction in the aftermath of trauma. 
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When, after her release, Mashinini undergoes treatment at a clinic for 
victims of torture in Denmark, the telling of her life story is again subject to the 
predetermined script (in the dialogue with the white doctor). Dr Inge Genefke 
(who is not a psychotherapist) encourages Mashinini to be more self-interested. 
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In response Mashinini searches ou.t instances as evidence (in this case) that she 
has acted out of selfish need. Here the 'accusation' is that Mashinini does not 
care enough for her 'self: the procedure of interrogation/confession is repeated 
in that Mashinini feels pressurised to point to external 'facts' to support the story 
that she has to produce to please her listener, in this case Dr Genefke: 
She would say, 'You've got to be selfish about yourself.' 
I was giving her examples to say that yes, I thought I was a selfish person. 
I said I was a person who could stand up and speak for herself. She said, 
'Give me one good example.' And I gave her an example .... 
Well, I told her that example. But she said to me, 'That's not enough. 
That's not being selfish. That is standing up for your rights.' 
I tried everything to prove that I can be selfish, and I did not find one 
thing.... I left Denmark prematurely, I know. Inge felt I should stay longer, 
but I couldn't. I was really longing to be out of hospital and to go back to 
my family. (94-5) 
It seems that in this final choice too Mashinini's experience of hospitalisation 
mimics interrogation where the only way to protect herself is to opt for silence. 
Ultimately Mashinini chooses to leave the scene of examination, to withdraw to 
her own world where she is labelled neither 'criminal' nor 'patient', and where her 
spoken identity is less likely to be judged according to its consistency with a 
preordained text from an ideology and culture alien to her.12 
12 I had the opportunity of meeting Dr Genefke at a conference in Cape Town entitled 'Caring for 
Survivors of Torture: Challenges for the Medical and Health Professionals' (15-17 November 
1995). In conversation after her talk on a project to train doctors in India to deal with survivors of 
torture Dr Genefke spoke of her interaction with Mashinini, tacitly acknowledging its failure: 'We 
are much cleverer now', she said, in that they know not to confine torture survivors to hospital 
beds. 
What of the truth that autobiography itself strives to tell? The 
predetermined strictures of autobiography demand that, unlike fictional texts, the 
story be verifiable by events from 'real life', the text outside of the printed text 
which is produced, to some degree, in the act of 'recording'. Although it is more 
commonly accepted that the notion of 'objective fact' is not fixed and certain, the 
most significant feature nonetheless which distinguishes the autobiographical 
text from any other is that it promises that what is offered is the 'truth', as 
perceived and etched in language by the subject of the tale. 
The ability of anyone to know and represent herself fully is, of course, 
limited. 13 One is ineluctably constrained by the self-evident limits of 
understanding and openness to a consciousness of the 'darker' elements of 
one's psyche - that which is repressed in order, inter alia, that one is able to 
operate within society. Moreover, the autobiographical text depends as much on 
the 'mature' self at the time of writing as on the remembered self of the time of 
experiencing (which then makes possible an almost infinite number of 
autobiographies of any one life).14 Most significantly, the notion that there is 
~ a single, apprehendable version of the self which can be found outside of 
the moment of writing and rightfully displayed as 'the truth' of the self is 
questionable. When discussing autobiography, J.M. Coetzee writes that he 
knows 'as little about [his] purpose, which lies in the present, as about the drives 
and desires, lying in the past, that [he wishes] to explore' (Coetzee 1991, 118). 
13 See Gayatri Spiva k's 'Introduction' to Jacques Derrida's Of Grammatology (197 4). 
14 See Dorothy Driver (1991) who analyses how this split is differently employed in 
autobiographies by Mary Benson, Caesarina Makhoere and Emma Mashinini. 
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Moreover, when considering the reproduction, or construction, of the 'truth' of 
autobiography, he toys with proposing this 'definition of autobiography': 
[IJt is a kind of self-writing in which you are constrained to respect the 
facts <?f your history. But which facts? All the facts? Of course not. All 
the facts are too many facts. You choose the facts insofar as they fall in 
with your evolving purpose. (118) 
The experience of interrogation, and then re-interrogation through the writing of 
prison texts, suggests that the presence (albeit imagined) of the listener, the 
interrogator with his/her (imagined) script, contributes significantly to the 
selection of admissible facts in the production of the autobiographical text and of 
the production of the self. The writer is detained and questioned at the scene of 
writing and must offer an explanation and the necessarily concomitant external 
evidence for verification. in order for her text to bear the title 'autobiography' with 
its promise of 'the truth'. It may be that for writers of prison texts the notion of a 
listening, judging public is that much more virulent and more 'present' at the 
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moment of articulating, the need to produce verification that much more pressing, 
and the sense of both the danger and the redemptive potential of the 'confession' 
that much more intense. 
It is perhaps fitting to conclude this discussion with a rather different 
perspective on the dynamic of telling: in her chapter on testimonial writing Dori 
Laub posits that the articulation of one's experience is a vital form of psychic 
survival, despite the futility of any attempt to recreate experience in language, 
the 'impossibility of telling' as it were. Laub has focused on the role of bearing 
witness in the lives of Holocaust survivors: 
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· Some have hardly spoken of it, but even those who have talked 
incessantly feel that they managed to say very little that was heard. None 
find peace in silence, even when it is their choice to remain silent.... The 
'not telling' of the story serves as a perpetuation of its tyranny. The 
events become more and more distorted in their silent retention and 
pervasively invade and contaminate the survivor's daily life. The longer 
the story remains untold, the more distorted it becomes in the survivor's 
conception of it, so much so that the survivor doubts the reality of the 
actual events. (Laub 1992, 79) 
Thus the horror is somehow contained in the naming of it. But central to the act 
of bearing witness is the place of the other who, in Laub's understanding, makes 
possible the dynamic without which healing (and therefore meaningful and not 
just literal freedom) cannot occur. Without having an other to address, one is not 
able to address oneself. Referring to the Holocaust again: 
There was no longer an other to which one could say 'Thou' in the hope of 
being heard, of being recognized as a subject, of being answered .... But 
when one cannot turn to a 'you' one cannot say 'thou' even to oneself. 
(Laub 1992, 82) 
Turning back to Mashinini we can see how this need for a (sympathetic) 
addressee was true of her, although the particular dynamic of the Danish 
hospital did not make it a place of healing for her, a place where she felt able to 
tell her story and be believed. Jacobs suggests that 'Mashinini learned the value 
of self-interr~gation as healing, and when she later approaches Dr Liz Floyd, 
friend of Neil Aggett, for assistance, narrative is consciously perceived as 
therapy' (Jacobs 1991, 124): 
When I went and told her about all my problems it was like a 
psychological release. I started emptying and talking, and it was a great 
relief. This was not a doctor and patient discussing. It was two friends 
who'd come from prison, and prison is not something you can leave 
behind. (Mashinini 105) 
This therapeutic exchange would seem to suggest that there is a redemptive 
role, then, in being a listener although for Mashinini it was necessary that her 
listener be one who had shared her experience and who is ideologically kin. Dr 
Genefke, who tries to persuade her that it need not be devastating to be called 
as a state witness, cannot play this role, for she does not understand the 
1mportance of acceptance by her community, for her own sense of self: 
This sent me totally berserk, to think of being a state witness. So I told 
her this, and she asked me, 'Why are you so concerned or afraid of being 
a state witness:' And I said, 'It's because the community can never accept 
you having been a state witness.' And she was educating me, saying, 
'You know that at times people are made state witnesses very much 
against their will, and they may have broken down, or there may be other 
very good reasons why they have eventually gone to become a state 
witness.' After all the trauma, to go back to the community and be 
rejected again. It means you are killing this person twice over. (94) 
To betray her community would be tantamount to a (second) annihilation of selt 
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This points to a second aspect of her experience at the Danish clinic which 
made it uncomfortably reminiscent of prison for Mashinini: she was isolated and 
without a sense of community there. She was unable to communicate with other 
patients who did not speak English. It was like 'again being in a sophisticated 
prison', Mashinini said in a telephonic conversation, for 'I could not communicate 
·with the people'. It was a 'solitary confinement' of sorts (Mashinini 1996). 
Without a community within which to speak, she is silent. 
Mashinini. described to me how she began to write: 'I thought I was not a 
writer.' She had a friend question her in order to facilitate her narrative, after 
which she would transcribe the conversation. She later dispensed with that 
device because 'I used to repeat myself. As a result, 'I became a writer'. The 
parallel which Jacobs draws between the interrogatory 'devices' of the Security 
Police and the 'victim's strategies' for self-expression is corroborated by this 
information (Jacobs 1992a, 125). But there are also fundamental differences in 
the interrogatory exchanges between prisoner and interrogator on the one hand 
and the ideologically and emotionally sympathetic dialogue Mashinini finds with 
friends, on the other. What is sure is that without an addressee - that is, a 
sympathetic addressee with whom she is able, first, to identify and, second, to 
communicate - Mashinini cannot embrace the nurturing dialogue that 
encourages her, ultimately, to take up the pen. 
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3. Representing the Violated Self in Prison and in Prison Writing 
Autobiography distinguishes itself from other narratives in that the writer and subject 
are uniquely synonymous and, more interestingly, what is promised is a subjective 
account of a life. A contradiction emerges in the co-existent expectation that what is 
created is both objective truth and the subjective - and therefore historically 
unreliable - account of a self. David Murray suggests that, as readers of 
autobiography, 'we are prepared for inaccuracies, even lies, since the guarantee 
of authenticity offered is not of historical accuracy or objectivity, but precisely of 
first-person subjectivity' ( 1991, 67). 
While this discussion is not primarily concerned with poststructuralist 
questioning of the validity of a written 'truth', it does seek to explore the way in which 
the notion of the truth operates in autobiographical prison narratives. By laying claim 
to the integrity implicit in the truth, those who have been silenced and detained are 
given the opportunity to counter the tale of the self thrust forward by the criminalising 
'vocabulary' of the prison. However, albeit potentially empowering, the act of writing 
is deceptively simple: autobiography is necessarily a negotiation of facets of a self, 
. where the audience is appealed to before the credibility of the signature can finally 
be agreed to and an identity can be carved in stone as it were.15 
It has already been suggested that this process is particularly fraught for 
writers of prison narratives whose credibility has already been thoroughly 
undermined through incarceration. It may be that the experience of interrogation 
15 The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) defines 'subjective', in part, as 'belonging to, of, due to 
the consciousness ... as opposed to real or external things; due to one's own feelings or 
capacities rather than being actually existent' (emphasis added). 
provides a sort of blue-print for the act of asserting identity in the face of a hostile 
audience. While the undermining of credibility may in no way unsettle personal 
moral conviction, it is conceivable that the experience of interrogation (where one is 
not believed and one's bona fides are not accepted) would profoundly affect that 
other dynamic of telling where an interrogatory audience is addi-essed in writing and 
presented with the truth of herself. 
J. U. Jacobs has suggested that interrogation works productively in 
providing the structure and language with which to make this appeal, with which 
to confess to, or assert, the truth of the self. Jacobs argues that 'the 
compulsions to confess provide the very means of restructuring the self, and the 
interrogator's devices for destroying the language of the victim become the 
victim's strategies for self-creation' ( 1992a, 125). · In a recent article David 
Schalkwyk cautions, however, that 'it is a mistake to project homogeneity into 
South African prison writing.' Schalkwyk's analysis of Breyten Breytenbach's 
The True Confessions of an Albino Terrorist shuns a simplistic genre-building 
critical approach, by highlighting the profound differences between Breytenbach 
and Jeremy Cronin, selected for Schalkwyk's discussion precisely because of 
the superficial similarities of their backgrounds. Schalkwyk's analysis of 
Breytenbach's ironic play with the dynamic of confession suggests that to treat 
all prison narratives as uniform is inappropriate. Even Breytenbach's self-
conscious play with confession is a deceptive strategy for this representational 
game mak~s 'rehabilitation' through confession 'impossible', Schalkwyk argues, 
'by the framing structure of a continually displaced confessor': 
It is like confessing to God, Christ, and Satan at the same time, and 
renders inevitable a dissipated self, the authority of which is negated by 
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being unable or unwilling to settle upon the authority of any single 
confessor or site of confession. (Schalkwyk 1994, 26). 
While I, too, am reluctant to accept Jacobs's blanket description of all prison 
narratives as 'confessional texts', this discussion takes a lead from Jacobs's 
suggestion that the assault on the self in prison interrogation will have a profound 
influence on the text of the detainee/writer. In particular; the notion of the truth is 
complicated as the autobiographer tries to find the yersion of herself which will both 
meet with approval and be consistent with her own sense of integrity and, as in the 
case of the anxious articulations made under interrogation, ultimately be rewarded 
with freedom. 
In her negotiation of an identity, one may well ask what constraints and 
obstacles the prison.writer may be faced with. How does the prisoner·find 
agreement between the identity she claims for herself, on the one hand, an identity 
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which is constructed within the context of a strong sense of community, perhaps, and 
in political struggle, and that which is ascribed her via the prison vocabulary on the 
other hand (the vocabulary of clothing, dependency, incarceration, prohibitions, 
isolation, alienating description of herself as dangerous, amongst others). On 
reading a text such as Emma Mashinini's Strikes Have Followed Me All of My Life 
(1989) one cannot presume to find a clear split between a free, confident self and 
the criminal or traitor created through imprisonment. At one point Mashinini writes 
rather jokingly, it seems, and certainly with a measure of remove, of the absurdity of 
employing a large contingent of prison staff to guard her ( 1989, 7 4 ): 'all just to take 
me from prison to prison. The waste of manpower in this! Sometimes it would 
depress me very much, the waste of these working people, with more education just 
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handed to them than we blacks could get with all our struggles - for what?' Even 
when she acknowledges the degree to which it affected her (so that at times 'I would 
believe them, that with all that manpower I must be a very dangerous person') one is 
not struck here by the profound sense of self-doubt and insecurity evident at a later 
point. Mashinini fears that, as a 'criminal', she may be shunned by the very 
community with which she has identified in political struggle and that, more 
especially, her family and friends would reject her: 
I'm always going away and now here I am in prison. It means again· 1 have 
found myself to be a nuisance· in my fam.ily. I'm always causing them pain 
by going away. All I could hope was they understood that I had not 
committed any crime. I hoped I had not done anything to offend them. I 
worried about my friends. I thought, Are they going to receive me when I 
come back? (87) 
What is striking is the way in which the possibility that she might in fact be a criminal 
has become assimilated into an earlier understanding of herself as a politically active 
woman and therefore a failed mother so that two versions of self ('criminal' and 
'mother') become mutually determining and she cannot find shelter from the label of 
'criminal' in her identity as 'mother'. Being in prison becomes, if just for a moment, a 
logical .extension of an apparently unacceptable and frequently manifested tendency 
to negl~ct her family. The process of constructing an identity is thus not a struggle 
I 
fought externally, on paper, so to speak, but a deeply internal wrestling where 
nothing is self-evident and anything asserted may be used to undermine the subject 
by an unseen (and internalised) critic, as Derrida puts it, the 'ear of the other' (1985). 
It is thus not surprising that external 'truths' may be invoked as evidence in the 
fight for credibility. When one's word about oneself is no longer enough (because 
one can no longer be sure that one knows oneself) the word of another may be the 
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only salvation. It is significant that Mashinini chooses to include, as a sort of preface 
to 'Part II' which deals with her time of incarceration, letters from other unionists 
(which are not given an introduction) and an extract from a newspaper article which 
both tells the story of her arrest and offers responses to the news of her arrest (59-
60). In addition, there are footnotes throughout the book in which an 
unacknowledged editor refers to Mashinini in the third.,person (but informally, as 
'Emma') when including information on South African history, language, politics, and 
the like. For example, a footnote on page 67 informs us that the 'DPSC [Detainees' 
Parents Support Committee] was formed in September 1981, following the spate of 
detentions that was to lead to Emma's own arrest in November .... For the minutes of 
the meeting to which Emma refers, .see Appendix B.' This has the effect of 
bypassing her subjectivity, as though an objective voice would lend credence to the 
account. In a subtle way this voice undermines her own voice while trying to support 
it, through the implicit suggestion that her own account does not carry sufficient 
authority and that external evidence is necessary in order to achieve a more 
'objective' ordering of the events. 
The struggle to claim a public voice is not a new struggle for women and is 
made all the more fraught through having to make space for the conflicting 
identities of woman, wife, mother, activist, comrade, worker, and so on. The 
disclosure of a public self may in itself be a challenge to an aspect of a woman's 
identity under patriarchal norms, such as 'supportive wife'. To return, briefly, to 
an earlier discussion, it seems appropriate to note Sidonie Smith's contention 
that, for women in certain cultures, to write (and be published) is transgressive 
and therefore anxiety-inducing (1987, 50). This is true, as regards formal 
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speech-making, for Maggie Resha who is alarmed at the prospect of writing a 
speech as leader of a delegation of the ANC Women's League to the World 
Congress of Women in Moscow because 'at home we usually addressed meetings 
off the cuff' (1991, 220). She prefers that her husband take this more 
ceremonious role. Her language is surprisingly strong: 'I was shattered. I had 
never before written a speech' (220). The same anxiety does not apply to 
speaking spontaneously at community or political gatherings 'at home'. 
According to Smith, the transgression of speaking out cannot be managed 
without a severe cost to the autobiographer herself, for it would require that she 
'silence that part of her t.hat identifies her as a daughter of the mother' (Smith 1987, 
53). For Resha, however, the speech does not amount to a departure from her role 
1 
as dutiful daughter for it contributes to the political objectives of her (ANC) 
community. It nurtures rather than transgresses community values. Her husband is 
supportive of her independent role as political activist and of the speech in particular. 
For Caesarina Kana Makhoere the cost of her outspokenness is much greater. 
Not only does her father disapprove of her student activism, but as a policeman 
himself he is prepared to lead the police to where she is hiding. Makhoere both 
excuses her father who 'suffered a lot of mental torture' ( 1) on her account and 
recognises that 'he was the one responsible for [her] being behind bars' (2). 
Although she does not direct anger towards him explicitly, her text dispossesses him 
of his role as father. He is described as 'really pathetic' (2). Later, when she is told 
that he had died, she 'only cursorily acknowledges the tragic news before returning 
to the political work of prison' (Harlow 1992, 155). She has excised all daughterly 
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feeling towards her family in favour of the new community of activists represented in 
her text. 
The disintegrating legitimacy of the family patriarchy that Makhoere 
introduces in the first chapter of No Child's Play is radically left behind in 
prison. 
Makhoere quickly undertakes the urgent work, even from within a partial 
solitary confinement, of remaking an organized social order of resistance 
and struggle among the women prisoners. (1992, 155). 
tier position as daughter disintegrates, as is confirmed when represented in her text. 
Her title draws attention to her lost childhood: life as a dissident is 'no child's play' .16 
However, she is able to construct in her text a new 'family'.which is free of 
disharmony. 
Leigh Gilmore suggests that autobiography, and in particular the confession, 
may be usefully appropriated by women writers in the attempt to secure an 
authoritative subject position: 'these narratives can be understood as a canny raid on 
the discourses oftruth and identity' (Gilmore 1994, 226). For a woman who has 
been declared a criminal, such an appropriation will not be uncomplicated and 
without enormous obstacles, not least of all the fear that publication would invoke the 
horror of being arrested again: Emma Mashinini writes that 'I had been told when I 
was released never, never to speak about my detention .... I was fearful, terribly 
fearful, that this would leak out and get to them, and 1would be rearrested and 
charged for having spoken about things' (92). It is useful to tum to specific texts to 
explore the possibility that language itself, and not simply publication, has the 
16 See Dorothy Driver (1991, 349) for a fuller explanation of the significance of Makhoere's title. 
capacity to betray and disempower even as it secures a victory in the battle against 
silence. 
3.1 The Word as Weapon 
In plain terms, writing may be thought to 'set the record straight'. For Mashinini it 
provides a welcome relief from the threatening spoken interaction of interrogation, 
even while the security police have an expectation that a written piece would reveal 
what they have not yet been able to extort through interrogation. 
They'd make me sit down and write, and perhaps in my writing they 
wanted me to say things, but here was nothing I could write that would 
give anybody away, because I'd write about my trade union matters. I 
would sit and write, and write, and this was better for me. Maybe it was a 
way of being able to think what to say without for once anyone pushing 
me and going on -· '.come on, come on, now. Speak.' And being rough 
about it. (75-6) 
Breytenbach spends even more of his time under interrogation writing, with his 
interrogators confident that his text will reveal the truth, that is, the information they 
need to clinch their case (1984). 
In a satisfying reversal of the conventional power dynamics in prison language 
offers itself as a tool for the detainee's use, as articulated in A Snake With Ice 
· Water, edited by Barbara Schreiner. 17 For Barbara Hogan (who, as an ANC activist, 
spent eight years in prison charged with treason) the language of the law provides 
some power and can be used to intimidate the wardresses. 18 She describes this as 
17 
Barbara Schreiner edits this South African collection of prison memoirs, photographs, drawings 




a 'war': 'In this war we never spoke Afrikaans, although I did occasionally, but we 
used English, and we used language like they use language against black people. 
We used academic language and we overpowered them in terms of intellect and 
understanding and things like that' (1992, 37). 
Ruth First, too, recognises the potential pot~ncy of her linguistic skills. In 
prison she has been 'disarmed of all weapons except for the last, my tongue' (44). 
First and Hogan are both mother-tongue English speakers. For others the only 
strength is in silence, to refuse the terms of the interrogators, and even to refuse to 
engage in language itself in what is a deeply threatening environment. Even the 
dialogue of concern is seen by Mashinini as a further, more subtle part of the 
intricate and gripping web of the imprisonment: 
And when [the inspector] said, 'Any complaints?' I never made any 
complaint. It would not serve any purpose. They knew. They had their 
little window and the nurse was coming in because of my hypertension. 
So they knew all was not well with me. They did not need to ask what was 
wrong. (64) 
For her, then, the language of concern is a ~ham; its purpose is not as it appears -
to enquire about difficulties and undertake to change them. The ability of the 
authorities to spy on her is most unnerving for Mashinini, controlled as it is by those 
on the other side ofthe wall. They have their information (as evidenced also by their 
not needing to ask her where her offices where, by their driving straight to Khotso 
House on her arrest).19 Were she to participate in the dialogue frankly she would be 
18 The writers studied in this project use the feminine fonn of the noun ('wardress') to refer to the 
female prison staff. I have elected to do likewise for the sake of consistency and for clarity of 
meaning when commenting on excerpts from the texts. · 
19 The Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers' Union of South Africa (CCAWUSA) which 
Mashinini led at the time of her arrest, had been offered office space at Khotso House by the 
Desmond Tutu, then General Secretary of the South African Council of Churches (SACC), as 
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exposing herself to being rewritten according to their language, using their 
'vocabulary', which she recognises has no bona tides. By responding to the 
questions in their own terms (that is, in terms of 'wanting' things) she thus protects 
her 'true' self and remains invulnerable. "'There is nothing I want."' She registers 
more than what is apparent. To the extent that her answer differs from their reading 
of her situation - via the instruments available to them, that is, the peep hole and 
the nurse (they 'did not need to ask what was wrong') - an answer is given them in 
terms of the subtext of their exchange: she is resisting their attempt to establish their 
control over her in the particular power struggle of the prison. She will not grant 
them access to herself through dialogue. 
Like Mashinini, Joyce Sikakane, who is also imprisoned under South 
African detention legislation, refuses to respond to a dishonourable offer of a job 
in London from the Security Police. 'Then they repeated their offer of a job offer 
in London. I didn't bother to reply yes or no, I just kept silent' (Sikakane 1977, 
63). Silence is a refusal of more than the offer itself. It denotes a language of its 
own, one which resists the co-operation involved in the convention of dialogue 
and any concomitant acknowledgement of .her would-be interlocutor's humanity. 
Their answer in turn is to lock her up once more, but the significance of her 
refusal to be engaged (and thereby 'encaged') linguistically does not seem to be 
lost with.the reassertion of her physical imprisonment. Her later strategy is to 
'answer' their questions by questioning them in a way which implicitly challenges 
the ethics underlying her imprisonment. 
-
'under the Group Areas Act [of 1950] blacks were prohibited from leasing offices in white areas' 
{Mashinini 49). 
Every so often, the Special Branch officers used to come and ask "Have 
you thought it over? .Will you agree?" and I used to answer "When are 
you releasing me? When are you charging me? I want to go home." 
(Sikakane 1977, 64) 
In this way she is able to use language - their interrogatory prison language - to 
register resistance and at the same time avoid being inscribed in the code which 
labels her 'prisoner' and 'criminal'. 
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However, language need not be experienced as an empowering tool. At times 
in Ruth Firsfs text there is evidence Of a profound mistrust of language or, more 
rightly phrased, a fearful belief in its power to betray the orie who(m it) speaks. First 
refuses to engage in language of (almost) any sort with her captors, choosing 
instead the illogical gibberish of 'the fluffy-minded frightened girl in a spot, given to 
inconsequential comment, with an inflexible inability to concentrate and grasp the 
essence of a problem'. She fixes on one previously constructed sentence 
(unspecified) and repeats it regardless of its applicability to the context, an act which 
for her is distinct from 'talking': 'I could not talk any more because I would be giving 
myself away, I insisted, and somehow or other, I didn't know how, they would find a 
way to use my own statement against me' (128). One is struck by an overwhelming 
sense of her powerlessness; there is nothing at her disposal which she can trust, not 
even her own powers of speech. Earlier, when being pressed to continue her 
insubstantial statement, she had 'repeated that the only way l knew how to protect 
myself in detention was by my silence' (126). 
First chooses to withhold from her readership what it is that she repeats to her 
interrogators which holds significant implications for an investigation into the 
dynamic of writing and reading prison narratives. She can recount the moment of 
opting to speak nonsense.as a protection device; she can even describe the role 
that she acted out, that of the 'fluffy-minded frightened girl in a spot', and can also 
comment on the nature of her 'inability to concentrate' (128). The effect qf this is to 
distance the writing First from the detainee who is the object of her narrative. Were 
she to offer for scrutiny her actual words, she would risk being placed under further 
judgement, this time from a readership whose sympathy and respect she courts. 
She cannot afford to identify herself too closely with those words, as the response, 
she fears, may rob her of the identity she asserts in this riew statement of self, . 
constructed under the spotlight of autobiography. In the same way, then, one could 
infer that 'the only way [she] knew how to protect [her]self when she is detained, not 
at the prison but now at the scene of writing is, again, 'by [her] silence' (126). 
3.2 The 'Baring' of the Self 
Following Jacobs, l suggested earlier that the experience of interrogation can, to 
some extent, be seen mirrored in the dynamic of telling in autobiography. This 
needs further inquiry. Jacobs writes that the 'stripping of the prisoner, both literally 
and mentally by a series of interrogators, provides the metaph~r for the compulsive -
baring of self that is autobiographY-, conscious self-disclosure through narration' ---( 1992a, 124 ). One obvious challenge tO the applicability of Jacobs's metaphor lies 
in the fact that autobiography could be seen as a 're-clothing' of the self, where a 
new identity is constructed and reasserted, as much as a 'baring' of self. Neither 
enforced nakedness nor the exposure of oneself in interrogation should necessarily 
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be assumed to be an uncomplicated mirror of the processes involved in writing 
prison narratives and autobiography more generally. 
Jacobs suggests that the 'narrative design' of prison memoirs as outlined in his 
discussion 'is a universal one' (1992a, 117), and not specific to South African prison 
memoirs only. He then goes on to consider the significance of enforced nakedness 
for prisoners and its impact upon their writing (118). There is a danger, it seems to 
me, in leaning too heavily on the metaphor of 'baring' and applying it universally, that 
is, without examining the specificities of the process of interrogation as such and of 
each act of writing. Jacobs does not consider the particular difficulties nakedness 
might have for a woman prisoner for: whom physical exposure may signal a sexual 
danger. Relations of power are implicated in hierarchical viewing: for a black.woman 
prisoner to be utterly naked before the penetrative gaze of a white woman wardress 
would have a particular political significance in apartheid South Africa. The 
prisoner's exposure performs her own powerlessness in the face of the apartheid 
-
system's dominance. It cannot be assumed that these power dynamics are 
' 
recreated in the process of (re)presenting oneself before an audience which is 
constructed, at least in part, as sympathetic. 
In an extract from Hell-Hole. Robben Island: Reminiscences of a Political 
Prisoner in South Africa quoted by Jacobs, Moses Dlamini describes how he refuses 
) 
to follow suit after watching the other prisoners exposing themselves under duress: 
when 'the tum of us political prisoners came, we handed the warders the clothes, 
opened our mouths, lifted up our hands, turned round with naked dignity and refused 
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to do the "tauza"' (Dlamini 38). 20 Immediately thereafter, and in reference to the 
quotation, Jacobs writes that, for Dlamini, the 'exposed self can be deliberately and 
calculatedly revealed in a narrative about the prison experience in which the reader 
" becomes discomfitingly obliged to occupy the position of witness to the paraded 
~the prison memoir' .(118). What Jacobs overlooks:- his argument is that, in ------( 
fact, Dlamini does not participate in the humiliation of the 'tauza dance' in which 
orifices are examined by the warders (although he is naked). Moreover, the use 
of the verb 'reveal' seems inappropriate for it suggests'a disclosure of something 
secretive or even devious. Dlamini could be said to 'clothe' himself with dignity 
·and volition (to reverse Jacobs's metaphor) in representing himself as able to 
evade the humiliation of (full) bodily exposure. His text is more an assertion of a 
robust self than an exposure of a vulnerable self. 
The problem of trying to construct for oneself a credible subject osition in t e 
~disbelief (w.hetber..m§ll, in the case of interrogation, or imagined, as~ 
~addr:eAslagJbe_uos..§en audience in writing) does seem to be prevalen~ 
however. Despite the reservation already raised it is useful to explore Jacobs's 
metaphor, while listening carefully to the text at hand. It is clear from a number of 
prison texts that the experience of being stripped of all clothing and exposed (even 
to the extent of being watched going to the toilet) is profoundly unnerving for those 
subjected to it. The responses range from humiliation and fear on the one hand to 
20 The 'iauza dance' is the name given by prisoners to the set of steps prisoners have to 
'perform' (naked) in front of the prison staff to ensure that contraband articles are not smuggled 
into prison. An extract from Maggie Resha's narrative describes this in greater detail. 
Dlamini wrote an account of the two years he spent on Robben Island while imprisoned for 
furthering the aims of a banned organisation, the Pan-African Congress. J.U. Jacobs discusses 
the narratives of prisoners held on Robben Island and the discursive significance of the island as 
'the ultimate margin to which the Pretoria government banished its opposition' (1992b, 73). 
outrage and a sense of moral supremacy on the other: Maggie Resha describes the 
'Tauza Dance' referred to by Dlamini and other prison narrators such as Caesarina 
Kana Makhoere: 
This 'dance' is very disgusting. One has to strip naked, then put one's 
hands on the floor and jump over one's legs in order to expose one's 
private parts. This is all done in public and is the worst humiliation I've 
ever experienced. (Resha 1991, 166-7) 
For Resha the experience is somehow mitigated by the thrill in having outwitted the 
wardresses during a ritual which is designed to ensure total exposure on her part. 
The purported aim of the 'tauza' is to make it impossible to smuggle contraband 
goods, such as drugs, money and weapons, into the prison. Resha defies this by 
managing to conceal pills in a carefully executed manoeuvre. This does not negate 
the humiliation itself in any way, but it allows her to evade the position assigned her, 
that of victim and impotent inmate, and at the same time expose the fact that the 
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more successful functioning of the 'dance' lies in the degree to which it humiliates; its 
ability to frustrate attempts at smuggling is limited. 
I had wrapped the tablets in a little piece of plastic, then placed them 
under my breasts. Before we handed our clothes and shoes in, to be 
kept, we were made to go through the 'Tauza Dance' .... As I undressed, I 
slipped the tablets into one of my shoes. Then, after I had done the 
dance, I put on my prison attire .... It was at this stage that I transferred the 
tablets from my shoe back to my breasts. That time the Nonna and the 
Mvakachi were busy scrutinising the next prisoner's private parts; they 
could not see what the people who were already dressed were doing. My 
breasts served as my medicine cupboard for the whole period that I was in 
prison. (1991, 166-167) 
Enforced nakedness, then, does not simply signify a loss of protection and 
vulnerability for Resha. The presence of her fully clothed adversaries leads to acute 
humiliation, but she is never utterly stripped of herself and the resources on which 
she can rely. She is not robbed of her mental acumen nor the fullness of her body's 
means. Her breasts offer her a secure hiding place: in her very body, then, she is 
able to find the protection that clothing previously would have afforded her and, one 
could argue, the association with healing that her nurse's uniform would have 
allowed her in the past. 
T.his is not so with Mashinini. There is evidence in Mashinini's text to suggest 
that the anxiety in being made naked is not so much as a result of the exposure of 
the body as symbol of an essential and vulnerable self, but rather as a result of the 
(irrational) fear that without clothes to affirm and attest to identity, one risks 
discovering that one has no identity. Nakedness figures as a possible nothingness 
or non-existence rather than the unveiling of an essential being. The question 
seems to lurk rather troublingly: what if there is no self once all vesture and ' 
adornment is removed? 
Mashinini's earlier experience of being utterly alone and without the 
opportunity to interact or read leaves her with a skeletal, but certain sense of self: 
' ... with nothing to read. Just with myself. The bare me' (60). A later moment, 
however, finds her unsure of what the 'bare me' is. She is dependent on the 




I didn't think I knew myself any longer. There was no mirror. It's odd what 
happens when you don't see yourself. You think, who am I? All 1 had to 
recognise~ _g jersey which was sent to me Qy _g friend. It was her 
jersey and I could recognise it. But I didn't know any longer how to 
recognise myself. (87) 
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The ultimate challenge in the experience of imprisonment (and, one could 
(!:----
argue, in writing, alone, at one's desk) is that of retaining a strong sense of self 
without the support of any of the external aspects of one's life which make up 
one's identity under normal circumstances. Isolation is frightening, particularly 
for those held under the 90-day clause of the Security Act because it is indefinite 
(contrary to its name). Moreover, letters, books and any of the other privileges 
allowed to convicted prisoners are prohibited. The fear is born out of the 
engulfing void within which one must survive, secure in the knowledge of 
oneself. Prisoners are relatively powerless in the construction of their own 
identities in prison and, for the most part, political prisoners are isolated. Ruth 
First is not expected, indeed, not permitted, to participate in the cleaning ritual of 
the prison but must remain an auditory observer from her cell in Marshall 
Square. The effect of this is to enforce on her the identity of the 1White Madam' 
which outside of prison she has chosen to shun. She writes of this persona with 
a certain detachment: 'The cleaning session was a chance to get out of the 
cooped-up communal African cells on the other side of the building and an 
opportunity to check on the police station talk that in the women's cells were 
sitting well-dressed Madams equipped with suitcases, pillows and thermos 
flasks, as though they had fallen on bad days .. .' (38). Shortly hereafter she . 
describes how the 'cha-cha cleaners' were or~ered 'to bring hot water for the 
"missus". That was me' (39). The 'me' that is thrust upon her by the racist prison 
system is antithetical to the identity she builds outside of prison as an activist 
against racism. Set apart from black prisoners, she is allowed to keep her cotton 
and thread, her nightgown and her own clothing. 
Mashinini, Makhoere and Resha, however, are stripped of all belongings and 
forced to don the belittling prison garments as a sign of their criminal identity. For 
Resha the ugly brown uniform and red 'doek' lock her into a sort of madness. The 
prison uniforms are seen in direct contrast to the 'clean, white uniforms' of her 
nursing colleagues. The text sets up an institutional opposition of hospital (place of 
healing and respectability) to 'lunatic asylum': 
And the more I put this in my mind, the more I hated the ugly uniform we 
had on, and the red scarves on our heads. It was so depressing; I felt as 
if I were in a lunatic asylum. (Resha 1991, 176) 
There are other ways in which prisoners are locked into an identity inirnioal to . 
< 
them. Resha is profoundly disturbed when branded a prostitute by the matron as 
r---- . 
punishment for having protected her knees while polishing the floor: 
What I had feared was physical punishment, but that was nothing 
compared to being called· 'Tickie Line', which was a synonym for the 
cheapest of prostitutes. Although I was very angry, I was powerless to do 
anything about the label 'prostitute'. {172) 
After explaining old South African currency she exclaims that 'you can see how 
terrible the insult was' {173). What smarts is not simply the suggestion that she is 
licentious, but that she is of little value, 'cheap'. Without the support of her family 
structure, her Congress involvement and her relationships within her community 
~ 
there is little to point to in defence of who she understands herself to be. She has 
recourse to nothing when undermined by the matron whereas, in relating to other 
prisoners, her reputation goes before her to secure.something of her free self. 
Resha is not in isolation and, unlike First who as the only white woman political 
prisoner is kept separate throughout her stay in detention, she is expected to 
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participate in the daily work routine of the prison. As a result, she is able to interact 
with other women and experience a sense of solidarity in being a fellow-inmate. At 
least, this is what is constructed in her text which allows her the opportunity of 
representing her own activism as respected by other prisoners {although, according 
to Resha, few of the other prisoners are politically active). Her activism immediately 
places her in a discursive {and political) category which Resha indicates by the use 
of quotation marks: 
[T]wo long-term prisoners remembered me from 1958. They were very 
kind to me, and gave me extra blankets. They also related to others how 
the 'Congress Women' helped to solve the problem of the exchanging of 
sanitary pads. (1991, 168) 
In this way an image of herself is sent back to Resha and she is not left unnerved 
and unsure of herself. The experience of being left in bleak isolation, however, 
makes it very difficult to keep alive any sense of self at all, without more dynamic, 
interactive relationships with the people and objects with which one surrounds 
oneself. It is not surprising, then, to find that, for Mashinini, interrogation seems to ,. -
operate as a sort of mirror in providing a welcome opportunity to 'recognise' herself 
through experiencing herself in dialogue with others. Interrogation is the only 
,_ ' 
possible mirror, even although the image it returns is distorted and refracted via the 
scurrilous, twisted Jens of the state security system. When this mirror is taken away 
from Mashinini, she is at a loss. 
And then, one day, the interrogations just stopped. That was it- bang. 
No word. Nothing about why. And I missed them. I thought once again I 
was going to be sitting in that room all by myself. (87) 
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The concept of a mirroring or recognition of self presupposes a sure image 
or visual 'self-possession' at a stage prior to the moment of seeing and belies the 
inescapable fact that identity is not fixed, and never can be, so that any attempt 
to present a complete and coherent self will necessarily fail. It is perhaps only 
the anxiety itself, evident in both Mashinini passages discussed above, that 
speaks truthfully. The need for the consoling reflection of a mirror image speaks 
of the persistent fear that there may be nothing to see. However, it is precisely 
the text's acknowledgement and even tolerance of this anxiety which marks its 
value for an exploration of the process of self-representation in language. 
Moreover, it is precisely this vulnerability which makes reading the text a moving 
encounter. 
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4. The Captive Body as Symbol and as Subject 
4.1 Resisting significations and the role of the body 
Caesarina Kana Makhoere's account of her imprisonment following the 1976 
student boycotts articulates more clearly than the other narratives in this study 
that, contrary to what one might assume, the object of state power can be said to 
be the body itself. Imprisonment is an attempt to subjugate and contain the 
insubordinate body. It is her black, dissident, (militarily trained) female body -
already deprived and discriminated against by what she calls 'the apartheid 
gods' - which is imprisoned. Consequently, her demands while in prison are all 
bodily demands, her fight for political recognition is a fight at the l~vel of the 
body itself. 
Makhoere grew up in Mamelodi, a 'township' on the Eastern borders of 
Pretoria, north of Johannesburg. In describing the events in which Mamelodi 
school~ were burnt down, Makhoere argues that 'that was the only way we could 
show our bitterness' (5). The first and most famous incident took place on 16 
June 1976 when 15,000 Soweto school pupils marched on Orlando West Junior 
Secondary School in protest against the educational authorities' insistence on 
Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in·certain subjects. Peaceful protest was 
met with brutal treatment from the police. Rubber bullets were shot into the 
crowd when they failed to disperse with tear gas. Two students were killed, 
hundreds injured. The rest of that year was characterised by a series of 
confrontations between reactionary police and boycotting students, on a national 
scale. What Makhoere's text does not reflect is the fact that mu·ch of the 
excessive violence was carried out, with the support of the police, by the older 
angry African hostel dwellers, angered at the disturbances of the youth. 21 
Responding to violence with further violence, she offers this rationale for 
having physically beaten up the white state-supporting teachers: 'this was the 
language they understood best' (6). Certainly violence is used against 
Makhoere with alarming frequency, both before and during imprisonment. 
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According to her account, she experiences great brufality during her five years of 
imprisonment. Her text records with obsessive attention the tussle between the 
prison authorities' attempts to extort obedience and her own refusal to comply. 
The battle inside prison is as much a war as the military battle being waged by 
'our brothers' on the borders and within the country. Her frequent threat to the 
warders is that the Umkhonto weSizwe (MK) soldiers fighting in Angola will 
retaliate. Her identification with MK goes further: she compares her fate with that 
of an executed soldier, Solomon Mahlangu: they are comrades fighting in the 
same war against 'the racist regime' (73). During one of her beatings she 
, accuses her assailants of cowardice: 
[T]hey were afraid of our brothers on the borders, let them go to Angola, 
SWAPO would shoot them to pieces, the bloody fucking cowards, they 
were just ill-treating women, knowing that we did not have weapons, 
anything; I'd just smash them to pieces anyway- after liberation. I would 
just show them. (61) 
21 Tom Lodge writes that.'a section of the migrant worker population of Mzimhlope Hostel in 
Soweto, with the toleration and even alleged encouragement of the police, raged through the 
streets of the township killing any young people they found in their path .... There were similar 
tensions between Langa hostel dwellers and school pupils in Cape Town later in the year' (1983, 
329). 
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However, Makhoere is able to find weapons - both literal and figurative 
- while imprisoned. Certainly she is fully conscious of the physical nature of 
her own battle and thus expresses no. remorse for her part in inflicting physical 
pain as she resists attempts to subjugate her and her comrades. When she . . 
attacks the hated wardress, nicknamed 'Mbomvana' (meaning 'red') because of 
her anger towards political prisoners, Makhoere's only regret is that she does not 
finally manage to kill Mbomvana in the series of scuffles that ensue. For the 
rest, 'we had nothing of which to repent' (75). The first attack on Mbomvana 
continues until blood flows: 
We stabbed her several timeswith those mathematical instruments. We 
had made up our minds that this person was not going to treat us like this; 
we wanted to kill her, there and then. Let us kill her and they can hang 
. us. Because we have had enough of her. We assaulted her for a long 
time, stabbing her in the face, on the head, on the body, all over. She 
was bleeding on to the passage floor. After we had satisfied ourselves we 
went back to our cells. (64) 
After one of Mbomvana's retaliatory attacks (there are several wtiich follow 
this initial incident) Makhoere herself is left in great pain: every 'part of [her] body 
was screaming' (68). However, it is not the physical pain itself that is most 
disturbing to Makhoere, but what the powerlessness signifies: 'I learnt what 
helplessness meant. I couldn't do anything. I was beaten.' During this attack by 
Mbomvana, Makhoere wishes she could kill her. Nothing less than the (final) 
destruction of the wardress's body would satisfy her, and the fact that she is 
unable to effect this reduces her to tears. 
When they left, I just dropped on top of my bed and cried. Everything was 
painful; but what made me cry most of all was that I knew that if I had 
been able to kill Mbomvana, it would have been better for me. At least I 
would have known that I had killed this one pig who had made my life so 
miserable. (68) 
This is an extreme example of the instinctive awareness which pervades 
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the text, that the battle for empowerment and autonomy is waged physically. It is 
bodily obedience that is sought by the authorities as a symbol of their hegemonic 
power. Thus, wherever possible, Makhoere elects to defy the regulations which 
require physical co-operation. To comply physically would be to submit to the 
arbitrary discipline of the system and participate in the obliteration of her political 
autonomy. Anthony Giddens (whose insights into the structures of disciplinary 
space will be discussed at length in chapter six) makes the controversial 
suggestion that subjugation requires 'more or less continuous compliance' from 
those who are its 'subjects' even if 'the achievement of compliance is itself a 
fragile and contingent accomplishment .. .' (Giddens 1985, 287). 
To yield to prison routine and to accede to the disciplinary regime would 
be to affirm the power of the authorities. Makhoere, for her part, refuses to 
comply at every possible opportunity. She recognises that the arbitrary 
regulations requiring her to stand to attention, dress in a particular way, etc., are 
vectors of a much more (politically) significant and sinister coercive strategy than 
is implied in the rationale of maintaining neatness and order. It is designed to 
stifle any opposition from Makhoere and other dissidents with whom she may 
identify. Her strategy is therefore to refuse whatever is being demanded of her, 
thus registering her opposition; resistance is what propels her narrative, as 
Dorothy Driver has argued: 
Given that her intended focus is her refusal to give in, the dramatic 
direction of her narrative is always towards survival: the survival of a 
fighting spirit which refuses to bow down under the systematic 
dehumanisation dealt it both outside and inside prison .... 
Reversal is Makhoere's consistent strategy. (1991, 349) 
When the head wardress demands that she stand to attention, Makhoere 
recognises that this would be to symbolise her acquiescence (and therefore the 
supremacy of the warders and their regime): whenever 'she talked to me she 
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wanted me to stand up with my hands behind my back. She always wanted me 
to show obedience' (9). Makhoere is therefore intractable and refuses thereafter 
to stand to attention or to parade during the rest of her time in prison (33). The 
fact that the wardresses elect not to challenge this act of resistance is an 
affirmation of her power. When other political prisoners follow suit, their unity -
and thus their efficacy - is strengthened. 
In a rather extraordinary reversal of the structures of discipline, Makhoere 
manages to secure the obedience of the wardresses who have to ask permission 
to .eat from the peach tree of which the prisoners claim (moral) ownership. 
'Eventually the wardresses accepted that it was more peaceful to ask our 
permission to eat those peaches' (20). The prisoners are thus not entirely 
powerless, as acknowledged by the wardresses' 'obedience'. This particular 
battle over the peaches takes place in a context of a greater struggle, involving . . . 
tensions betwe~n authorities' attempts to maintain a veneer of legitimate 
governance and the dissidents' determination to expose the system as being 
corrupt. Makhoere is quite explicit: life in prison is a continuation of the struggle 
against apartheid going on outside. 
The wardresses were not free to abuse the (political) prisoners. The 
international outcry following Steve Biko's death in detention in 1977 had · 
sparked a limited attempt on the part of the authorities to tread more carefully 
with political prisoners. 22 Moreover, the new generation of activist was unlike the 
old, as Nelson Mandela recounts in his autobiography: 
These young men were a different breed of prisoner from those we had 
seen before. They were brave, hostile and aggressive; they would not 
take orders, and shouted 'Amandla!' at every opportunity. Their instinct 
was to confront rather than cooperate. The authorities did not know how 
to handle them, and they turned the island upside down.... In their 
anxiousness to deal with these young lions, the authorities more or less 
let us fend for ourselves .... (1994, 471, 475) 
On Robben Island manual labour was brought to an end in 1977, which Mandela 
ascribes to protest and 'simple logistics'. The new prisoners were 'so bold tha·t 
each man seemed to require his own warder' (Mandela 1994, 475). 
So, when the hated Mbomvana tries to 'assume control of our beautiful 
peach tree' it is easier for the wardresses not to fight. Makhoere and fellow 
prisoners lay claim to a moral authority in demanding that she comply. What is 
at issue in the matter of the peaches is not the peaches themselves nor the 
rightness of who should have access to them, but the assertion of control. 
She had to ask permission from us, which we often refused, to get near 
that peach tree. The supervisor in charge of our tree was Mama Dorothy. 
We gave permission to all prisoners only. We very rarely gave 
permission to prison officials. Agh, those peaches were nice. (20) 
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22 In November 1974 South Africa had been expelled from the United Nations General Assembly 
and in July 1975 the Organisation of African Unity had adopted a Pan-Africanist Congress 
document the effect of which was to declare South Africa's international status illegal (Lodge 
1983, 314-15). Politicians inside the country continued to feign indifference while heavy 
censorship kept citizens ignorant of political realities, such as the extent of the discontent within 
the country, the war against Angola as part of a regional destabilisation offensive and 
international condemnation of apartheid abuses. 
The expression of satisfaction is linked with having access to the language of 
domination ('permission', 'supervisor in charge') but it is the materiality of the 
peaches which provides the focus for this contest over social control. The 
peaches, as objects of ownership and fairness, are the tangible, visible 
indicators in the tussle over control, just as her own body, in its refusal to 
perform obedience, functions as a symbol of h~r resistance. 
When Mbomvana ignores their demand they are able to lodge an official 
complaint. Thus they exploit a rare moment when official channels may be used 
to the prisoners' advantage and protection. As Don Foster and Diane Sandler 
suggest, in their investigation into conditions of detention in the 1980s, 
detainees' access to official protection in the form of doctors, prison inspections, 
etc. was infrequent and arbitrarily given. This, they argue, was contrary to the 
evidence of state records. Makhoere's account suggests that her experience as 
a convicted prisoner was somewhat different: '[w]e had many visits from prison 
staff members, asking for complaints. Now we took a resolution that we were not 
going to speak to them' (52). Official visits merely become another object upon 
which to encode her resistance. 
The recurring refrain of Makhoere's text is, simply, an insistence on saying 
"'no"'. 'Her way of being heard and recognised - her fight against mutedness 
and invisibility - is, simply, to say No. She says No at every turn' (Driver 1991, 
349). Even towards the end of her sentence, spent in bleak isolation in 
Klerksdorp Prison, she continues to assert her resistance, articulated plainly:. 
'You have to be able to say no' (119). Her text valorises resistance above all 
else: 'a .person has to continue to resist to the very last, irrespective of the 
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pressure that person is under' (84). In the same way that the 'people said "no"' 
to the apartheid state (47), so too would she continue to assert her refusal while 
in prison: refusal to work, refusal to clothe herself in prison gear, refusal to 
accept the discriminatory treatment of prisoners of different race groups. 
They had been under the illusion that they would just break us, turn us 
into ja-baas (yes-boss), divide us, break our spirits, shatter our unity. We 
made it clear they would never succeed in chaining our spirits. They had 
the idea that putting us in prison would solve the problem, keep us quiet; it 
surprised them that even in prison we said 'no' to the apartheid regime, 
we said 'no' to the oppressors, we said 'no' to the exploiters. We 
demanded equal treatment, resisted all their discriminatory laws. (47) 
Throughout her narrative she insists that her body itself can be as 
intransigent and uncompromising as her 'spirit'. Her body will not be positioned, 
passively, without fierce - sometimes violent- resistance. Her insistence on 
'no' is thus also, and primarily, delivered through her body which is represented 
as being invulnerable in its assertion of defiance. The power of her proclamation 
is not affected by beatings and hunger strikes. Hunger, in her text, is a signifier 
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of the degree to which she has been wronged and so is used textually as yet 
another weapon. The hunger is not allowed to indicate weakness: 
Full people, people who had eaten a delicious breakfast who had filled up 
on healthy food for the whole week, came to fight women they thought 
must be weak from not eating. But perhaps they did not know that you 
can get really angry when you are hungry. (51) 
Their bodies are represented as being indestructible, which suggests that a 
distinction must be drawn between the way the body functions in the text and 
what her experience of her body might have been in reality. 
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When the station commander at Silverton Police Station forbids her to 
sing, her uncomplicated enjoyment of singing takes on a new and more 
satisfying delight because it becomes a vehicle of the same message of denial: 
'He threatened that if I continued with that kind of behaviour he would send me 
away. I liked that, and started to sing louder' (11.). Singing is both a physical 
and a linguistic activity, epitomising, as I see it, the nature of Makhoere's 
defiance: utterly physical in its production yet self-consciously vocal. Anthony D. 
Cavaluzzi highlights the linguistic nature of the songs which he describes as a 
means to overcome the effective ban on communication imposed on prisoners by 
solitary confinement. Makhoere's songs were 'combinations of spirituals and 
revolutionary hymns, often ending with a call for violent action against the 
oppressor' (Cavaluzzi 1991, 16). 'This rewriting of basic christian lyrics is not 
uncommon to groups attempting to break free from a colonial situation' and thus 
links Makhoere to a tradition of resistance (1991, 16). The songs do not simply 
constitute defiance in the face of a warder's command; they are invested with 
signifiers of resistance. 
Makhoere's strategy of ignoring the wardresses entails a similarly physical 
yet richly communicative statement. She assigns (or, as. she puts it in the text, 
'we' being used instead of 'I', they assign) a name to this (non-)action, 'dis'. This 
suitably irreverent abbreviation could also be read as a brutalisation of the 
English word 'this' and thus as a signifier of her refusal neatly to adopt a 
dominant language (in.the way that, for example, African American rap culture 
might do). Makhoere is at pains to explain how it is used linguistically: 
They would come and we would ignore them. · We called it 'dis', for 
'disregard' - you 'dis', you give them 'dis'. That one weapon completely 
frustrated them; they became flustered. (52) 
Other actions are less obviously articulations of resistance but equally 
self-conscious in their message. Her violent objection to wearing the prison 
uniform is a response to the diminishment of self that the clothing symbolises: 
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Looking at this ensemble, a normal, reasonable person could see that this 
was insane. The place looked like a mental asylum when we appeared in 
these crazy combinations of clothes .... These people had decided to treat 
us like mad people, but identically mad, a uniform insanity. (21) 
She initiates a boycott of the clothing about which other prisoners feel 
ambivalent. Her own position is uncompromising and based on the 
discriminatory nature of the sets of uniforms: 'I have told these people I wish to 
wear the same type of clothes as the white prisoners' whose uniforms were more 
varied and, according to Makhoere, more stylish (35). The attempt by the prison 
staff to placate Makhoere by providing her with roughly hewn 'sandals' (which 
·were in effect poorly adapted shoes) is met with anger and further recalcitrance. 
The style of shoe itself - whether open or closed - is irrelevant. The 
discriminatory denial (for it is a denial to black prisoners only) of the privilege of 
choice (albeit limited) is not. Her rejection of the Christmas day privilege of 
wearing civilian clothing may appear to contradict her previous demand for the 
right to wear her own clothing, but Makhoere recognises that the relations of 
power are unchanged by one exceptional occasion of privilege. The apparently 
generous offer merely entrenches the fact that the prisoners are still dependent, 
still treated prejudicially, still without autonomy. 
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[W]e did not intend to take as a special Christmas privilege_ something that 
we regarded as our right the whole year round. So we refused to put on 
our own clothes .... we should wear our own clothes every day, all the year 
round, just like the white prisoners did, not only on Christmas Day. (24) 
The contest around food similarly suggests that Makhoere is fully 
conscious of the degree to which (punitive) physical arrangements constitute the 
currency in the exchange of social and political control. She recognises and is 
enraged by the fact that rotten and unwholesome food for black prisoners 
articulates the same apartheid hostility which drove her to join the resistance 
movement. Repeated throughout the narrative is the charge that black prisoners 
are treated inhumanely: the food is not fit for human consumption, and therefore 
implies that the prisoners are not accorded the dignity and value of a juridical 
person. Her response is simply not to eat, in order to demonstrate the living 
death to which she is subjected and to demand an acknowledgement of her 
subjedhood. 
Thus, the 'hunger strike began. It had never happened in the history of 
South Africa that women prisoners had been on a hunger strike' (30). 23 Her 
narrative immediately establishes the communal nature of the act of protest and 
positions it within the context of the liberation struggle. The target of the protest 
is 'the system' which continues to oppress blacks. So, what is in essence a 
personal and bodily activity - consumption of food - becomes an intensely and 
23 Ruth First embarked upon a brief hunger strike after having been rearrested immediately after 
her release from the first period of ninety days in detention. See 117 Days, 112-13. Makhoere's 
hunger strike may be the first embarked upon by a group of women in a South African prison. 
Makhoere does not attempt to give historical evidence for this assertion (which would possibly 
work to detract from its forcefulness). Regardless of the historical accuracy of the claim, it 
speaks of Makhoere's perception of the enormity of the undertaking and her belief that she 
(extended, as is typical in her text, to 'they') is (are) uniquely defiant. 
self-consciously political activity. The body's starvation signifies and re-enacts 
the horror of being denied political empowerment while simultaneously 
articulating a potent challenge and flouting disempowerment. The physical 
weakness brought on by lack of food is glossed over and is not separated in the 
text from the anger her defiance produces: 'This anger helped me to be strong' 
(70). She addresses the wardress: 
We have nothing to lose if we don't eat. This system is not afraid of 
scandals; you are used to them. Having killed a person like Steve Biko, 
then who are we: So we don't think you mind killing us or any other 
people. We won't stop fighting for our rights. You'd better know that. (30) 
She mocks the veneer of paternalistic benevolence maintained by the prison 
system, refusing the medical treatment offered by the prison staff: 'I'm not going 
to see their doctor. Because I don't need his treatment. ... I'm not ill. What I want 
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is proper food, edible food' (30-31 ). In fact the weakness brought on from lack of 
food is life-threatening, so that on two separate occasions fellow hunger-strikers 
are put into straitjackets and force-fed. But this response on the part of the 
authorities is as brutal a counter-offensive as, for example, Makhoere's attack on 
Mbomvana. When Elizabeth Nhlapo calls for help, weak from going without food 
and from a kidney operation, Makhoere demands that the prison staff 'go and · 
attend to that comrade who is ill' (53). Makhoere is anxious that Nhlapo's 
treatment not involve eating food because 'the minute they were able to force 
one of us to eat - putting Elizabeth in a straitjacket would mean that -
everything would flop' (53). What constitutes.being 'ill' or 'well', 'good treatment' 
or 'bad treatment', 'good food' or 'bad food', 'acceptable shoes' or 'unacceptable 
shoes', 'hooligans' or 'fellow prisoners', and so on, is entirely under the control of 
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Makhoere's pen and depends on the political agenda of the textual moment. 
(Nhlapo's illness ceases to be a concern at this point. She is mentioned again 
much later [89 and 91] as one of four political prisoners who are transferred to 
Pretoria Central Prison soon after Makhoere is moved there.) 
Makhoere and her comrades are not alone in bodily resistance.· She 
recounts the experience of a condemned prisoner, Caroline from Cape Town, 
who was sentenced to death for killing her employer after the woman had 
threatened to have her arrested for stealing: 
I knew the voice of the doctor and those of the medical people. They 
were trying to force her to eat her food. It was Caroline who was refusing 
to eat, yelling that she did not see the reason why she had to eat, since 
the apartheid regime had already decided to take her soul away ... She 
was refusing to take a bath, refusing to talk to anyone. (85) 
Caroline's refusal to keep her body functioning normally may well be suggestive 
of severe depression rather than ardent protest (which is how Makhoere 
repres.ents her own numerous and self-affirming hunger strikes). Despite 
Caroline's apparent resignation to the fact that she is already damned -
designated dead - by the state, her story, as represented in Makhoere's 
' . 
narrative, attests to what Michel Foucault proposes: at the heart of the penal 
.? system it is the body that is at issue (1977a). It is the body which is imprisoned in 
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a bid to circumscribe the (political) subject and to constrain other 'free' citizens within· 
a carefully guarded system of social control. The move away from the spectacle of 
punishment to the institutionalised 'rehabilitation of the soul' merely obscures the fact 
that, according to Foucault, what is at issue is the body itself, as signifier of the 
politically constituted subject. 
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In a country where censorship has played such an important role in 
suppressing dissidence Foucault's emphasis on the body might seem 
inappropriate. For cef"!sorship works powerfully to stifle thought, not only making 
invisible or inaccessible that which has been articulated, but stunting thought at 
its inception through self-censorship. It is important to note two things, if 
Foucault's emphasis on the body is to be proven useful. First, the body, as 
conceived of by Foucault, is not separate from the 'mind' or 'spirif or other 
formulations, such as Spivak's notion of the subject's 'constitutionality' (1988), whi.ch 
acknowledge politically substantial subjecthood. Their interconnectedness will 
become evident in the course of this discussion and the analysis of Makhoere's text. 
Second, the phenomenon of censorship itself deserves clo~er attention. In 
an essay which provides an overview of censorship legislation in apartheid 
South Africa and its effects on literary studies, Nick Visser describes how the 
Minister of Interior went about justifying the provisions in Section 9(3) of the 
proposed Publications Act 42 of 197 4 which banned for possession literature 
which was deemed 'dangerous to the state' (Visser 1992, 490). The Minister 
cited literature detailing plans of power stations and water reservoirs, or 
instructions on how to make bombs, as examples of those publications likely to 
fall foul of the Act. According to Visser, within four years of the Act a third of all 
books banned were banned for possession under Section 9(3). Visser's point 
concerns the alarming proportions of bannings issued with reference to 
censorship laws originally aimed to curb the planting of bombs. Even mildly anti-
racism texts, including most works of fiction by black South African writers, were 
censored. There is another point to be stressed. The attempt to impose heavy 
censorship, as articulated in the P?rliament of apartheid South Africa, had at its 
root a paranoia about 'physical' safety. The maintenance of 'Law and Order'24 
was dependent on limiting access to ideas as well as armoury. For the threat of 
political dissidence (of the sort that was likely to emerge from reading a 
dissenting book) was conceived of as a physical threat. 
4.2 Michel Foucault and Structures of Discipline 
In the opening chapter of Discipline and Punish (1977a) entitled 'The Body of the 
Condemned' Foucault observes that the disappearance of public executions in 
France at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries 
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marked the point at which the object of punishment shifted from being the body itself, 
locus of pain and object of spectacle, to being the more nebulous entity of the· 
juridical person: 
The guillotine takes life alrnost without touching the body, just as prison 
deprives of liberty or a fine reduces wealth. It is intended to apply the law 
not so much to a real body capable of feeling pain as to a juridical subject, 
the possessor, among other rights, of the right to exist. It had to have the 
abstraction of the law itself. ( 1977 a, 13) 
Punishment becomes focused on constraining liberty and tempering personhood, so 
that from 'being an art of unbearable sensations punishment has become an 
economy of suspended rights' concerning which the body functions as a tool, the 
corporeal expression and only tangible evidence of the infliction of the more complex 
24 The 'Ministry of Law and Order' was the name given to the governmental department dealing 
with the police service, before the change of government in South Africa in 1993. 
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manipulations known as punishment (1977a, 11 ). The use of 'technicians' in the 
developing fields of the human sciences, from doctors and warders to chaplains and 
psychologists, attests to this historical shift (1977a, 11 ). Furthermore, their use 
speaks of another radical shift: the discourse of criminology addresses itself to the 
individual, so that the criminal as well as the crime is judged: 
Certainly the 'crimes' and 'offences' on which judgement is passed are 
juridical objects defined by the code, but judgement is also passed on the 
passions, instincts, anomalies, infirmities, maladjustments, effects of 
environment or heredity; acts of aggression are punished, so also, 
through them, is aggressivity; rape, but at the same time perversions; 
murders, but also drives and desires .... They are judged indirectly as 
'attenuating circumstances' that introduce into the verdict not only 
'circumstantial' evidence, but something quite different, which is not 
juridically codifiable: the knowledge of the criminal, one's estimation of 
him, what is known about the relations between him, his past and his 
crime, and what might be expected of him in the future .... The criminal's 
soul is not referred to in the trial merely to explain his crime and as a 
factor in the juridical apportioning of responsibility; if it is brought before 
the court, with such pomp and circumstance, such concern to understand 
and such 'scientific' application, it is because it too, as well as the crime 
itself, is to be judged and to share in the punishment. ( 17-18) 
The heightened sophistication of a criminological jurisprudence which appears to 
aim its penal code at the criminal 'soul' rather than the body responsible for a given 
crime is misleadingly disingenuous, if one follows Foucault's reasoning. While 'the 
penalty ... no longer addresses itself to the body' but to 'the soul' (1977a, 167) the 
altered strategy has more to do with an impulse on the part of the judicial system to 
abdicate responsibility, to appear to be a mere conduit of an humane, natural and 
paternalistic justice rather than the author of an arbitrary and controlling code. 
According to Foucault's analysis the employment of so-called experts in the human 
'sciences' to make a judgement about the psychological state of the alleged criminal 
obscures the judicial system's discretionary role in according punishment. By 
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deferring to 'non-juridical' elements, such as psychiatric evidence regarding the 
appropriateness of the sentence (based on a character assessment of the alleged 
criminal) the judgement parades itself as 'the cure' in what Foucault terms 'medico-
judicial treatment' (1977a, 22). What Foucault refers to as the 'new penal system' 
(1977a, 22) has the veneer of a new sense of humaneness, having apparently (and 
ostentatiously) abandoned the excesses and cruelties of the old. According to 
Foucault, those extra-juridical disciplines which have become part of the penal 
process have not been redefined in legal terms specifically in order to obfuscate the 
operation of juridi,cal power: 
[W]hat is odd about modern criminal justice is that, although it has taken 
on so many extra-juridical elements, it has done so not in order to be able 
to define them juridically and gradually to integrate them into the actual 
power to. punish: on the contrary, it has done so in order to make them 
function within the penal operation as non-juridical elements; in order to 
stop this operation being simply a legal punishment; in order to exculpate 
the judge from being purely and simply he who punishes. 'Of course, we 
pass sentence, but this sentence is not in direct relation to the crime. It is 
quite clear that for us it functions as a way of treating a criminal. We 
punish, but this is a way of saying that we wish to obtain a cure.' (1977a, 
22; emphasis added) 
Nonetheless, Foucault argues, all penal systems are steeped in 'a certain 
"political economy" of the body' so that 'even when they use "lenient" methods 
involving confinement or correction, it is always the body that is at issue' (1977a, 24). 
The body is central in the production of knowledge which has at its core the 
operation of power (1977a, 28). The increasingly sophisticated dynamics of modern 
penal codes has merely masked the fact by introducing the concept of the 'soul' 
through the fields of psychiatry, criminal anthropology, religion, education, etc., yet 
still at root is the subjugation of 'the body'. For Foucault, 'the soul is the effect and 
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instrument of a political anatomy; the soul is the prison of the body' (1977a, 30; 
emphasis added). The notion of the 'soul' provides the stumbling block to freedom; 
because the 'soul' is invoked, the body will be imprisoned.· 
This reversal of the maxim is startlingly thought-provoking and perhaps 
easily misunderstood as a denial of subjectivity. Foucault's challenge is to the 
institutional commandeering of the notion of the 'soul', with all its religious 
overtones of 'good' and 'evil', in order more slickly and less obviously to 
strengthen a system of social control. Thus, while previously the discourses of 
imprisonment were undoubtedly focused on the corporeal and material, it 
became necessary to introduce a more subtle system of social control which did 
not lend itself as easily to being resisted: 
85 
[Previously there were] revolts, at the level of the body, against the very 
body of the prison. What was at issue was not whether the prison 
environment was too harsh or too aseptic, too primitive or too efficient, but 
its very materiality as an instrument and vector of power; it is this whole 
technology of power over the body that the [subsequent] technology of the 
'soul' - that of the educationalists, psychologists and psychiatrists - fails 
either to conceal or to compensate, for the simple reason that it is one of 
its tools. (1977a, 30) 
The rehabilitation of the 'soul', then, is merely the sophisticated recasting of a 
process of subjugation similarly harsh and controlling and just as crude - and 
corporeal - as any public display of torture in the eighteenth century. 
. . 
Never is this more apparent than when the penal system addresses itself to 
political dissidents whose actions are not easily translated into the vocabulary of the 
criminal justice system without implausible reference to social delinquency and the 
spiritualised morality implicit in the notion of the soul. The careful provision of a 
bible, when no other reading material is allowed, is pointed to by both Caesarina 
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Kana Makhoere and Ruth First as being one of the ironies of the South African penal 
code. First's text makes a mockery of the false piety implicit in the policy and a 
warder's exhortation that she read 'the Book. And get down on your knees, down on 
your knees' (64). 
fT]he Security Branch conceded us the Bible not to deepen our faith and 
understanding and improve our religious erudition, but out of deference to 
the Calvinist religion of the Cabinet and the Nationalist [sic] Party which, 
mysteriously, justifies apartheid policy by its interpretation of divine 
' teaching, and could therefore deny the ballast of this theology to no 
prisoner, not even an atheist political. Giving us the Bible, they seemed to 
think, fulfilled the State's Christian duty to us as prisoners. We had the 
Book and our consciences in solitude ... (65-6) 
Makhoere's sense of outrage drowns out any subtle satirical tones: 'And these same 
people call themselves Christians' ( 101 ). Her text acknowledges a particular 
formulation of Christian values which is offended by the apartheid regime's wrongful 
appropriation. But Makhoere's reference to Christianity is strategic, lending support 
to her construction of herself as having been wronged. For the rest her text is quick 
to expose the illegitimacy of the authorities' stance as guardians of lost souls and the 
hypocrisy of religious figures such as the African priest whose damaging testimony is 
crucial in securing the case against her. 
Foucault's analysis of the use of psy9ho-spiritual terms exposes their use as· 
being saturated in oppositional relations of power. The humanitarian gloss is 
shallow, argues Foucault, for the 'soul' - along with concepts such as 'psyche, 
subjectivity, personality, consciousness' -is a discursive construct which conceals 
. the more sinister agenda of retribution, the focus of which is the body. 
Even in his earlier use of the 'body', however, it is clear that Foucault's 
conceptualisation of the body is not as an object in physiological terms alone. For 
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Foucault the body functions as a site of political and cultural investments and 
operates within discourse, not apart from it. An unusually explicit articulation of his 
conceptualisation of the body points to this most clearly: 
The body is the inscribed surface of events (traced by language and 
dissolved by ideas), the locus of a dissociated Self (adopting the illusion 
of a substantial unity), and a volume in perpetual disintegration. 
Genealogy, as an analysis of descent, is thus situated within the 
articulation of the body and history. Its task is to expose a body totally 
imprinted by history and the processes of history's destruction of the body. 
(Foucault, 1977b, 148). 
The body is thus imbued with political significances and representations of 
selfhood, as becomes more explicit in Foucault's later writing. In The Uses of 
Pleasure (1984a) and The Care of the Self (1984b), the last two volumes of The 
History of Sexuality (1978), Foucault turns his attention from modern penal 
codes and regulatory institutions to Greek practi.ces of self regulation and sexual 
conduct. Elizabeth Grosz rightly points out that while the themes of ethics, 
power and containment are still a focus, he is now 'primarily concerned with the 
genesis or self-creation of subjectivity' (158). Foucault articulates his project this 
way: 'to analyze the practices by which individuals were led to focus their 
attention on themselves, to decipher, recognize, and acknowledge themselves 
as subjects of desire ... [so that they] discover, in desire, the truth of their being' 
(195). Existence is intertwined with the activities and positioning of the body, that 
is, how the body is represented and 'read'. The functioning of the body as the 
palimpsest upon which the self is inscribed is the primary object of Foucault's 
investigation, for the body is the substance through which being-in-the-world is 
experienced and represented. 
It is for this reason that the concept of the body demands to be addressed 
in a discussion of the constitution of the subject, particularly where subjectivity 
has been challenged through the institution of imprisonment and where writing 
functions as an act of resistance and self-assertion as in the case of Makhoere's 
text. It is useful to examine the way in which bodies-are represented in 




5. Bodily Specificities 
5.1 The 'Body. as a Cultural Entity 
. ,, Foucault conceives of 'the body' as the result of the workings of power, rather than a 
natural entity to which one can refer in an apparently transparent language. This is 
not to deny the 'material reality of anatomically discrete bodies' but it is to suggest 
that 'it is impossible to know the materiality of the body outside of its cultural 
significations' (McNay 1980, 30). The bddy is not separate and distinct from the way 
in which it functions in discourse. It will always be imbued with the workings of 
power: 'the body cannot be known in its unadorned state' (McNay 1985, 30). 
It is precisely in view of this conceptuansation of the cultural value of the notion 
of the body that Lois McNay declares Foucault's own expositions inadequat~ in 
accounting fort.he gendered body. Sandra Lee Bartky has cautioned that 
Foucault is 'blind to those disciplines that produce a modality of embodiment that 
is peculiarly feminine. To overlook the forms of subjection that engender t~e 
feminine body is to perpetuate the silence and powerlessness of those upon 
whom these disciplines have been imposed' (Bartky 1988, 64). 'For Foucault, the 
Qds.on.er's_b.ody,ir.:1deedJbedi$.CJQlined body in general, is often implic_illy_g~ 
J;!.e..male.: (McNay 1985, 34) whereas in fact female criminality is often understood to 
differ from male criminality and the institutions which address themselves to each 
articulate themselve_§_qiff~~'!!!.~ This is particularly true in South Africa where 
----~~ 
prisoners are grouped with reference to gender/race. categories (such as, 'white 
women' and 'black women') and treated accordingly. 'Race and gender most 
obviously function as potent signs in the organisation of power relations in South 
African society' argues Judith Coullie (1991, 12). 
, White women political prisoners, for instance, have carried an added burden 
r of condemnation for 'betraying' white nationalism. Marion Sparg, a journalist and 
ANC activist in the 1980s, was sentenced to 25 years imprisonment on a charge of 
treason in November 1986 for planting bombs at police stations in Port Eli:zabeth 
and Johannesburg. In the Supreme Court judgement in which leave to appeal was 
refused, Justice P.J. van der Walt exclaims: 'It was the first and hopefully the last 
case of this nature in our country of a white woman who joined a black terrorist 
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organisation .... ~he was SJnteocedJor,.h§r lack of re12entance and for what she did. 
Rehabilitation is out.'25 In his original judgement he was even more explicit about the 
significance of her race. According to a report in The Argus the judge 'regarded as 
an aggravating feature the fact that Sparg was white' whereas if 'a black South 
African was in that position his actions could be understood although not 
excused'.26 A similar sense of horror and outrage is evident in articles which indulge 
in more speculative jour~alism than legal reporting allows, but explanations are 
found for Sparg's traitorous acts. In an article entitled 'Inside the Tortured Mind of 
Marion Sparg' journalist Ann Palmer who, we are told, 'knew Sparg as a reporter', 
represents her this way: 
Fate dealt young Marion Sparg a crushing double blow. She was a 
desperately lonely schoolgirl, and a weight problem caused even her 
fellow students at university to reject her. 
Haunted and consumed by her desperate loneliness, Sparg was perfect 
terrorist material many years before she ever thought of planting bombs. 
{The Argus 9 Nov. 1986) 
'1
5 'Sparg Refused Leave to App,eal Against Sentence,' The Argus 28 Nov. 1986: N. pag. 
26 'Sparg Gets 25 Years,' The Argus 6 Nov. 1986: N. pag. 
Sparg's resistance is thus refigured as pathology. Ruth First, who is 
considered an intellectual, is represented with more respect and less 
paternaHsm, particularly in 1982 after her death, being referred to as 'Professor 
First'. 
27 
At the time of her arrest in August 1963 she evokes greater disquiet in 
the popular press. She is consistently identified by the label, 'a named 
communist'. 28 One strategy of containing this d,isquiet is to domesticise her so 
that her identity as 'Ruth First', writer of banned books, is represented as 
extraneous to her 'true' (because more acceptable) identity as wife and mother: 
'As "Ruth First", Mrs. Sleva ha~ written a book on South West Africa.'29 'In her 
private life she is Mrs. Joseph Slave' we are told a~er hearing of her role in 
bringing South Africa's human rights abuses in South West Africa (as it was 
known then) to the attention of the United Nations. 30 
As a (white) woman, Ruth First is told in prison that she should 'count [her] 
lucky stars that we still have respect for women in our country': 
cou.ld h. ave be. en charged in the Rivonia case. But we didn't want a 
man_ir1Jhatcas.~-·- We stilLhave some feeling for women. (122) ' 
~~--- •• -• -'•' - ~~-··~--~-~··r~~~~-=---.~·:=;·~-·::F-.:: 
While this rather unsettling acknowledgement of sexist treatment might bring a 
w:::w=- c - - .. ·- ""'!- ""r-" .,~• 
modicum of relief, the insidious tactics of First's interrogator, Viktor, are steeped 
27 'Letter Bomb Kills ANC VIP Ruth First,' The Argus 18 Aug. 1982: N. pag. 
28 
See, for example, 'Mrs. Slovo to Leave S.A.' in The Argus (13 March 1964. N. pag.) and 'New 
Orders SeNed on Three,' The Argus (4 Feb. 1963. N. pag.). 
29 'Mrs. Slovo is Arrested in Wits. Library,' The Cape Times. 10 August 1963. N. pag. 
30 'Court Hearing Helps Refute Slurs on S.A.' The Argus. 17 March 1966. N. pag. 
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in sexual innuendo. First is all the more vulnerable because the tactics are not 
easily identifiable in the intricate web of their subtly sexualised relationship. This 
form of psychological battery is not accounted for in discussions of the body 
which are not gender-specific, ~j:IJb~bO,SJiJ1ty ... J)J~t~J::t.-P~~J2Qgy_io_ 
.~artl)ej.Q .. pr:is.o.r:is-car:n:iot be_£Q_mpar~~~ t_? ,t~~t of ~~t!.~·~(These issues will 
be discussed with detailed textual reference in the final chapter which deals with 
techniques of torture and the effects these have on articulations of self.) ·) 1. f al-~" 
jf"G--j ,t .tp. ''J 
{Elizabeth Grosz is critical of Foucault for using a male body as the generic: ~~~-1.1P .. t · 
i 
I 
) Implicitly, or without adequately acknowledging it, Foucault talks only 
! about the male body - with the exception of one or two paragraphs. The 
I 
',treatment of prisoners is especially clearly sexually linked - the kinds of 
punishment received, the kinds of crimes committed, the kinds of 
' judgments (and what it is that is judged) are clearly different for the two 
: sexes in ways that he does not explain. (Grosz 1994, 157) 
Moreover, if Foucault is right in thinking that the 'hysterization of women's 
bodies' - a 'process through which the female body was analysed ... as being 
thoroughly saturated with sexuality' (Foucault 1978, 104) - is centrally part of a 
(sexual) power play, one would have thought the discourse of female criminality 
all the more deserving of a thorough critique. · Grosz finds the discussion of the 
hysteria 'as an effect of power's saturation of women's body' inadequate in that, 
for example, Foucault 'ignores the possibility of women's strategic occupation of 
hysteria as a form of resistance to the demands and requirements of 
heterosexual monogamy and the social and sexual role culturally assigned to 
women' (157-8). While critical of Foucault's acknowledged exclusion of women 
in much of his work (it was 'an ethics for men: an ethics thought, written and 
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usually feared as dangerous men in the eyes of society, the disgraced and 
dishonored woman has always been considered pathetic': 
This view has its roots in the fact that women's most frequent offenses 
were violations of the normative code with respect to sex and 
drunkenness. Moreover,· women who committed criminal offenses tended 
to be regarded as erring and misguided creatures who needed protection 
and help rather than as dangerous criminals from whom the members of 
society should be protected .... 'Treatment' for women meant instilling in 
them certain standards of sexual morality and sobriety and preparing them 
for their duties as mothers and homemakers. (Giallombardo 1966, 7) 
In South Africa's divided society, however, this is not universally true. Black women, 
Makhoere's text continually asserts, are not treated as human beings and the 
violence to which she is victim while serving her five-year sentence certainly cannot 
be described as 'lenient'. Ruth First, on the other hand, is forced to occupy an 
uncomfortable position as 'Madam' while in prison. She is exempt from manual 
labour and, as the only white political prisoner for most of her detention, she is 
separated from other women. Viktor's treatment of her suggests that he keeps alive 
the fantasy of her as a feminine ideal. Certainly white women were seldom beaten 
physically (the exception being the case of Stephanie Kemp whose head was 
banged against the floor and whose arm was broken) although they were more likely 
to experience lengthy periods in solitary confinement, while for black women -
particularly those detained post 1976 -:.Q_hysical torture was.Jban.or:m.,. The reality 
; 
of conditions in detention in South Africa during the 1980s is exposed in a study by 
Don Foster and Diane Sandler (1985 and 1987). Unfortunately the authors do not 
distinguish between white women and black women, but their report makes 
strong claims that Africans were much more severely treated and that women as 
well as men suffered some form of pt:Ysical .P!IJ.D;_Amongst their findings they 
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identified age as being a significant factor affecting the harshness with which · 
detainees were treated. 
Gelfand exposes the contradiction in the lenient approach to women's 
criminality which has, by the same rationale, historically been branded all the 
more heinous, indeed savage, because of its inconsistency with 'natural 
femininity'. Indeed, the very fact of having transgressed societal laws and of 
having positioned herself as deviant would have made a woman fearsome. 
Arguably, for black South African women, their 'otherness' is already established 
by virtue of their race and political activism and is not so closely connected with 
being branded 'criminal'. The insults flung at Emma Mashinini (54) stem first 
from her being black ('You're fat, Kaffir meid') and second from her activism 
('You're a nuisance and a trouble-maker'). 
Gelfand's analysis of the rise of individualism in the late eighteenth century is 
nonetheless useful. She argues that the apparent freedoms that emerged at that 
time did not necessarily apply to women: ~5 
~'~ 
. . Cr>ffl°?c.l-'.c< ..,?' 
... if assertion of individuality was admired in men, in women it was Jr&(~ J~ l 
perceived as threatening. As a result, submissiveness became the most ~ V 
valued sign of female normality. And a criminal act, seen as the strongest v~.s 
form of self-assertion, was considered the complete refusal of women's \. 
passivity and the denial of their assigned role. (43) 
Thus, the definition of and explanation for what tias historically constituted 'criminal 
activity' in a woman is dependent on the degree to whic{l what is seen as 'virtuous' 
behaviour has been transgressed. As a result, Gelfand argues, many women 
prisoners' texts display an alarming degree of self-doubt and an obsessive impulse 
to escape the stigmatisation of criminality (and other perceptions of transgressive 
96 
behaviour). Characteristics such as defiance, anger, delight in 'wickedness', indeed 
the very desire to speak out: these cannot be assumed to be an uncomplicated part 
of a woman's narrative simply because the text can be slotted into the 'genre' of 
prison narratives. Women have a different relation to language and to systems of 
control, Gelfand argues, and therefore to 'the topoi critics have assumed to be ... the 
prime characteristics of prisoners' writing' such as '[pJower, domination, 
transcendence' {20). 
In calling for new approaches to prison writing that are not based on a 
universalised male experience, Gelfand makes an important critique. However, 
she also tends towards an essentialism of her own in uncritically making a series 
of assumptions about writing by women. While she argues convincingly that 
'[nJew theories are needed about women writing from prison, since universalizing 
ones do not work' (22), she sweepingly refutes the generalities ascribed to male 
texts. Initially describing the texts on which she is focused, she argues -
naming specific authors in parentheses - that there is little evidence of 'a will to 
dominate or to possess; there is at best a sense of weakness inverted into irony 
... or solitude glorified as martyrdom' (20). However, this specifying gesture is 
abandoned in favour of a more generalised comment on narratives other than 
recent ones: 'There is likewise little evidence of triumph over circumstance and, 
until recently, no evocation of transcendence' (20). It is not clear which recent 
texts have been examined in order to make the last observation, but thereafter 
the distinction she sets up between the lives of men and women is so thorough-
going that her argument loses its earlier specificity: 
The act of creating in a hostile environment like the prison cannot be 
universalized so long as women's and men's lives in a 'normal' 
environment - which. prison in large part reflects - remain radically 
different. (20) 
My contention with Gelfand is not her refusal uncritically to assume male 
norms in representing all prison experience, but the fact that she leaves 
uninterrogated the discursive monoliths, male and female. Indeed, '"normality" is 
different for each sex' (19) but this totalising eoncept covers over many more 
differences than this dichotomy of human experience. It has become standard in 
feminist practice to acknowledge the diversities which~ an unsophisticated use of the 
category 'women' cannot accommodate. Teresa de Lauretis, for example, writes of 
the 'other axes along which oppression, identity and subjectivity are organized -
. such as race or color and ethnic or sexual identification' ( 1988. 134 ). Her particular 
contribution is to point out the transforming interconnectedness of different forms of 
oppression which together constitute a particular permutation not correctly 
represented as the sum of each form: the 'layers of oppression are. not parallel but 
intersecting and mutually determining' (135). Her point is that women occupying 
different race and class positions will experience sexism differently. 
Thus, the category 'women' is wrongly assumed by writers such as Gelfand to 
be homogeneous and already historically constituted. Chandra Mohanty 
distinguishes, significantly, between the 'discursively consensual homogeneity of 
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"women" as a group' and 'the historically specific material reality of gr6ups of women' 
(1988, 65). The problem with the former use of the term -that is, of "'women" as a 
group, as a stable category of analysis' - is that 'it assumes an ahistorical, universal 
unity among women based on a generalised notion of their subordination' (72). 
Moreover it positions women, simplistically, as victims, and men as perpetrators: 
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Because wo.men are thus constituted as a coherent group, sexual 
difference becomes coterminus [sic] with female subordination, and power 
is automatically defined in binary terms: people who have it (read: men), 
and people who· do not (read: women). Men exploit, women are exploited. 
Such simplistic formulations are both historically reductive; they are also 
ineffectual in designing strategies to combat oppressions. All they do is 
reinforce binary divisions between men and women. (73) 
It is important to note that Mohanty does not reject out of hand the discursive 
usefulness of the term 'women'. Her challenge, however, demands a commitment to 
specificity and circumspection in its use. For even the well-intentioned impulse to 
oppose oppressive practices under a united banner, as it were, involves a similarly 
totalising gesture in which women's identities arid experiences are again masked in 
an ·attempt to achieve political coherence. 
My concern is not to try to identify an alternative set of terms with which to 
discuss sexual difference. Th~re is not scope for such a discussion, nor would it 
· be a task I would choose. Rather, the purpose of this discussion has to do with 
the way in which women are positioned as women discursively and the degree to 
which the body operates as a signifier of difference. 
5.2 The Body of Difference 
It is not surprising that feminists are suspicious of a discussion of the body for it has 
_,.Qlstinguishing·feature_Qf .~~0!:!~1 d itf~!~Of~LJt nas .. b~e.n. ~s~d histo~i~Jly asJtJe 
ratignale.behi ndJhe.perpeh.1edJnferioci.ty 9f;y~qr:11E?n, Jh.e;~~P:-call~q 'weak.~r s~2(. 
,,-------'.',. --- -- -
Psychoanalysis itself has made use of a bodily model in defining women as 'lack'. 32 ~ 
The body figures as difference in a system of dualities which sets women up as the 
inferior partner to men, corresponding to what body is to mind, nature to culture, 
psychical to 'real'. This system relies on binary differences, which depend on 
apparently irrefutable 'natural' phenomena - such as the body itself. Elizabeth 
Grosz points out that uninterrogated epistemological assumptions are based in the 
acute and lived experience of the body: 
[B]odies provide a neuralgic locus for the projection and living out of 
unreflective presumptions regarding tt)e sexes and their different social, 
sexual, and biological roles. The sciences themselves are not immune to 
- indeed, they depend for the very mode of their formulations and 
operations on - everyday assumptions and beliefs of scientists and 
others regarding knowledge, power, desire, and bodies. (1994, x) 
A reconsideration of the epistemological certainty of the body has' radical 
implications not only for the social sciences but also for the natural sciences 
themselves, Grosz argues. She takes issue with the common separation 
between sophisticated discourse on cultural investments in the body and 
apparently objective expositions on the tangible physicality of the body. 
Introducing the thesis of her book she denies 'that there is the "real" material 
body on one hand and its various cultural and historical representations on the 
other'. 
It is my claim throughout this book that these representations and cultural 
inscriptions quite literally constitute bodies and help to produce them as 
such .... (x) 
32 In her discussion of the psychoanalytic concept of 'lack' Elizabeth Grosz quips that 'there is no 
lack in the real, as Lacan is fond of saying' (1994: 60). 
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She is at pains to unsettle the assumption that body constitutes the 'bedrock' of 
'real' and unchangeable biological fact upon which psychical and social 
meanings are inscribed. 
Grosz refutes the binary distinction between body and mind: she does 
more than just propose their connectedness, but goes a long way to developing 
a language which is able to slip between both concepts: 'If bodies are objects or 
things, they are like no others, for they are the centers of perspective, insight, 
reflection, desire, agency.... Bodies are not inert; they function interactively and 
productively. They act and react. They generate what is new, surprising, 
unpredictable' (x-xi). She appropriates Lacan's metaphor of the Mobius strip, the 
horizontal three-dimensional figure of eight, and uses it (differently) to 
' 
conceptualise the fluid interconnectedness, indeed oneness (if also visually 
distinct) of the body and mind. The model 'provides a way of problematizing and 
rethinking the relations between the inside and the outside of the subject, its · 
psychical interior and its corporeal exterior, by showing not their fundamental 
identity or reducibility but the torsion of the one into the other, the passage, 
· vector, or uncontrollable drift of the inside into the outside and the outside into 
the inside' (xii). Thus, in her conceptualisation of the relationship between the . 
body and mind (or subjectivity), the two are not distinct, nor is the body simply a 
signifier of identity. Grosz speaks of the body's being 'psychically constituted in 
order for the subject to acquire a sense of its place in the world and in 
connection with others' (xii). 
'Being a body is something we must come to accommodate psychically, 
·something we must live' (Grosz, xiii). A crucial part of 'accommodating' our 
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physicality is responding to the way in which our bodies are read and positioned 
by others. Grosz devotes a chapter of her book to a discussion of body image 
which she proposes as a third term 'intervening between and requiring the 
operations of both mind and body' (62). Body image - what another critic has 
called 'the psychic representation of one's body' (Manganyi 1981, 117) -
emerges out of the dialogue between, on the one hand, the lived perception of 
the body from within, as it were, and, on the other hand, the external, 
surrounding space and the objects in the body's field of vision. The 'inner' body, 
involving 'libidinal investments' and self..:identification, includes the 'outer' body, 
or that which is determined in social relations. Body image is both internal and 
external, 'introjected' (84) and projected outwards. It attests to the fact that self-
conceptualisation is socially circumscribed and steeped in bodily consciousness. 
Grosz's primary concern with body image is the extent to which it 
'mediates the mind/body polarization': 
) 
The body image does not map a biological body onto a psychosocial 
domain, providing a kind of translation of material into conceptual terms; 
rather, it attests to the necessary interconstituency of each for the other, 
the radical inseparability of biological from psychical elements, the mutual 
dependence of the psychical and the biological, and thus the intimate 
connectionbetween the question of sexual specificity (biological sexual 
differences) and psychical identity. (85) 
However, implicit in the notion of body image are relationships of viewing which 
do not form a focus in Grosz's discussion. Grosz does speak of 'visual 
sensations' (83) thus placing an emphasis on the bodily experience of looking -
as opposed to being looked at - but this points only fleetingly to the role of the 
exchange of looks and the multiple positions simultaneously assumed by the 
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subject in looking at her own body. To form a mental (and psychical) picture of 
the body requires also an externalised eye. (An extreme form of this distancing 
from one's own body is described by Grosz as a condition called 
appersonalisation, which involves treating one's body as an external object 
belonging to another.) 
This reflexivity of viewing entails both a dispossession and an embodiment 
of the self constructed in response to the look, under the spotlight, as it were. In 
the body of the prison cell, where the prisoner's own body is held in tension as 
both 'dangerous' (because locked away) apd vulnerable (to harsh treatment), the 
self which emerges in that tension can only be split, explosive, uncertain. The 
scene of the prison cell brings the body into focus sharply where previously it 
was free to occupy positions less defined and fiercely imposed. In the prison cell 
relations of viewing are distorted, turned in upon themselves, allowing for no 
affirming (or even unthreatening) visual exchange. To be looked at is to be 
caged by the hostile eyes of the other (as will be discussed later with specific 
reference to Mashinini). Similarly, to look at one's body from within the cell is to 
have th~ message of criminality returned in the bleakness of the cell walls. As a 
mirror of sorts their statement is unrecognisable and fear-inducing. The prisoner 
is displaced in the hostile environment of that dungeon-like womb, alienated from · 
her own construction of self and from her own body which is produced (through 
being looked at) in terms of the authorities' contempt. As such the body is made 
overwhelmingly present,33 but it is an alien body (as is the case when Mashinini 
33 Elaine Scarry has argued that the infliction of pain in torture has the effect of making the body 
the sole object of awareness, obliterating all other contents of the detainee's consciousness. i 
discuss Scarry's thesis at length in chapter seven, using her conceptualisation of the effects of 
pain to discuss the bodily discomforts of psychological torture and sexual harassment. 
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loses her sense of who she is through being unable to see and recognise 
herself, discussed earlier). The body - marked, viewed, beaten, starved, caged, 
categorised, positioned, named, and inscribed with anatomical signifiers of social 
significance - is thus at the heart of constructions of identity and 
representations of self. And as a key signifier of identity, the body is at the heart 
of identity politics. 
5.3 Identities and the Body 
The deconstruction ·of the meanings attributed to the concept'body' is not meant as 
an attempt to refute the materiality of the body, but rather to dislodge the arbitrarily 
but firmly secured scaffolding on which social catego~ies (in particular categories of 
race and gender) rely. It is not my intention to deny sexual difference per se, .but to 
examine the processes through which difference is constructed and entrenched in 
discourse. It is the fixity of the naming of, difference which needs to be examined, its 
contradictions which need to be exposed. 
To speak of the body in general terms will n<;>t produce an analysis of the 
. ) 
complicated matrix of relatiqns between .bodies (and subjects) which are discursively 
identified as male and female, black and white, or with varying sexual preferences. 
What follows is a closer look at the negative significations of the black body and the 
female body (and the black female body, following De Lauretis' reminder) in· order to 
consider how these significations might be encoded in the prison narratives of this 
study. For it seems that the practice of imprisonment is a particular physical 
expression of discipline which is directed at - and in fact produces - the dissident 
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body. Makhoere, for example, self-consciously makes her (black) body her 
instrument of protest in the same way that it had been the focus of the racist 
treatment she receives. The way in which she represents her body and responds to 
the significations accorded it are thus crucial to her narrativised articulation of self. 
Historically read as sexuality itself, the female body is defined in terms of 
anatomical differences from the male body. Elizabeth Grosz argues that the bodily 
signifiers of essential 'womanness' are arbitrarily identified: 
If women have been defined on the side of the body and men on the side 
of the mind, then there are particular bodily zones that serve to emphasize 
both women's difference from and otherness to men. There is nothing 
inherent in these regions and zones that makes them more suitable for 
culturally representing sexual difference - many others would have 
served this function just as well; what culturally marks sexual difference is 
biologically arbitrary, conventional. With the developments of puberty, 
what becomes visible and tangible as a measure of womanhood is the 
development of the so-called secondary sexual characteristics, the filling 
out of breasts and hips, the growth of pubic hair, and perhaps most 
strikingly, the onset of menses. (203) 
Female bodily fluids come to signify the horror of difference in a way that male 
fluids do not. Male differences have been elided because 'the specificities of the 
masculine have always been hidden under the generality of the universal, the 
human' (198) while women's bodies 'and sexualities have been structured and 
lived in terms that not only differentiate them from men's but also attempt ... to 
position them in a relation of passive dependence and secondariness to men's' 
(202). Women's bodies have been seen as receptacles for men's assertive 
desires and seminal fluids. One is conscious of the figurative use of 'seminal' to 
mean originating, of great significance, productive, ground-breaking. To the 
extent that women's bodies emit fluid it is seen as a seepage, a contaminating 
defilement associated with excrement (Grosz 203, 206) and death.34 
Similarly, the black body carries with it significations of defilement and is 
saturated with sexuallty.35 N. Chabani Manganyi, a South African clinical 
psychologist and Black Consciousness critic writing from the 1970s, has 
considered how the polarisations operating on the body influence black body 
image. The black body has become, 'in race supremacist cultures, a medium for 
the development of racist symbol systems and fantasies' (Manganyi, 1981 a, 
105). He does not speak of an essentialised black body, or make a virtue out of 
stereotypical meanings traditionally associated with being black, but recognises 
the centrality of the body in social relations: 'we make our approaches to the 
world through our bodies' and vice versa (Manganyi 1973, 6). 
For Manganyi 'skin colour in itself is not what is at issue. 'What is more 
important is what the skin actually signifies in sociological and psychological 
terms. The skin only becomes significant in these terms as body' (1973, 18). 
The opposition set up between good and bad, purity and impurity, reason and 
savagery, bodily strength and 'anality' finds its damning parallel in white and 
black. Manganyi seeks to explode the 'mystery about the heavens and the 
depths, God and the Devil, whiteness (purity, good, chastity) and blackness (bad, 
dirt, faeces)' (1981, 108). However, the way blackness is read has devastating 
implications for the meaning pf 'being-black-in-the-world'. 
34 See Julia Kristeva; Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection (1980: 71). 
35 See Leon Kamin (1993) who, in 'On the Length of Black Penises and the Depth of White 
Racism', exposes the racist assumptions and dubious scholarship which continue to exoticise 
blacks as being more sexually potent than whites. 
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The negative values assoc(ated with blackness (blackness as dirt. 
impurity, smell) become vehicles in race supremacist cultures for the 
racist's attempts to adapt to his estrangement from the reality of his body. 
The projection of these undesirable attributes of the human body to the 
victim of racism as a convenient scapegoat, is part and parcel of the 
process of denial and self-deception which characterises the cultural 
heroics of Western culture and civilisation. (1981, 113) 
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For the black child the traditional distinction between the upper and lower bodies 
- respectively the seats of reason and defecation - can provide no 
psychological comfort. The lower body, with its associations of impurity, cannot 
be repressed in favour of the upper body because the 'devaluation of the lower 
axis of the body' ( 108) and the set of categories attached to it encompasses, for 
the black child, the entire body: the 'anxiety of the black child, however, must be 
understood in terms of a bodx- that is stereotypically devalued as a totality' (115). As 
a result any positive sense of self is always overshadowed by a form of self-hatred. 
Aspiring to greater 'whiteness' (which .is how Mashinini describes herself as a 
younger woman who used skin lightening creams and wigs} produces an alienation 
from self: the meanings attributed to blackness cannot be obscured by the 
camouflages produced while 'trying for white'36 and the attempt further denigrates 
the social value of being black. Dorothy Driver explains the complex nature of 
Mashinini's representation of her relation to racial categories in her article, 
'Imagined Selves, (Un)imagined Marginalities' (1991 ). Mashinini employs (to a 
limited degree) the common autobiographical convention of a split between a 
younger, more impressionable self (formed before her encounter with Black 
Consciousness) and a mature self who has been freed from racist self-hatred 
36 A colloquial expression commonly used in South Africa in judgement of blacks who are 
thought to imitate white attributes (hair styles, clothing, accents, etc.). 
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through the gift of Black Consciousness (BC). Nevertheless she is also able to 
move beyond the dualisms reproduced in BC. Her distance from BC is partly a 
result of her construction of a self outside of BC in order to reproduce 'that 
developmental process' (346) but partly owing to the measure of self-questioning 
tolerated in her text (353). 
For to enact a neat reversal is similarly entrenching of stereotypes. Frantz 
Fanon, an Algerian psychologist and philosopher (whose analysis of the psychology 
) . . . 
of racism contributed to the burgeoning Black Consciousness movement in the 
United States in the 1960s and in South Africa in the 1970s ), argues that the 
inferiority complex suffered by the colonised is not innate but internalised as a result 
of racist undervaluing of black physical and cultural identity in colonialist ideology.37 
Cyril Couve, in discussing Fanon's perspectives on the psychology of the colonised, 
writes of the strategies adopted to counteract this undervaluing of blackness: 
The division within colonised subjectivity, however, rests centrally on the 
conflict between this internalised sense of inferiority and the 
compensatory manoeuvers to combat it: that is, the setting up of an ideal 
guiding fiction. (Couve 1_988, 57) 
The 'guiding fiction', according to Fanon's analysis, takes the form of identifying with 
whiteness or exchanging the idealisation of whiteness for an idealisation of 
blackness.· Couve is critical of Fanon's tendency nevertheless to construct an 
oppositional black identity as 'a unitary category' despite Fanon's liberating analysis . . 
of the constructedness of racial categories. The way in which the body is read and 
31 See Fran~ Fanon's Black Skin. White Masks (1952) and The Wretched of the Earth (1961). 
108 
represented is thus at the heart of both racism itself and strategies to counteract 
racism. 
According to Makhoere, Resha and Mashinini, being read as a black 
female body can be deeply disturbing. Their strategies of coping with this differ. 
When Mashinini is insulted it is first her body which is. verbally abused, then her 
personal and political person. The two, however, are one and the same: "'You're 
fat, Kaffir meid," one said to me. ''You're a nuisance and a troublemaker"' (54). 
Later on in her narrative she revisits this label without the distance of quotation 
·marks: 'I was nothing but a Kaffir' (74) which suggests that the insult could not easily 
be discarded. 
Maggie Resha turns racist aversion back in on itself by using her (sexed and 
sexual) black body as a weapon. After a raid on her house by the Security Branch, 
one of the men lingers, alone, in her house after his colleagues have left: 
When he did not move, I became hysterical. 'You get out; you want that,· 
when your friends come back , they arrest me and charge me of having 
broken the Immorality Act with you?' I was now screaming at the top of my 
voice. Immediately I mentioned the Immorality Act, (which dated from 
1927, but which had been amended in 1967 in order to tighten up the 
definition, as well as the penalties for 'immorality' between whites and 
black people) he shot out of the house like a bullet from a gun. (193) 
In her 'hysterical' fear that he might threaten her, Resha invokes the racist laws 
his ,work supports (which outlaws sexual relations between white and black), 
using her body and sexuality as a weapon which has the effect of ousting him, 
pulling a trigger so that his body becomes 'like a bullet'. 
In an unexpected moment in her text Makhoere invokes the negative 
significations of 'black' in her description of the brutal interrogator, Selepe, who 
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stands in opposition to her. After giving an account of his merciless treatment of her 
she describes him as a 'big, very black, policeman, threatening and boasting to a 
defenceless young woman' (7). Her~--'black' is set up in opposition to,'woman'. For 
the most part, however, the unifying, unquestioned category of 'black' is one of the 
unassailably fixed textual categories in which she finds protection from the white 
world and from self-doubt and isolation. She uses 'the people' in a similar way. 
Gitahi Gititi writes that while 'there can be no doubt about Makhoere's commitment to 
the cause of liberation, there is evidence of political sloganeering, not necessarily 
peculiar to her, but disturbing because categories such as "the people" are often 
used uncritically and with a great deal of abstraction' ( 1991 , 48). 
Makhoere recognises the denigrating conception of blackness, but her way of 
evading the negative significations is not to expose them as fictitious constructions 
but to reverse the set of dualities through which 'black' is vilified. She describes the 
'nasty, cruel and racist' Brigadier du Plessis as seeming 'to belong to that group 
that would rather die than see blacks sharing power. He had it in his mind that 
blacks were devils and whites, especially Afrikaners, were the chosen children of 
God and that South Africa was the promised land' (13). Makhoere, however, is 
able to disconnect herself from Du Plessis's racist belief structure, placing him 
and what he has 'in his mind' in a similarly dismissive category rather than 
concurring with his categorisation of her. She cannot remain quite so easily 
unaffected when she hears of the 'strange' practice of using black bodies as 
shooting targets at Pretoria Central. It is all the more disturbing because it 
comes up in casual and seemingly friendly conversation with the wardress 
Erasmus who mentions that 'they were learning how to shoot straight' (78). 
Erasmus seems unaware of the menacing implications in having 'a board with a 
black man painted on it, with various parts of the body circled'. Makhoere says: 
They would shoot at the board, and the person who hit the indicated parts 
was congratulated. They are instilling the idea that they have to know 
how to kill black people. (78-9) 
This is confirmed by Erasmus: 
I questioned her. 'Tell me, if they are teaching you how to shoot, who 
are you going you [sic] shoot? Are you going to kill black people?' 
Her reply was, 'If it is necessary, yes.' 
Here was an honest Afrikaner woman .... (79) 
For Makhoere, though, this is indicative of the racist's monstrous inhumanity rather 
than the hatefulness of blacks. 'What kind of humans are these?' she asks (79). 
The contest over the meaning of being black is central to her representation of 
the battle over access to clean laundry; her outrage at being denied clean laundry is 
focused on the racist categorisation of blacks as 'smelly' which she denies by 
reversing the traditional association of blacks with dirt. In prison access to bodily 
cleanliness is regulated, along with food, exercise, clothing and so on. In her 
representation of her endeavours to secure the privilege of bi-weekly laundry 
Makhoere overturns racist assumptions: 
There is one particularly stupid belief of many South African whites: that 
all blacks smell. It sits within the minds of those wardresses, that we are 
smelly. Fine: if we smell, whose fault _is it? They use perfumes, they have 
all the showers and the baths, they can wash as many times as they want. 
But you take a common-law prisoner who is denied the opportunity of 
showering after working for them in prison .... Here these common-law 
prisoners work in a laundry at Pretoria, this steaming place, doing 
washing for the very same people who tell them they are smeliy .... [T]hese 
very same apartheid gods, who can't even wash their own panties, they 
take their panties to a laundry - they have the audacity to say we are 
smelly .... 
So I demanded that my clothes be washed twice a week, that whether I 
was in prison or what, I just had to be clean. (90) 
110 
Her demand to have access to clean laundry is a direct response to the 
derogatory meanings associated with being black. The strategy with which she 
evades the damning associations of blackness is simply to overturn the 
assignment of meanings by logical argument in this way: while she is committed 
to being clean, whites cannot maintain cleanliness themselves without the 
support of expensive perfumes and black labour. Whites are dirty, she is clean. 
The dualistic structure which privileges one category over the other is 
maintained, its chauvinistic strategy boldly employed. 
The association of blackness with criminality continues to be a source of 
bitter resentment throughout Makhoere's imprisonment and it is this which is at 
the heart of her unrelenting protest (in the form of hunger strikes, largely) about 
the two issues of food and labour. Race itself is punished more severely than 
crime, her narrative suggests, in that white prisoners, regardless of the natures 
of their crimes, are given privileges simply on account of their being white 
whereas black prisoners are given punitive rations. This is also clearly 
articulated in Maggie Resha's account, which is similarly indignant about the 
discriminatory practices in prison, if not quite as harsh in her response: 
We were not given [tea and coffee], because we were black, and 
therefore not entitled to such items. 
Throughout our stay in prison, we never had any of these foods, nor 
were we given sugar, milk, fruit, fish, cheese, butter or eggs, which we 
saw formed part 'at the everyday diet of the white prisoners - no matter 
·what crime they had committed .... (171) 
Moreover, black prisoners are compelled to work while in prison. Resha's 
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text highlights the connection between work and punishment: the more strenuous 
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work (washing heavily soiled canvas as opposed to ordinary clothing) is reserved 
for those who are being punished: 
Each morning, after breakfast, was time for laundry. We did heaps and 
heaps of washing: our uniforms, as wel.I as that of the male prisoners. 
Those for the men were made out of canvas, and very difficult to wash. 
Worst of all, some of these uniforms of the men were full of blood and 
pieces of dead skin and pus on the area of the buttocks .... These 
bloodstained clothes were always sorted out and put aside to be washed 
by women who were punished for one thing or the other. Noone [sic] 
could escape punishment in prison, because it seemed that prisoners 
were wrong all the time. The swearing at,/and beating of prisoners, by the 
white wardresseswas a daily thing. Other prisoners cleaned the cells and 
washed the dishes; but the majority did the laundry. White prisoners, we 
were told, did no work while in prison .... [l]n South Africa a black prisoner 
is a slave of the government. (169-70; emphasis added) -
When saying that 'noone could escape punishment' Resha clearly means no 
black prisoner, as white women detainees were not as a matter of course 
expected to work (as is evidenced in Ruth First's text where she describes being 
the 'White Madam' who has to have her hot water brought to her). Resha 
considers the work 'a form of punishment. ... At least, that is what everybody 
thought it was' (172). 
Makhoere, Resha and First all tell of the way in which black women were 
used to wash the cloth,ing of senior government officials. Resha comments on 
the vested interests of the magistrates whose washing was done by the women 
whom they had sentenced: 
Another woman ... boastingly said: 'See, I am washing for the Chief 
Magistrate!' 
... What came into my mind was 'so these white magistrates were filling 
the prisons by sentencing women for petty crimes, like drunken noise, to 
make sure that they got free prison labour'. ( 17 4) 
113 
It is worth noting that discrepancies still exist in the kind of work allocated, in 
practice, to white and black prisoners, according to the 'Human Rights Watch' 
report referred to earlier (Brown, et al, 1994). This is despite the fact that the 
Correctional Services Act of 1990 has outlawed discrimination between prisoners 
(and prison staff) of different race groups: 
. [Whites are] more quickly promoted to the highest 'privilege group1, where 
they would avoid the worst hardships of prison. Ttiis differential treatment 
was also confirmed to us by some warders to whom we spoke outside 
prison walls, and by some white prisoners. In particular, whites have 
greater access to training facilities and are assigned to less onerous work. 
In prison after prison, we observed a high proportion of whites among 
prisoners employed in the kitchen (one of the most desirable work 
assignments in prisons worldwide). (Brown, et al, 1994, 19) 
J 
Makhoere responds assertively to the discriminatory prison regulations 
requiring that she work. She refuses to participate in the actions which signify 
the degree to which black bodies are considered despicable and delinquent. 
She refuses to eat the food designated for blacks38 and to do any work while in 
prison: 'I never did work again ... I am not a prisoner, I am not a slave.... They 
thought they were going to work me; I made them work thoroughly instead' (45). 
These strategies are part of a greater project of refusing to comply with the way 
in which she is positioned. She thus identifies an 'other' arid attributes to them 
the negative associations to which she has been victim. So, in her terms, 
convicted white criminals should be thrust into the discursive category which 
encompasses evil, delinquency, ignorance and barbarism. In relation to 
' 
discriminatory food allocation Makhoere asks this of the prison staff: 
38 Accounts of her numerous hunger strikes are to be found throughout her text (30, 32, 34, 48, 
79, 80, 85, 93). ' 
'Are your white prisoners, all those hooligans you have here, and these 
hobos who commit petty crimes, you accommodate them here, you treat 
them like kings and queens, with all the privileges you can think of. 
Privileges, just because they are white. And I am denied decent food. 
think I am also capable of appreciating good food.' (31) 
She thus claims access to the nebulous social category of people who are 
capable of appreciating good food from which the delinquent and socially 
despised ('hooligans' and 'hobos') are excluded. Her strategy of controlling the 
way in which she is read, is to deny, often forcibly, the meanings imposed on her 
- black, lazy, smelly, uncultured, without value, delinquent, and so on - and to 
assign them to another group within her text. Thus polarities are reproduced 
and, once overturned, firmly re-entrenched. Her text is indomitable in beating 
out the rhythm of her revised structure of meaning which relies entirely on an 
'us' -and-'them' hierarchy. The content of those categories may not be consistent 
t, 
(such as when she describes the hated Selepe) but the structure is always one 
of dualities. The representation of her own body - clean, invulnerable, free to 
be at leisure and so on - is crucial to this strategy, as is her representation of 
the bodies of others. 
Mashinini differs from Makhoere in being able to acknowledge the 
complicateq relation she has to 'whiteness' and the meanings associated with it. 
Her mistrust and fear of whites is marked, all the more so because of the 
contradictory pulls, the double bind in which she finds herself as a result of the racist 
privileging of whites: she feels envy and awe of them because of their association 
with wealth and privilege on the one hand but also great anger at the discriminatory 
ideology upon which white privilege is based, on the other. For while Black 
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Consciousness has 'saved us all from hating the colour of our skin' the insults of the 
wardresses carry much power, as argued earlier.39 It is only after she recognises the 
degree to which she has been abused at the hands of her white warders that she is 
able to distance herself from the perverse impulse to envy whites and aspire to what 
she associates with 'whiteness': 
I was so sick of seeing those white people. To see always white people, 
white people pushing your food at you through the door, white people 
pushing you and telling you 'Come' or 'Go' and what to do - it was 
· making me ill. Because when you are black you have a need for persons 
of your own colour. And with my envy of white people, now to be 
surrounded by them made me realise again how stupid that was, to envy 
their skin or hair. It was no privilege to be among them. It was a misery 
and a deprivation. (73) 
Mashinini does not need to overturn and repeat the derogatory labelling to 
which she has been victim in order to release herself from the damning 
significations of her blackness. It is true, though, that her experience of abuse 
by whites is so formative that it affects her ability to be unguarded with her white 
doctor in Denmark: 
I 
But for me I was speaking to a white doctor, and I had spent so much time 
with white police, surrounded by white people. 1t was a white woman who 
had refused me chewing gum, and a white woman who had put those 
bracelets [handcuffs] on me. And it was hard, very hard, to trust her, this 
new white woman. (92) 
However, her acknowledgement of this difficulty to trust whites immediately 
introduces a dimension to her representation of race that is not evident in 
Makhoere's text. The acknowledgement itself attests to a reflectiveness which is not 
39 I am indebted to Dorothy Driver (1991) for this quotation from Mashinini in particular and for 
an analysis of the significance of Black Consciousness in the narratives of Mashinini and 
Makhoere. 
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found in Makhoere's text. For Mashinini does not have to construct her doctor 
simplistically and dogmatically as untrustworthy in order to explain her own inability 
to trust whites. This has the effect of opening up a space in her narrative to move 
beyond the fixed structures of identity and struggle which circumscribe Makhoere's 
text, asserted in order to secure her story. For Makhoere, to be tentative in her 
judgement, and to risk uncertainty, would be to threaten the security of her position 
as subject. Dorothy Driver suggests that this difference in the texts of Makhoere and 
Mashinini may be due to generational and educational differences: 
While [Mashinini's] doubts may simply mean she is more circumspect 
[tha·n Makhoere], and may also point to the fact that she has been 
educated in a different era, which gives her a perspective on the Black 
Consciousness that Makhoere inhabits, they also reveal the kind of 
interest in her own self-construction that necessarily places her outside it, 
in an interrogative position. (1991, 352) 
The brutality that Makhoere has been victim to is also crucial to her 
reconstruction of self. I have argued that the positioning of body - that is, the way 
in which it is read and the degree to which it functions as a focus of systematic 
violence against dissident subjects - is formative of subjectivity. So too, then, is the 
body central in the representation of self offered in response, or, for Makhoere, 
offered in self-conscious retaliation. To allow for any sort of uncertainty in the 
construction of her identity may threaten to dislodge the heavily bolstered self which 
is made available through invoking the absolute categories of identity politics. The 
body itself, as it is linguistically and culturally represented, gives Makhoere access to 
this apparent security as a subject in battle. 
6. Prison space and personal space: a closing-in of subjectivity 
The opening line of Ruth First's 117 Days, an account of her time (literally, 117 
days) as a political prisoner in apartheid prisons, points immediately to the 
d~gree to which the (enforced) position of her body defines her identity: 'For the 
first fifty-six days of my detention in solitary I changed from a mainly vertical to a 
mainly horizontal creature' (9). Thereafter her text is infused with accounts of 
her struggle to inhabit the space designated as hers and with her obsession. with 
the passing of time. Indeed the title conferred upon her text is one which 
demands that attention be given to the passing of time. The carefully structured 
focus of the book which is limited to a particular period mimics something of the 
strangeness of being locked into a space sealed off from the rest of her life. 
First's 117 Days chronicles her imprisonment under the 90-day detention 
law in South Africa during 1963. 40 Prior to her arrest in 1963, First had worked 
as a journalist in various capacities. She had been editor of the left-wing South 
African publication, Fighting Talk, for nine years before it was banned. She 
herself was then banned from writing or publishing or even entering newspaper 
premises and so enrolled for a librarianship course shortly before her arrest (11 ). 
4° First quotes the relevant section from Clause 17 of the General Law Amendment Act of 1963 
which provided for the arrest without trial of people deemed politically dangerous: 
Any commissioned officer ... may ... without warrant arrest ... any person whom he 
suspects upon reasonable grounds of having committed or intending or having intended 
to commit any offence under the Suppression of Communism Act, 1950 (Act No. 44 of 
1950), or under the last-mentioned Act as applied by the Unlawful Organisations Act, 
1960 (Act No. 34of1960), or the offence of sabotage, or who in his opinion is in 
possession of any information relating to the commission of any such offence or the 
intention to commit any such offence, and detain such person or cause him to be 
detained in custody for interrogation in connexion [sic] with the commission of or 
intention to commit such offence, at any place he may think fit until such person has in 
the opinion of the Commissioner of the South African Police replied satisfactorily to all 
questions at the said interrogation. but no such person shall be so detained for more than 
ninety days on any particular occasion when he is so arrested. (50; First's emphasis) 
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First was arrested along with those who were to become the Rivonia trialists. 
Except for a brief spell during which Hazel Goldreich and Anne-Marie Wolpe, 
wives of two of the four Rivonia trial escapees, were held for questioning, she 
was the only white woman political prisoner in Marshall Square· Prison Station, 
Johannesburg, or in Pretoria Central Prison, where she spent 28 days. 
First's text is remarkable in that it self-consciously draws attention to the 
space-time dimensions of her incarceration and how they affect her experience. 
of herself. Not unlike Makhoere who pointedly trades in bodily retorts, First's 
articulations bespeak an acute spatial sensibility. This discussion will explore 
the way in which space-time dimensions influence First's representations herself 
and the set of social relations of which she, as prisoner, is a part. How she sees 
the space she inhabits is indicative of how her political and personal self is being 
controlled. Her use of spatial metaphors to represent herself attests to the ,___.... 
complicated way in which time and space are invested with her selfhood, both 
---·~---
passively, as a function of the way in which she is positioned by the state, and 
. . ··-· ~"'·~····. .. ~.->~-.. ---·~~--~. -~ -~
~Y,ln her own representation· of self where her environment comes to stand 
'in for her. ----In an interview with Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault proposes the 
interconnectedness of space and being: 
f I think it is somewhat arbitrary to try to dissociate the effective practice of 
freedom by people,.the practice of social relations, and the spatial 
distributions in which they find themselves. If they are separated, they 
become impossible to understand. Each can only be understood through 
the other .... (Foucault 1993, 163) 
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In prison, the arrangement of space is an essential form of control which works 
insidiously to deliver the message of disempowerment to the prisoner. 
Thomas Markus, who provides a useful historical overview of the 
development of architectural models for prisons, writes of Jeremy Bentham's 
unquestioning faith in the centrality of architecture in moulding social life. It was 
Bentham who in 1791 first conceived of the panopticon as an architectural model 
for prisons which formed the basis of modern penal institutions, although 
inadequately reproduced, according to Markus. Bentham's 'belief in architecture 
was absolute': 
Morals reformed- health preserved- industry invigorated- instruction 
diffused - public burthen lightened - Economy seated as it were upon a 
rock - the Gordian knot of the Poor Laws not cut but untied - all by a 
simple idea in Architecture! (Bentham 1791, qtd. in Markus 1993, 127) 
Bentham's conception of the perfect prison will be discussed in greater detail 
towards the end of this chapter, but his belief in the extraordinary power of 
spatial arrangement to transform social relations is worth noting here. 
The impact of space and time on social relations is not new to the social 
sciences, 41 although the pertinence of space-time considerations to theories of 
literary representation is not commonly proposed by theorists in that discipline. 
Edward Soja argues for a revision of the opposition which privileges historical 
over spatial or geographic considerations in materialist analyses and explicates 
the complex constructions of social space and its connectedness to 'existential 
dimensions': 
41 See, for example, social and cultural theorists such as David Harvey, T. Hagerstrand, Edward 
Soja, Pierre Bourdieu and Anthony Giddens whose respective analyses of the impact of space 
(and, increasingly, space-time) on social existence are frequently cited. 
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Just as space, time, and matter delineate and encompass the essential 
qualities of the physical world, spatiality, temporality, and social being can 
be seen as the abstract dimensions which together comprise all facets of 
human existence. More concretely specified, each of these abstract 
existential dimensions comes to life as a social construct which shapes 
empirical reality and is simultaneously shaped by it. Thus, the spatial 
~der of human existence arises from the (social) production of space, the 
construction of human geographies that both reflect and configure being 
·. in the world. Similarly , the temporal order is concretized in the making of 
history, simultaneously constrained and constraining in an evolving 
dialectic that has been the ontological crux of Marxist thought for over a 
hundred years. (Soja 1993, 147; emphasis added) 
Soja thus points to the constructedness of what could otherwise be understood 
simply as natural data.42 He thereby claims the usefulness of analyses of 
spatiality for discussions of the construction of the human subject. He directs 
attention to a comment by Foucault which links explicitly the manipulation of 
space and the wielding of power. For Foucault, writing in 1980, the political 
dimensions of space (and the spatial dimensions of social politics) had yet to be 
explored: 
A whole history remains to be written of spaces - which would at the 
same time be the history of powers (both of these terms in the plural) -
from the great strategies of geopolitics to the little tactics of the habitat. 
. (1980, 149) 
My concern rests not so much with the call to plot a history of the organisation 
and use of space as with an analysis of the force of space-time dimensions in 
the shaping of subjectivity and representation. 
42 See also Edward Soja, 'The Spatiality of Social Life: Towards a Transformative 
Retheorisation' (1985). 
D.H.J. Morgan and Sue Scott have warned against over-theorising and 
thereby rendering abstract the body in space which, they argue, is necessarily 
steeped in the concrete, that is, daily experience. 
One possible difficulty here is that the three terms, body, space and time, 
add up to a large number of abstractions with the consequences of 
distancing and alienation from experience that we have noted in 
connection with some other theoretical enterprises. Yet time, space and 
bodies are not just abstractions; they refer to the immediacies of 
everyday, lived experience. (1993, 18) 
And yet Morgan and Scott's tendency to privilege experience above a 
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theoretically informed understanding of social organisation is dangerous in that it 
masks the symbolic functioning of daily life. It is precisely the constructedness of 
space as a socially laden concept that allows for its usefulness in a discussion of 
representation, such as this one. So, too, with the structures such as fences, 
walls and gates which enclose spaces (spaces and their enclosures being 
integrally connected). This is particularly evident in prison space which imposes 
a certain value and identity onto the inmate whose very identity is constructed by 
virtue of her/his being enclosed, her/his space circumscribed. She is likely only 
to experience herself as a criminal when incarcerated: her existence in a cell 
makes her an inmate; her refusal to re-enter the cell also identifies her as a 
dissident (such as in the case of Makhoere's onetime campaign during which she 
and others resisted entering their cells). 
Identity and space are thus intertwined and mutually constitutive, for space 
functions symbolically as much as it operates in the 'real'. The symbolic value of 
space and structure is not distinct from the structure itself and a narrative whose 
language weaves comfortably ~nd indistinctly the strands of symbolism and 
reality cannot be dismissed as mere metaphor. David A. Napier asserts the 
inseparability of the symbol and the 'real': 
The symbol becomes the basis for other sympathetic relations, so much 
so that actions occurring in the real, actual; or architectonic world may be 
inseparable from their symbolic content. (1992, xviii) 
122 
First is transformed as a result of being enclosed in a tiny space where the 
bed is the only place of comfort. Her description of herself as a 'mainly 
horizontal creature' for whom a 'black iron bedstead became [her] world' (9) 
suggests that her bodily position comes to be read as her-self. The bleak and 
inhuman environment, which she describes at length as being 'grey', 'catacomb-
like, claustrophobic', covered in a 'dirty film' of dust and 'sticky black soot', leads 
to a fear of becoming 'one of those colourless insects that slither under a world 
·-of flat, grey stones, away from the sky and the sunlight, the grass and people' 
(9). ~ 
Later the metaphor she uses to de.scribe her prison existence is one of 
being confined to a 'matchbox' and relegated to orderliness: 
· On the iron bedstead it was like being closed inside a matchbox. A tight 
fit, lying on my bed, I felt I should keep my arms straight at my sides in 
cramped, stretched-straight orderliness. (9) 
The closing-in of First's space enacts a closing-in of her control and volition, just ----------
as the enforced extension of temporal experience in that space functions as a 
performance.of her being abandoned to the seemingly unlimited and arbitrary 
power of her captors to confine her. The architecture of the space she inhabits 
symbolises the social space assigned to her and functions to structure her social 
-..: -~---·-· . ·--- ~--
(and, to the extent that she as subject submits to it, her psychical) identity. It 
also sets up relations of power: First's horizontality ensures that she is held in 
the passive position, a 'kept' woman, whereas the prison staff operate vertically. 
In this set of relations verticality could be said to signify (phallic) power. 
Anthony Giddens proposes a useful term, 'locale' (1981, 161),which 
differs from 'space' or 'place' in that it allows for a more conscious integration of 
the erstwhile dualities of physical structure and the human interaction, thereby 
also introducing the factor of the passing of time. 'Locales refer to the use of 
space to provide the settings of interaction, the settings of interaction in turn 
being essential to specifying its contextuality' (Giddens 1985, 271; original 
emphasis). Giddens is critical of much time-space geography because of its 
tendency to reproduce the 'dualism of action and structure' and its emphasis, 
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following the seminal work of T. Hagerstrand, on 'identifying sources of 
constraint over human activity, given by the nature of the body and the physical 
contexts in which activity occurs' (Giddens 1985, 266). What this approach 
produces, according to Giddens, is a dangerously biologistic conception of the 
subject and an inflated view of human agency which is understood to be 
'constrained' by external physicalities rather than produQed in situ, as it were. 
Elsewhere too he finds fault with time-space geography because it 'operates with 
a naTve and defective conception of the human agent' ( 1985, 270). According to 
Giddens, Hagerstrand 'tends to treat "individuals" as coming into being 
independently of the social settings which they confront in their day-to-day lives' 
(1985, 270). Rather, the positioning of bodies in contexts within which power 
relations operate has a significant impact on the vagaries of subj~ctivity. Human 
~--------- --· . - ---~--
existence is not merely constrained by the confines of prison space; it is 
produced in relation to space. 
In discussing the work of Giddens, John Agnew articulates a particularly 
useful 'angle' on space (1993). Even Giddens's notion of 'locale' fails to move 
beyond a conceptualisation of space as object or 'thing', albeit acknowledged as 
cont~ibutive to the dynamic within which subjectivity is constituted. Agnew's 
contribution is to highlight the lived perception throu'gh which the meaning of 
space is constructed, 'from the inside' as it were. He argues that 'place is also 
more than an "object"', drawing on Raymond Williams's r:iotion of a 'structure of 
feeling'. (1977) and Allan Pred's critique of the rigidity of spatial metaphors in 
discussions of space. 43 
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But place is also more than an 'object'. Concrete, everyday practices give 
rise to a cultural mediation or 'structure of feeling' ... or 'felt sense of the 
quality of life at a particular place and time'. This sense of place reinforces 
the social-spatial definition of place from inside, so to speak. The 
identification with place that can follow contributes yet another aspect to 
the meaning of place: one place or 'territory' in its differentiation from 
~-,·\~other places can·become an 'object' of identity for a 'subject'. (263; last 
"' emphasis added) 
Agnew's emphasis on the construction of spatial significations from within a lived 
experience of place is helpful. However, it seems that his conceptualisation of 
the dynamic process of constituting self in relation to one's surrounds is 
surprisingly one-dimensional, focusing as it does o.n the 'definition of place' and, 
despite itself, on the way in which space does, or at least 'can' (Agnew 1993, 
43 Agnew quotes Allan Pred, 'Structuration and Place: On the Becoming of Sense of Place and 
Structure of Feeling'. 
See also Allan Pred, 'The Social Becomes the Spatial, the Spatial Becomes the Social: 
Enclosure, Social Change and the Becoming of Places in Skane' in Social Relations and Spatial 
Structures (1985). 
263), function as an object of identification. His analysis ultimately fails to 
produce a fruitful reading of the necessarily complicated, dialectic process within 
which identity is constructed in rela'tion to human space. For this reason it 
seems that his use of Pred is simplistic, particularly given that elsewhere Pred 
critiques geographers who describe the space-identity dialectic in precisely the 
phraseology used by Agnew (although Pred does not take issue with Agnew 
himself). Pred is emphatic in his critique of the ways in which human 
geographers have treated space as rigid, defined, fixed, productive of meaning 
rather than produced in relation to subjective psychical arrangement. '[P]laces 
have been portrayed as little more than frozen scenes for human activity,' Pred 
argues: 
Even the 'new humanistic' geographers who see place as an object for a 
subject, as a centre of individually-felt values and meanings, or as a 
locality of emotional attachment and felt significance, in essence conceive 
of place as an inert, experienced scene. (Pred 1985, 337; emphasis 
added) 
Pred thus distances himself from Agnew, by implication, as a geographer who 
conceives of place as 'an object for a subject'. For although this 
conceptualisation of place does acknowledge that the subject is constituted in 
relation to place which can function as an object of identity, Pred's proposal as to 
-- . -·- . = 
the meaning and function of place is more explicit in understanding place as a 
product of human signification. Place and subjectivity are more mutually 
...___~~- ··--·--· - - ·-
constitutive than Agnew's analysis suggests: 
: '·f>1ace always represents a human product; it always involves an 
Uppropriation and transformation of space and nature that is inseparable om the reproduction and transformation of society in time and space .... ~
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It is not only what is fleetingly scene [sic] as place, a 'locale' or setting for 
activity and social interaction. 
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For the purposes of a discussion on th~ representation of self within prison 
~ace1, Pred's assertion that place is necessarily a 'human product' is useful. 
Space is constitutive of identity as identity is constitutive of the meaning of a 
.. _ ·- ~ 
place. But in prison one is not fully in control of one's space (and body); others 
are at least in part constructing one's space and hence one's modes of 
subjectivity. The ways in which writers of prison narratives represent their 
bodies suggest that for white and black women in apartheid prisons, bodies and 
subjectivities are. produced differently by state power. 
Throughout her text Ruth First adopts metaphors drawn from the space 
she occupies when representing herself, using a language that is steeped in the 
physicality of the prison to articulate both her own sense of volition and the 
powers of the state. When first allowed out of her cell to exercise in the 
courtyard the symbolic step over the threshold of her cell takes her into a 
boundary-lessness which seems, through the reference to a figure of eight, to 
promise a continuousness of being. Here the term 'space' is charged with the 
magnitude of outer Space itself: 
The few steps out of the cell were like a hurtle through space on a fun-fair 
figure of eight, and my stomach leapt as my legs moved across the· 
concrete threshold. ( 42) 
The whirl of a figure of eight is gravity-defying: there is no distinction between 
the upper and lower positions. As a two-dimensional mathematical symbol it 
functions to represent infinity. Moreover it introduces the suggestion of third 
dimension, given ·the reference to the movement of a rollercoaster ride at the 
funfair, and th.e freedom to occupy space fully, continuously. 'Fun-fair' also 
evokes a sense of hysterical· excess, .and the ambivalence associated with what 
. . 
excites even as it terrifies. Rather ominously, it speaks of the degree to which 
the physical bounds of her prison existence have come to figure as her own 
edges so that in crossing over that (psychical) threshold she is threatened with a 
frightening lack of control as she steps into the expanse. 
But all too soon she realises that the same symbols of entrapment are at 
work in that enclosed space, for despite its grander proportions and the fact that 
the courtyard is in the open air, her status as captive is as entrenched, her 
freedom as determinedly kept from her, her movements under as vigilant 
surveillance as when she was in the smaller space of the cell. The enclosing 
power of th.e prison building has extended to the sky itself, that ultimate signifier 
of boundless infinity; the sun itself, source of daylight's cycle, has become 
regulated by prison time. 
But the exercise yard was too like a cell. The sky was trapped by brick 
walls extending upwards and, like the warders regulating my stay in the 
courtyard, the brick walls officiously limited the shine of the sun. ,(42) 
The brick walls, given the quality of officiousness, have taken on the identity of 
the imprisoning system. '"Fhey' have in fact become the system of incarceration. 
There is no distinction to be made between the regime by whose wrath and 
unjust laws First is punished as prisoner, the authorities and hapless warders 
who carry out the daily tasks of imprisoning .her and the very walls of the prison 
buildings themselves. 
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Nor is First's own person distinct fro~ the space with which she id,ent_ifies, 
-----·---that is, the open freshness of the sky and warmth of the sun. Later First speaks 
of how she followed the sun during her daily hour 'outdoors': 'On sunny days I 
basked in the patch of sun, moving with it, if I could stay long enough, as it 
inched westwards across the courtyard and then out of reach' (42). The force of 
the verb 'bask' invokes the metaphor of an animal emerging from hibernation in 
dark corners to soak up the energising warmth of the sun. She lives within the 
sun's regulated space. But the sun tqo can be imprisoned by the tall walls of the 
courtyard which shut out the sun and set boundaries around the sky. This 
_recalls both Makhoere's and Mashinini's insistence that the confining powers of 
the state extend beyond the prison too: life outside is only a 'kind of freedom' for 
Mashinini (88); the same nightmare of discipline and deprivation that Makhoere 
experiences in prison extends to all life in apartheid South Africa for blacks for 
the 'evil system has made our lives a pitiful thing .... Until the people shall govern 
our people will still be sleeping in ditches, in trees' (118). 
For First the meaning of the enclosed courtyard is utterly transformed, 
however, through the written testimonies of the prisoners, so that it comes to be 
read as their register, recreating their togetherness: 'Arthur Goldreich had 
written his and Hazel's n~me in his precise architectural printing; Harold was 
there too' (43). His script, in mimicking something of his character (that is, his 
meti~ulous~ess), comes to stand in for himself. Moreover, the walls, as the 
pages on which signatures are inscribed, acknowledge the presence, across 
time, of what becomes a community of prisoners. Despite her physical solitude 
(and the dictates of the prison which proscribes communality) she is constructed 
128 
129 
as one of a community of fellow sufferers, fellow activists. In this way an identity 
is made concrete through these representations of community. 
The large exercise yard had become our place of reunion and our archive. 
Next to the names were scratched the dates of detention, and simple 
arithmetic caiculations deduced that the fate of those arrested was 
continuous detention, except for those who had escaped or left the 
country. ( 43) 
Despite the hostile role of the place, it has been able to function positively as a 
site where the political prisoners a·re able to make a gesture which is invested 
with themselves, representing their individual and communal presence. 44 This 
presence is reassuring because it lingers across time; the fact that the prisoners 
are not all physically present at the same time is irrelevant in this realm where 
time is felt to be held. It also functions as a warning of the extent of the state's 
power to incarcerate indefinitely, thus limiting that power which uses the fear of 
the unknown as a tool. (The following chapter will consider the role of 
unpredictability in disempowering prisoners.) 
In the horror of time itself being held captive, the specificities of time are 
represented in a remarkably physical and explicit way. For it is, paradoxically, 
fear of the very infinitude of time held that produces the impulse to make 
concrete, make physical the nebulous, limitless passage of time. So, the 
obsessive need to measure time becomes dominant. The sounds of the life in 
the police station 'were welcome', First writes, 'in a series of endless days when 
time was determined only by [her] scratches on the wall and the visits of Security 
44 Barbara Harlow writes that the 'political fraternity [sic], its historical record, is in many cases 
inscribed on the prison walls themselves, which become archives of the resistance' (1987, 128). 
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Branch interrogators' (32). At another point she writes of the intolerable pain of 
waiting through time in a state of anxiety. The role of time is crucial, frighteningly 
akin to physical beating: 
Yet, I told myself, I was subjected to no beating, no physical pain. The 
passage of time in anxiety was painful, .and my ulcer was the recording 
instrument of that discomfort. But theoretically one could endure for years 
like this, in cold storage, with the pulse reduced. (75) 
She uses a spatial metaphor to describe the formlessness of limitless time: 'It 
was not only the· pain of existing in a vacuum. It was the indefiniteness of it all' 
(75). If a vacuum is correctly spoken of as 'space devoid of matter' (OED) it 
seems that, in using a spatial metaphor, she is drnwing attention to the 
indefiniteness of time in detention. It is precisely the nothingness of the 
(temporal) dimensions in which she exists that inflicts pain. The physical void 
exists because of the lack of temporal structure or, at least, because of her 
powerlessness to determine the structure. The void is a function of the 
. emptiness of her volition, her lack of control. 
In her attempts to out-wit time (that is, her own sense of the passing of 
time) she becomes slavishly committed to the carrying out of trivial tasks with an 
obsessive attention to detail: 
I made the bed carefully several times a day, I folded and refolded my 
clothes, re-packed my suitcase, dusted and polished everything in sight, 
cleaned the walls with a tissue. I filed my nails painstakingly. I plucked 
my eyebrows, then the hair from my legs, one hair at a time, with my small 
set of tweezers. (When I got into the sun I pulled out the strands of grey 
hair growing at my temples.) I unpicked seams in the pillow-slip, the towel, 
the hem of my dressing-gown, and then, using my smuggled needle and 
thread, sewed them up again. (73) 
The most significant of these tasks is the one by which she records her 
existence: her needlework calendar. This (lived) metaphor of creating days 
through sewing stitches suggests that to measure time is to create it, but what is 
being created is not time itself but an inhabitable temporal structure and a 
confirmation of her own efficacy: 
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Ninety days. I calculated the date repeatedly, did not trust my calculation, 
and did it all again. Every day I repeated that little rhyme 'Thirty days hath 
September and I counted days from 9 August, the date of my arrest. My 
wall calendar had been left behind at Marshall Square; in Pretoria my 
calendar was behind the lapel of my dressing-gown. Here, with my 
needle and thread, I stitched one stroke for each day passed. I sewed 
seven upright strokes, then a horizontal stitch through them to mark a 
week. Every now and then I would examine the stitching and decide that 
the sewing was not neat enough and the strokes could be more deadly 
exact in size; I'd pull the thread out and re-make the calendar from the 
beginning. This gave me a feeling that I was pushing time on. creating 
days,· weeks, and even months. Sometimes I surprised myself and did not 
sew a stitch at the end of the day. I would wait three days and then give 
·myself a wonderful thrill knocking three days off the ninety. (7 4; emphasis 
added) 
But, as her narrative acknowledges, the 'thrill' in being able to record (and 
therefore govern) time is precarious because artificially constructed. She is as 
trapped by her own obsessive discipline (set up to affirm her control of her life) 
as by the routine imposed on her by the prison itself. In relation to the carrying 
out of her tasks, First writes that the 'repetition of these meaningless tasks and 
the long loneliness made me a prisoner of routines' (73). While at this point in 
her prison spell her ability to record and represent her relationship to the passing 
of time may contribute to her sense of control, her narrative structure burdens 
the reader with the knowledge that it is not, in fact, 90 days but 117, as the 
book's title announces, that she must endure. After the 'cruel pantomime' (112) 
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of being released and immediately re-arrested she abandons her 'calendar' as 
each new day becomes a signifier, not of her increasing endurance, but of the 
increasing (and immeasurable) power of the state. It is now left to her ulcer to 
register the passing of time, 'ulcer [which was] already recording, with a steady 
dilating pain in my inside, the state of my nervous anxiety' (113). 
6.1 Surveillance 
Central to the discussion thus far has been the question .of control as a crucial 
mechanism of imprisonment: the prisoner's lack of control over who has access 
to the space she inhabits and how it is defined, with time (and therefore 
existence) being controlled by prison routines and structures. So too, visibility is 
not determined by choice but is entirely subject to the whim of the authorities. 
The prisoner is not always watched but is always visible, with 'the penny-sized 
peephole' a constant reminder 'of the humiliation of being locked away' (First 28-
9). 
To recall Foucault's work on the disciplining structure of the prison 
~discussed earlier, the role of arbitrary and enforced visibility is an important 
disciplinary mechanism. He is attentive to the technology of observation itself as 
indicative of the greater project of subjection. The physical construction of 
'observatory' spaces plays a fundamental part in the practice of control and in its 
representation. An 'architecture of discipline', so to speak, is not designed 
' . 
simply for public viewing of prisoners and cadets but functions 'to permit an 
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internal, articulated and detailed control - to render visible those who are inside 
it' (Foucault 1977a, 172): 
[l]n more general terms, [it is] an architecture that would operate to 
transform individuals: to act on those it shelters, to provide a hold on their 
conduct, to carry the effects of power right to them, to. make it possible to 
know them, to alter them. (Foucault 1977a, 172) 
Thus in Foucault's view the mechanism of control at work in prison institutions is 
· not simply one of confinement but of control through visibil'ity, what Tony 
Bennett, in a different context; calls 'the opening up ... to more public contexts of 
inspection and visibility' (1994, 137).45 Foucault's sub-heading to his chapter on 
the 'means of correct training' makes exp,!icit the inequality in this relationship of 
viewing: 'Hierarchical Observation' (1977a, 170). The structure of the prison 
ensures that the inmate is always under surveillance, the object of an unknown 
but controlling look. The controller remains veiled; his are 'eyes that must see 
without being seen' (1977a, 171). 
This invisible surveillance contributes to Mashinini's horror at being caught 
unawares by what she describes as 'two eyes piercing me' (64 ). The warders' 
eyes, peering at her unannounced through the hole in the door, are intrusive to 
the point of inflicting injury yet remain hidden and seemingly dissociated from 
anything human. In contrast to Mashinini, First is able to neutralise the horror of 
being positioned as an object of a malevolent gaze both in her spoken challenge 
to the wardresses (which immediately situates her as a subject) and in the 
authority of her textual representation of the event which positions the warders 
45 Both Bennett's and Foucault's analyses are supported by a wealth of historical observations 
which will be absent in my discussion because of its specific scope and concerns. 
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as exhibits of her gaze. Once published, her text, through representing the 
wardresses lin~uistically, makes them objects of a much more potent look which 
is ultimately more constitutive of them than their positioning of her is able to be. 
She exposes the sinister mission of the peephole with satirical indignation: 
By prison standards it was designed to have the prisoner under scrutiny 
from the outside, not for the prisoner to view anything from the inside of 
the cell. 'Back fro111 the door!' the wardress would cry when she saw the 
pupil of an eye up against the peephole. The hole was hers, to see if the 
prisoner was on the bed or off it. Sitting up or lying down. Laughing or 
crying. Facing the wall or turned away from it. Alive or dead. Locked up 
or escaped. I resented the spyhole and felt that to be peered at through it 
was a violent infringement of my privacy .. Above all I objected to being 
talked to through the hole. 'If you want to see if I'm here, or say anything 
to me,' I told the police and the wardresses, 'Open the door. Don't spy at 
me through that hole.' (29) 
In a subtle reversal of the criminalising discourse of the prison, First's speech, 
and then her text as well,· categorises the warders themselves as villains (who 
'spy'). It is she who demands respectful interactions. And yet her attempt to 
reverse the positions is not altogether successful for when she tries to 
' 
appropriate the role of observer by peering through the keyhole she is 
discovered and suffers further shame: 'I felt humiliated every time I was detected 
standing on tiptoe trying to look out. It was as though my curiosity had got the 
better of my ability to exist in isolation' (29). By desiring to look she has 
transgressed her own code that she not capitulate. But her shame is only 
produced when she is 'caught out' by the wardresses as wanting (and needing) 
to look, as if it were a sign of her weakness and thus of their power to unnerve 
her through surveillance. Thus Foucault's analysis of the connection between 
viewing and relations of power makes explicit what First and Mashinini as 
narrators implicitly know: 
Disciplinary power ... is exercised through its invisibility; at the same time 
it imposes on those whom it subjects a principle of compulsory visibility. 
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In discipline, it is the subjects who have to be seen. Their visibility 
assures the hold of the power that is exercised over them. It is the fact of 
being constantly seen, of being able always to be. seen, that maintains the 
disciplined individual in his subjection. (1977a, 187) 
Jeremy Bentham's conception of the panopticon in the late eighteenth 
century was the first articulation and encoding of this inequality of visibility. 
Bentham conceived of the panopticon as a solution to his brother's prob!em with 
unproductive factory workers, which in itself highlights the sinister disciplinary 
purpose of the structure of surveillance. It was later applied to prisons. Central 
surveillance was fundamental to Bentham's structure as it 'achieved total and 
continuous control' (Markus 1993, 123). The numerous attempts thereafter to 
reproduce this model through building 'centric' prisons did not, Thomas Markus 
argues, correctly establish the requisite viewing pattern of Bentham's design: 
They lacked that total asymmetry of power which was an essential feature. 
Inmates could see and hear each other, or they could see their keepers, 
or there were periods when they escaped surveillance. (Markus 1993, 
123) 
There are two essential features to Bentham's design: first, the invisibility of the 
authorities and second, the separation between prisoners. Barbara Harlow 
writes of 'the one-way observational control of the Benthamite panopticon ... 
whose modern counterpart is the "peephole"' (1987, 150). Bentham's design 
does not consider the possibility of other forms of 'seeing' or recognising people. 
First is quite explicit about the uselessness of sigh.t in prison, but she has an 
alternative: her ability to hear. 
I could dispense with my eyes. Ears were more useful in isolation. There 
would be the jingle of keys and the clang of doors to announce the 
approach of an intruder, or a new episode in the regulated monotony of 
life in a cell. (30) 
She is able to monitor the life in prison and become acquainted with the 
personalities on the staff (with remarkable insight) and in this way re-empower 
herself to 'see': 'I identified the wardresses by the sound of them long before· I 
. . ' 
saw them. Female voices. Raucous. Shrill. Pained. Competent' (30). The 
authorities' power over the prisoner is no longer absolute once they have been 
'examined', that is, analysed psychologically. First makes use of the strategy of 
objectifying her warders by assigning them satirical names, thereby exercising 
an authority of sorts over them. She thus escapes their humiliating 
categorisation of her as criminal and traitor. 
Bentham stipulated that the hierarchy of surveillance was to be applied to 
136 
the warders themselves: 'successful surveillance required the guards themselves 
to be under surveillance in hierarchically ascending layers in which the Governor 
was finally subject to Boards, Visitors, Commissioners and Overseers' (Markus 
127). First's text suggests that when her guards are seen to be similarly under 
surveillance, the scope of their power is diminished in the eyes of the inmates. 
When the institution of the 'Key Man' is introduced to monitor the wardresses' 
use of the key to the second, bigger lock on each cell, First is alert to the 
wardresses' humiliation. The wardresses, once figures of great power (potent in 
their verticality, I suggested earlier), are reduced to being lackeys of the system, 
and of the prisoners themselves. 
The keys in the hands of the wardresses, once a badge of office, had 
become a mockery. The wardresses locked the prisoners in their cells, 
but were themselves powerless to regulate their incarceration. They had 
degenerated into skivvies, into messengers sent to fetch a man carrying a 
key ring.... Big Brother, hauled from the ranks, was watching them. (28) 
There is a marked difference between this irreverent representation of the 
imprisoning symbols and an earlier moment in 117 Days when the extraordinary 
symbolic power of the key itself is acknowledged. First is 'transfixed by the 
largest of the keys' and fantasises about its size thereafter: 'Four and a half 
inches long, yet when I heard its rattle in the lock it seemed to grow in my mind's 
eye to the size of a poker' (19). The hierarchy is clearly gendered, according to 
First's account. The_phallic proportions of the key-wielded by 'Big Brother' -
suggest that ultimate power is his. 
The second essential aspect to Bentham's design is that the prisoners are 
to be kept apart from one another. According to Markus, 'Bentham had foreseen 
that cellular solitude was crucial to prevent prisoner solidarity' (127). When 
prisoners have voluntary access to one another a modicum of control is lost to 
the authorities. Barbara Harlow describes how an illicit conversation between 
Jacobo Timerman (author of Prisoner Without a Name. Cell Without a Number) 
and a fellow prisoner undermines the controlling design of isolation (1987, 150). 
Giddens argues that 'presence-availability' is crucial to social organisation of 
space. In prison, there is a doubleness to this phenomenon, for prisoners have 
to endure an enforced 'co-presence' (being always available to hostile or 
137 
unwanted encounters with other prisoners or with warders) while at the same 
time they are denied access to a self-identified nurturing community: 
Prisons and asylums are often associated with enforced continuity of co-
presence among individuals who are not ordinarily accustomed to such 
routines of daily life. Prisoners who share the same cell may rarely be out 
of each other's presence for the whole of the day and night. On the other 
hand, the 'disciplinary power' of prisons, asylums and other types of 'total 
institution' is based upon disrupting the gearing of presence-availability 
into the routines of daily trajectories 'outside'. Thus the very same 
inmates who are forced into continuous co-presence are denied the 
availability of easy encounters with other groups in the prison, even 
though those others may be physically only on the other side of the walls 
of the cell. (Giddens 1985, 276) 
Giddens does not consider the features of prison space in greater detail and 
thus does not comment on solitary confinement specifically, which is a 
fundamental part of apartheid South Africa's security legislation. (Solitary 
confinement will be discussed in the following chapter.) However, an application 
of his use of 'presence-availability' highlights the horror of being always about-
to-be-seen, which is not only a question of visibility but also a matter of being 
compelled to be constantly available, without access to privacy, yet isolated from 
the community with which one identifies. As First comments, isolation and 
privacy are not 'the same thing by any means' (29). Her isolation cuts her off 
from her own community while imposing on her an utter dependence on a 
different, hostile community of jailers. As the only white woman detainee at this 
time, First is the only woman in her section of the prison during most of her 
detention. CThe exception is Anne-Marie Wolpe who was briefly detained 
following the escape of Harold Wolpe from prison.) This meant that First was set 
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apart from other women prisoners and forced into a particular class position 
within the prison and thus a further isolation: 
I, a prisoner held under top security conditions, was forbidden books, 
visitors,, contact with any other prisoner; but like any white South African 
Madam I sat in bed .each morning, and Africans did the cleaning for the 
'missus'. (37) · 
This 'enforced sequestration' of prisoners is, according to Giddens, a 'defining 
feature of a 'total institution' (Giddens 1985, 276). The dominant tool of this task 
is what Foucault refers to as the 'meticulously sealed wall, uncrossable in either 
direction ... the monotonous figure, at once material and symbolic, of the power 
to punish' (1977a, 116). 
The spatial arrangement in prison is thus fundamental to the authorities'. 
project of breaking down the prisoners' dissidence (particularly in the case of 
those charged with political 'crimes'). The structured relationship between 
building, inmate and guard is a complex one. For while the 'body' of the prison is 
the site within which the prisoners are constructed as prisoners, it can also be 
their place of self-construction. The prisoner's self-identification must take place 
\ . 
in relation to a hostile (and, in the case of torture, painful) environment. But the 
intimate nature of the cell, despite its infliction of dishonour and subjugation, 
makes self-expression possible so that its inhabitants, remarkably, are never 
entirely without recourse. 
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7. The Body of the Prison as Bearer of Pain 
Ruth First equates her incarceration in Pretoria Central with 'being sealed in a 
sterile tank of glass in a defunct aquarium' (71 ). The sterility itself and the 
dazzling harshness of the place (which 'shone of bright polished steel') threaten 
asphyxiation, both to her body and her spirit: the text links the description of the 
barren prison with the fact that she 'grew increasingly subdued' (71 ). 
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I would initially like to consider the difficulties arising out of the physicality 
of the prison, and the physicality it both enforces on and entrusts to the prisoner 
whose entire world takes on an intense physicality, and for whom bodily 
proportions become the dimensions through which life and being are 
experienced. A space utterly unfamiliar to the prisoner and empty of all that she 
'is' - indeed a space antagonistic to, and even denying of the self forged in 
warm and intimate abodes - functions as the site of a profound disorientation. 
All that is tangible must be grasped, read, interacted with, in the absence of more 
conventional interlocutors. The anatomy of the. prison is the body within which 
and in resistance to which identity is made dynamic, is brought to life, is allowed 
to breathe. 
What also concerns me is how one's experience of one's body in prison, 
and the physical space, the pain, the fact of being denied freedom physically to 
be elsewhere, the fact of being dressed in a uniform, of being cold, of being in a 
place of death and of brutality- how these discomforts affect the prisoner's 
sense of self and, most especially, _how the writers of prison narratives talk about 
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their experiences of their bodies and the symbolic use made of body in their 
texts. But first to the 'body' of the prison. 
7 .1 Anatomies of Prisons and Constructions of Self 
Elaine Scarry approaches the relationship between physical space and psychical 
awareness of self differently from the human geographers discussed earlier. 
She suggests that in a complicated way the physical structure within which one 
moves becomes an extension of oneself, indeed the object onto which one 
projects oneself. This physical structure is, in effect, an 'enlargement' or 
'magnification' (Scarry 1985, 38) of the body in that it plays the protecting and 
deJimiting role that the body plays, offering shelter, keeping others at a distan~ 
-ensuff ng warmth, etc. It can also be seen as a 'miniaturization of the worl& in 
that the walls, as independent objects, stand in for the external world against 
which the body positions itself and in relation to which interaction takes place: 
-·----·~·-~. 
--------. ________ __ 
The walls are] objects which stand apart from and free of the body, 
objects which realize the human being's impulse to project himself out into 
a space beyond the boundaries of the body in acts of making, either 
physical or verbal, that once multiplied, collected, and shared are called 
civilization. (Scarry 1985, 39) ..---. 
The walls, then, participate in the creative process during which identity is 
forged. This surely accounts, in part, for the common impulse to decorate one's 
~ ---
domestic space so that it feeds back an image both with which one can inte13-ct 
-· '' - '' -~~-. ·--~-~-----~---
and through which oo.e~s.sense~ef-selHs...feiofor:ced. In addition, the walls act as 
~ "-·~=----.., 
a filter to thelouts.id.e...wD.r:ld,_p.ar.tLc.Ld~d.Y so in Rrison where the sing~ll door 
~
142 
along with the window is the only point of access to the little of the outside world 
which the prisoner is shown. The edges of the room mark the point at which the 
~ ------:-:----::--~:---;--;::---;-----;;--7.':-;--,;--~ 
subject engages with and contributes to the dynamic of cultural and political -
~ 
production of meaning Scar!}' refers to as 'civilization'. -----c::::: As such, the 'body' of the room (or prison cell) tak,es on a particular 
significance. Because it mimics the protective and iaentifying-edging-te-t.J:ie_ 
prisoner's self-identified and public persona, it literally 'stands in for'-tneoody of 
~--.. ----
the prisoner. .Under more 'normal' circumstances, the outer structure of a room 
(including the furniture, Scarry argues) does the work of the body: the room 
'accommodates and thereby eliminates from human attention the human body' 
(1985, 39). The body is displaced, relieved of its watchdog task. Consequently, 
the body is no longer the 'obsessive object' of concern (39) so that the subject is 
free to focus its attention and consciousness on objects beyond itself, thereby 
enlarging its world. When this.set of relations (physical to psychical) is distorted 
I . ~
in the horror of imprisonment and torture, the prisoner's world begins to shrink-~--
and the body is made terrifyingly present and overwhelmingly a focus of 
----~----~---:----------
awareness. ---------- . · Central to Scarry's thesis is the notion of the 'undoing' of 'the world' 
through the infliction of pain (of which enforced isolation is an example). The 
conventional function of the room is perverted when it is used as a weapon 
against the body (by, for example, locking the prisoner into its enclosing space, 
and thus inflicting fear and disempowerment in a way in which a domestic room 
would not). It is 'undone', its meaning radically altered: 
[T]he room in both its structure and its content, is converted into a 
weapon, deconverted, undone: ... The domestic act of protecting becomes 
an act of hurting and in hurting, the object becomes what it is not, an 
expression of individual contraction, of the retreat into the most self-
absorbed and self-experiencing of human feelings .... (Scarry 1985, 41) 
Undoubtedly the 'protective' role of the room becomes duplicitous when it also 
takes on the hostile role of locking in its inhabitant and rendering her powerless. 
Moreover, when its very nature - as a cell, dirty and cold, designed for 
punishment and identified with criminality- imposes on the prisoner a perverse 
identity, her place of shelter becomes (also) a fearsome participant in the 
political battle being waged against her. 
An ambivalence, born of the multiple roles played by the enclosing cell, is 
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evident in Emma Mashinini's response to her space and the walls which define it. 
She is able to draw strength from her physical space once it is decorated out of 
its prison 'shape'. At one point in her narrative she describes how she made 
meaningful use of the five-litre fruit juice boxes which her husband had brought 
her while in John Vorster Square . 
. One time it was peach, orange, apple and so forth. I had these boxes in 
my cell. When they were empty I kept them. The colour meant much to 
me - the green, the orange - it was my closeness to nature. It kept me 
going. (1989, 77) 
The boxes, now devoid of their juice content and even their box shape, offer 
sufficient substance nevertheless to function as a symbol. Interestingly, it is not 
simply 'nature' which they symbolise for Mashinini, but 'my closeness to nature'. 
Displayed on the cell walls, they affirm for Mashinini a perceived aspect of her 
identity - that of her link with things natural - which cannot be represented in 
the bleakness of the cold grey stone. It is worth noting that we are not told more 
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about this 'closeness' and it is never concretised elsewhere in the autobiography 
(which is not only about prison life) by reports of outdoor excursions. But the 
mounted boxes are able to signify and thus keep alive an aspect of her identity: 
the boxes 'keep me going' in an environment which forbids her access to the 
tools of representation crucial to constructing one's own subjectivity. By 
displaying the boxes she is able to represent herself as being 'close to nature' in 
a way in which any actual excursions into nature could not do, at the level of 
) 
representation. 
And yet being confined in an excruciatingly enclosed space where she is 
watched, 'like an animal', is ultimately profoundly disturbing to Mashinini. 
Ironically, the concept of 'nature' is invoked at an earlier point in her narrative to 
articulate the dehumanising experience of being caged: 'I thought, it's like an 
animal, to see those two eyes, and I'm in a cage. It was frightening' (64) .. Most 
troubling is the fact that the structure of her cell enables the wardresses to look 
in without her sanction. The room no longer functions as a protector and a place 
of privacy which shields her from unwanted intrusion. Instead it takes on the 
terrifying dimensions of a cage. The distressed repetition of the third-person 
plural pronoun 'they' - the faceless, all-knowing, all-seeing agent - suggests 
that her own sense of control is frighteningly absent. 
They knew. They had their little window and the nurse was coming in 
because of my hypertension. So they knew all was not well with me. 
They did not need to ask what was wrong. 
It was a very frightful thing, that window. Whilst I was sitting on my only 
sitting place - there was no chair, I had to use the bed to sit, to sleep, to 
do everything - I was always sitting opposite that window, which was 
sealed. But then when I was on the bed, trying to sleep, not expecting 
anybody, I would just see two eyes piercing at me. All I could see was 
their eyes. It was very, very frightful. I couldn't get used to it. I thought, 
it's like an animal, to see those two eyes, and I'm in a cage. It was 
frightening. (64) 
The eyes themselves become an obsessive focus for Mashinini ('all I could see 
was their eyes'). The eyes are the classic reminders of animal eyes in the dark, 
but with even greater force they are suggestive of eyes behind ·the barrels of a 
gun. She is in their 'sights'. It is Mashinini, then, who is produced as an animal. 
Although from her view the eyes are framed by the little window it is she who is 
~ 
framed, even for Herself, through looking at eyes which themselves are looking. 
In seeing the eyes of the other, Mashinini sees herself (via the other's gaze). 
She is constructed through. being looked at - through seeing herself being 
looked at. The eyes of the other occupy a crucial position in her own 
construction of self, just as the ear of the other must be present to mediate and 
to verify the subject's own message. The anxiety about the look- or censure -
. from the other attests to the centrality of that mediating position in self-
construction. 
Later a paranoia about the 'dirt' of that space emerges and she tackles 
every part of the cell with disinfectant. The text is surprisingly clear in linking the 
slur of 'criminal' with the desire to sanitise the space and expunge it (and thus 
herself) of its (and her) sulliedness. 
I asked at this time for things to clean the place. I was given disinfectant' 
·for the toilet, and I cleaned the walls and the floor. It was interesting 
cleaning the walls, because in places I could read, 'I WAS HERE FOR 
RAPE', and a signature, or 'I WAS HERE FOR STEALING CARS'. 
Everybody who had been in that cell wrote on that wall what they were 
there for, and it kept me busy, reading all this. But then it began to torture 
me, because I thought that I was not a criminal. Why must I be sitting in a 
cell of rapists and people who stole cars and who were selling liquor? So 
I washed the walls as far as I could, and my toilet was now nice and clean, 




There is a certain poignancy in the text's acknowledgement of the impossibility of 
achieving this sanitising objective: we are left with the picture of Mashinini 
pouring the antiseptic liquid 'again and again' with no sense of ever reaching a 
state of cleanliness which could allow her to rest, cleansed and restored. This 
action can be read as an attempt to exercise control in producing herself as 
subject ('pure' as opposed to 'criminal'); the fact that she repeats it compulsively 
is an acknowledgement that it is impossible, ultimately, to secure identity. The 
criminal slur cannot be erased, although the impulse to do so is urgent and 
ongoing. 
For the literal text inscribed on the walls and their signification, as cell 
walls, of criminality threaten to produce Mashinini as criminal. But the same text 
is initially fasdnating to Mashinini. She is drawn to the writing as though it offers 
her a welcoming, potentially self-restorative context and a shelter from the 
isolation she fears. The signatures themselves constitut~, symbolically, a 
community of fellow prisoners who have managed to testify to their existence in 
this small but crucial way. She is a member of that community simply by being 
present to read and attest to the (erstwhile) presence of the other prisoners. But 
if her own identity is to be constructed with reference to their representations 
Mashinini must reject that instrument of self-representation for herself and, 
moreover, erase the testimonies of others. It is only later, once she is o~tside 
the walls which were built to house criminals, that Mashinini can embrace a 
community of (ex-)prisoners, in the healing solidarity which she finds with fellow 
activist and detainee, Liz Floyd. Later still she finds yet another context within 
which to articulate and thus to restore her sense of self, another (sympathetic) 
dialogue within which to represent herself. Barbara Harlow writes that the 
'forbidden use of "we," in prison discipline as in the conventions of 
autobiography, is challenged by the writing of the prison memoirs of political 
detainees' (1987, 153). Writing offers her the tool and the community for her 
self-construction. 
· The same anxiety is not found in the book written by Caesarina Kana 
Makhoere, who uses her own body as a weapon (No Child's Play: In Prison· 
Under Apartheid). She simply refuses the signification of criminality (although 
acknowledges proudly, for example, having attacked Mbomvana with the 
intention of killing her). Rather, she self-consciously presents herself as a 
freedom fighter. She goes as far as to say, quite simply, 'we were not prisoners' 
(and this while in prison). Her defiance is clearly articulated in a refusal to 
complywith the bodily subjection of prison discipline. Earlier I considered the 
way in which she uses her body to defy the way in which she is read by the 
apartheid prison system. What I did not consider was the reciprocal relationship: 
how the prison structure - the cell in particular - is used against her, and the 
way in which she responds to it (and represents it in her text) as a statement of 
her identity 
Unlike Mashinini who endeavours to transform the messages of the prison 
cell, investing them with something of herself, Makhoere rejects prison 
significations out of hand, refusing at one point even to enter the cell. 
One day the authorities started to block the windows. There had been 
proper windows; instead they put a four-cornered steel plate, about half a 
meter high with small holes in it. Those windows were made for 
storerooms. Really, these people are terrible. I don't have a suitable 
147 
word for them. They clearly believed they could treat political prisoners 
like dry goods. (Makhoere 1988, 40) 
The decision to 'take action against this type of treatment' promises an 
appropriately physical response (that is, to remain outside the cells). This 
follows months of verbal 'complaining': 
[W]e announced: 'we are not going back to our cells until something is 
done about the windows. We have been complaining ever since early 
1978, and it is now January 1979. It simply means you are not willing to 
treat us like human beings. We are not going into our cells.' ... They tried· 
to plead with us. We said 'over our dead bodies'. ( 40) 
The implicit threat of suicide, along with the numerous hunger strikes, operates 
as a weapon of intimidation which threatens to expose the artificiality of the role 
of caretaker professed to by the prison authorities .. It is not surprising that 
Makhoere elects death itself as an instrument, given that the 'meaning' of the 
structure of the windowless cells is understood by Makhoere to erase the life of 
its inhabitants, who become 'like dry goods'. ·(Historically, however, the state 
security system in South Africa has used the phenomenon of suicide to explain 
the numerous deaths in detention, denying that detainees were ever tortured. 
Presumably the death of a detainee is therefore not as threatening to the prison 
authorities as the text suggests. In fact, Ruth First is at pains to hide her 
attempted suicide from the prison staff because she fears they would delight in it 
as a confirmation of their power and her capitulation.) 
Makhoere's campaign throughout her time of imprisonment (and 
throughout her text) seems to be in part an attempt to force the authorities (and 
her readership) to recognise her humanity. She defies the signification of 
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lifelessness by which she is oppressed: 'at some point you no longer know you 
are human; that's how I felt' (8). This is particularly clear early on in her text 
when she describes Pretoria Central: 
This building is a nightmare. It was a government mortuary before it was 
converted into a prison. This is where people who are sentenced to death 
are hanged ... (8) 
The building, as a place for dead bodies, threatens to impose a kind of 
lifelessness on her, which her belligerence and her text, itself, seeks to defy. 
She remarks on the fact that '[b]lack prisoners were hidden whenever I was 
supposed to go out of the cell. If they appeared when I was led out they were 
shooed away before they could even see me' (9). Here and later at Silverton 
Police Station her response is to register her existence through outspokenness, 
and to seek contact and statements of solidarity. Both strategies make use of 
the structure of the prison, of its body and hers: 
As my cell was sandwiched between two other cells I could hear footsteps 
coming and going. If they unlocked the door of the first cell, I would know 
there had to be people in there. A few minutes after they had locked up l 
would bang on the wall with both my feet and hands. I would bang until 
they hurt and the other detainees would respond by also banging on their 
side of the wall. That would excited me so! The windows had a wire 
mesh with a small hole between the wire where one could open the 
window. I would open the window and shout a greeting to the prisoner 
next door who had just responded to my banging, and she would shout a 
greeting back through the window .... Talking to these prisoners kept me 
sane, kept me going. (10-11; emphasis added) 
It is not insignificant that she uses precisely the same expression used by 
Mashinini to describe her new sense of courage and reassurance when 
decorating her cell with colours. The fruit boxes, Mashinini said, 'kept me going' 
as does the stolen contact for Makhoere, made possible through the 
reverberation of the cell walls .. Banging on the cell walls comes to·signify that 
she is there, is alive, and, moreover, that she continues to be part of a 
~ommunity. 
Her text stands as a confirmation of this. She asserts not only her own 
existence but that fact that she exists within the community represented in her 
narrative. 
7.2 Pain and Subjectivity 
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The infliction of pain and deprivation which Makhoere and Mashinini respectively 
try to counteract is integral to the disempowering strategy of imprisonment. The 
prison strategy is a complex one, involving the body in a sophisticated 
manoeuvre in order to assail the subject and her world. When pain is inflicted on 
the body, subjectivity itself is assaulted. Scarry is useful in demonstrating the 
interconnectedness of the body and subjectivity. With the infliction of pain the 
prisoner's whole world is diminished to the immediacy of her own body. Scarry 
deals primarily with brute physical pain; it seems necessary in addition to 
include, more broadly, physical discomfort and the psychological distresses 
associated with bodily humiliation and deprivation which are referred to explicitly, 
by Mashinini and First particularly. I will also consider the discomfort of sexual 
harassment as a kind of physical ordeal which brings the body sharply and 
exclusively into focus. 
I 
1· 
Scarry argues that the pheno_menon of pain is exceedingly difficult to 
represent for it is language defying. Pain has 'the ability to destroy language, 
the power of verbal objectification, a major source of our self-extension' (54). 
Moreover, it 'annihilates not only the objects of complex thought and emotion but 
also the objects of the most elemental acts of perception' (54). Through pain the 
prisoner's entire world, it could be said, is rendered void. 
[A]s the content of one's world disintegrates, so the content of one's 
language disintegrates; as the self disintegrates, so that which would 
express and project the self is robbed of its source and. its subject. 
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World, self, and voice are lost, or nearly lost, through the intense pain of 
torture and not through the confession as is wrongly suggested by its 
connotations of betrayal. The prisoner's confession merely objectifies the 
fact of their being almost lost, makes their invisible absence; or nearby 
absence, visible to the torturers. (35) 
Pain renders the body exclusively and obsessively the focus of the subject's 
consciousness: it 'occupies the entire body and spills out into the realm beyond 
the body, takes over all that is inside and outside, makes the two obscenely 
indistinguishable, and systematically destroys anything like language' (54). It is 
only when 'the body is comfortable, when it has ceased to be an obsessive 
object of perception and concern, that consciousness develops other objects, 
that for any individual the external world ... comes into being and begins to grow' 
(39). Now, to the extent that the subject is produced linguistically and is itself an 
object of perception, subjectivity itself could be said to be obliterated when 
language and consciousness are destroyed in the horror of acute bodily 
awareness. 
Inflicting pain is thus primarily an act whereby the torturer's power is 
extended and confirmed, and the prisoner's power diminished along with the 
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extended and confirmed, and the prisoner's power diminished along with the 
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contraction of her world and self. Torture is a 'conversion of the enlarged map of 
human suffering into an emblem of the regime's strength' (56). The torturer (and 
what he stands for) is exalted through the act of torturing, which Scarry · 
articulates as an amplification of the torturer's voice as the prisoner's voice is 
obliterated: 
[U]ltimate domination requires that the prisoner's ground becomes 
increasingly physical and the torturer's increasingly verbal, that the 
prisoner become a colossal body with no voice and the torturer a colossal 
voice ... with no body, that eventually the prisoner experiences himself 
exclusively in terms of sentience and the torturer exclusively in terms of 
self-extension. (57) 
The confession which may result from torture cannot be seen as the voice of the 
prisoner, Scarry argues,· but an extension of the voice of the torturer and signifier 
of his predominance. Confession is thus wrongly understood to be a form of 
betrayal:· 
To assent to words that through the thick agony of the body can be only 
dimly heard, or to reach aimlessly for the name of a person or a place that 
has barely enough cohesion to hold its shape as a word and none to bond 
it to its worldly referent, is a way of saying, yes, all is almost gone now, 
there is almost nothing left now, even this voice, the sounds I am making, 
no longer form my words but the words of another. (35) 
The three facets are thus intertwined: the body of the prisoner, which Scarry 
argues is overwhelmingly present under torture, the prisoner's ability to articulate 
her/his existence in language, and the relationship of power between the state 
and the prisoner. 
A crucial aspect of the respective magnification and contraction is the 
system's denial of the reality of the pain so that even the prisoners' own. 
perceptions of themselves and their credibility is lost to them: 
The act of disclaiming is as essential to the power as is the act of 
claiming.... [The torturer] first inflicts pain, then objectifies pain, then 
denies the pain - and only this final act of self-blinding permits the shift 
back to the first step, the inflicting of still more pain, for to allow the reality 
of the other's suffering to enter his own consciousness would immediately 
compel him to stop the torture. (57) 
The ability to deaden oneself to the pain of another, to deny it in order to inflict it, 
requires a kind of dehumanising on the part of the torturer. This points to 
another of Scarry's insights into the dynamic of torture, that the torture itself is a 
sign of the torturer's own diminishment of self (58, 59). Born of an anxiety and 
vulnerability, and a desire to be empowered, torture signifies the torturer's 
brokenness. The prisoner's pain cannot be acknowledged: the torturer thus 
condemns himself to his own silence. 
The history of detention and torture in South Africa is thus not surprisingly 
hidden; for years the Nationalist Government denied detainees' reports of 
excessive torture during interrogation and justified sinister and uninhibited 
powers of detention in security legislation with innocuous-sounding titles such as 
the 'Public Safety Act'46 and the 'Internal Security Act'. 47 Don Foster and Diane 
Sandler point out that 'numerous cases for damages [were] settled out of court' 
which is 'tacit admission of irregularities' (Foster and Sandler 1985, 26). At the 
time of their report (1985) which was based on interviews with some 135 ex-
46 Act 3 of 1953. 
47 Act 74 of 1982. 
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detainees, there had been no public acknowledgements of the practice of torture 
and no published documents gathering information on the strategies of coercion 
and maltreatment used in detention. It is noted under the section of Fosfer and 
Sandler's report entitled 'Recommendations' that professional bodies in the fields 
of law and psychology had not by 1985 made any attempt either to investigate or 
publicly to condemn the practice of torture. For much of the period of apartheid 
rule, then, detainees were unprotected both because of the enforced silence of 
extensive censorship and bannings and the tendency towards complacency on 
the part of socially powerful institutions within the country. 
Ruth First's narrative includes an account (italicised in her text) of the 
inquest following the death in detention of Looksmart Solwandle Ngudle, a 
' 
prominent Cape Town ANC activist who was found dead in his cell sixteen days 
after his arrest on 16 August 1963. The Security Branch denied ever using 
torture as a coercive strategy to induce a prisoner to talk, despite the widespread 
accounts of torture in prison. Ngudle's body was buried and his clothing 
disposed of before his mother had arrived from the Transkei. 
Detective-Sergeant Ferreira was in charge at the time of Ngudle's death. 
When cross-examined by Advocate Vernon Berrange, Ferreira is asked what 
would happen if a prisoner were not prepared to answer questions and the 
interrogators were convinced he had valuable information: 
'Well, he has got to be asked again.' 
'And again' - 'Yes.' 
'And again' - 'Yes.' 
'And again' - 'Yes.' 
'And again' - 'Yes.' 
'I see, the idea is to wear him down, I suppose?' - 'I make no comment.' 
(First 1965, 96) 
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Ferreira acknowledges the horror of the interrogation experience unwittingly, 
however, when asked to consider what would happen if the detainee were in fact 
not in possession of the information the Security Branch were after: 
'That would be a dreadful thing to happen to a man, wouldn't it, if in fact 
you were wrong?' - 'Yes.' (97) 
Although the verdict of the magistrate corroborates police denials by 
concluding that Ngudle has 'committed suicide by hanging himself' and explicitly 
absolves the police of all responsibility, First's text celebrates the opportunity, by 
representing the inquest and her own experience, to lift 'the lid ... on the 
systematic resort to torture of Ninety-Day detainees by the Security Branch': it 
was not possible 'for officialdom to try to stifle' that evidence of and, by 
inference, this published testimony of the reality of torture (102). First's account 
of the banning of Ngudle after his death reads satirically as another (futile) 
attempt to gag abused dissidents whose very existence, once exposed, is 
necessarily subversive. The overwhelming power of the state, then, is 
unthreatened only in the hidden spaces of the torture rooms, although First's 
incorporation of Ngudle's story introduces the suggestion that the terror of 
detention and torture is so because the state's power to dispose of bodies is 
extensive. Ngudle's death is not just a linguistic obliteration, nor does it only 
concern identity in language·. Death in detention symbolises the precariousness 
of a person's existence under prison conditions, and it is this awareness which 
- as we shall see - contributes to Mashinini's (psychological) 'torture' while in 
detention. 
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Torture is not easily defined for it encompasses a limitless variety of 
devices, the primary aim of which is to inflict pain purportedly to extract 
information regarding crimes against the state from which it derives the veneer of 
official sanction. However, as Scarry argues, that legitimising motive must be 
treated with suspicion and considered in relation to 'the final product and 
outcome of torture', namely power itself, created and demonstrated in the act of 
torture. 
Article 1 of the 'Declaration against Torture' adopted by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations in December 1975 defines torture in this way: 
[T]orture means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether 
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted by or at the instigation of a 
public official on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a 
third person information or confession, punishing him for an act he has 
committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating him or 
other persons ..... 
48 . 
Torture is said to involve 'cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment'49 which, along 
with the explicit reference to 'mental suffering', undoubtedly includes solitary 
confinement as experienced by detainees under South African security 
legislation (Foster and Sandler 1985, 6). This is corroborated in Mashinini's 
narrative which describes the agony of being denied access to information and 
contact with the outside world. When she is ordered to leave her cell she is left 
anxiously to wonder what awaits her. 'These people have fine ways of torturing 
you. They let you torture yourself (65). When she catches a glimpse of a 
headline announcing the death in detention of a detainee and is not given the 
48 United Nations. 'Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment', 1975. 
49 As defined in Part 2 of Article 1 and quoted in Foster and Sandler 1985, 6. 
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identity of the person by her interrogators she d~scribes this as a form of torture: 
he 'never told me who that person was and this was a torture and a hell to me' 
(77). 
Makhoere's account on the other hand resists a closer analysis of complex 
psychological responses to imprisonment, generally remaining on the level of the 
physical deprivations. She describes the rationing of food, which 'assumes major 
proportions in prison' as a 'form of torture' (80). However, at one point she 
acknowledges, briefly, the incomparably disturbing effects of solitary 
confinement. 
I spent two-and-a-half mpnths there, alone. From August until the end of 
October. 
That segregation was the most destructive part of the sentence. If I had 
had to stay there until November I would have gone raving mad. I was on 
the brink of it. (75) 
This acknowledgement of her vulnerability is not allowed to linger, though. 
Within a few lines her narrative has returned to its characteristic defiance: 'At 
times I think I am tough. They did not break me then, either' (75). In an earlier 
reference to the psychologically destructive devices of detention Makhoere 
retains this tone: Makhoere describes the 'stupid' deputy head of Kroonstad 
Prison, Colonel Steyn, as being 'a racist and a sick racist at that': 
He wanted to make you feel that you had failed, that you were no longer a 
human being. That you were going to succumb to everything he told you. 
He thought he could switch you on and off at will. (29) 
Ever defiant, Makhoere exalts in the failure of Steyn's attempts to break her: we· 
'gave him the shock of his life' (29). 
For Mashinini it is not quite as easy to evade the shattering effects of 
detention. The greatest pain she experienced while in prison, Mashinini writes, 
is the pain of not being able to remember her daughter's name. 
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One day, thinking about my own children ... I could see my youngest 
daughter's face and I wanted to call her by her name. I struggled to call 
out the name, the name I always called her, and I just could not recall 
what the name was. I struggled and struggled. I would fall down and 
actually weep with the effort of remembering the name of my daughter. I'd 
try and sleep on it, wake up. I'd go without eating, because this pain of 
not being able to remember the name of my daughter was the greatest 
I've ever had. (87) 
Scarry's analysis of the language of pain suggests that there is a confusingly 
0 
doubled sense of agency which identifies the body itself as the agent of pain -
"'my body hurts"' (47) -while at the same time the source of the pain is 
somehow external, veiled (52-53). Scarry speaks of this as the 'unseen sense of 
self-betrayal in pain', all the more acute when a prisoner is forced to exercise or 
to maintain an uncomfortable position for a protracted length of time (47). The 
body itself produces the resultant pain. The dynamic in which the other's look 
constructs the self is reproduced here in a moment of extreme confusion when 
the hostile and pain-inflicting will of the other is internalised, producing a 
crippling alienation from self. The (hurt) body hurts the body. 
So too with psychological pain. Mashinini herself is responsible for the act 
of forgetting Dudu's name, thus inflicting enormous pain not only on herself but 
on her daughter who beco.mes the object of her apparent neglect and lack of 
care. Forgetting a daughter's name is a disavowal of the relationship itself, and 
therefore also of a fundamental part of Mashinini's identity: 'mother'. The threat 
of losing an essential part of herself is excruciating for Mashinini and, like bodily 
pain, it overwhelms her consciousness and annihilates all other thought content, 
to use Scarry's terms. The poignancy of this moment emerges from the 
intolerable convergence of guilt and agonising impotence. 
A similar sense of being both victim and perpetrator of a self-inflicted 
agony is painfully evident in 117 Davs: 'I was wide open to emotional blackmail, 
and the blackmailer was myself (127). For, unlike physical torture where the 
perpetrator is more easily identifiable (even if the source of the pain is also 
experienced as being within the body), psychological torture is more insidious 
and therefore more difficult to recognise and contain. First feels acutely 
responsible for her disorientation under interrogation: 
I had presided over my collapse with a combination of knowingness and 
utter miscalculation. My conceit and self-centredness had at last undone 
me.... I had been stupid. Weak. A failure.... I was a spider caught in my 
own web, spinning finer and finer threads in my head to make 
disentanglement impossible. (130) 
First's text also acknowledges the degree to which her profound confusion is a 
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form of assault: the 'bombardment from Swanepoel split my bamboozlement wide 
open and it dropped from my head like a broken husk' (123). Elsewhere, too, 
First uses a strikingly physical image, similarly violent, to describe the mental 
collapse she and others experience, who 'crack like egg shells' under the strain 
of detention (134). The overwhelming impression is one of fragility: selves (like 
egg shells) are easily cracked and irreparable. 
Foster acknowledges that no 'precise operational definition of what 
constitutes psychological torture' has been (or could be) proffered. He adds 
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some content to the United Nations' description of 'cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment': 
[D]efinitions of psychological torture should additionally include some 
notion of distorted communication techniques, vicarious forms of abuse 
such as those involving witnessing other persons' maltreatment, and 
psychological devices that have been shown to weaken or disorient basic 
mental and emotional functions and so render the person more vulnerable 
and less capable of rational or emotionally stable form of thought or 
action. This third criterion would include treatment such as solitary 
confinement, sleep deprivation, hooding· and blindfolding, and 
administration of drugs. (Foster with Sandler and Davis 1987, 104) 
Foster's study does not, however, consider the particular forms of abuse meted 
out to women prisoners, nor does he distinguish in his study between the 
treatment of black women and white women who were categorised quite 
differently in South African prisons, as shown in the narratives discussed in this 
study. Although Foster includes being forced to undress amongst a list of 
psychological forms of torture, there is no mention made of sexual harassment or 
threatening sexual innuendo. Nor does he consider how enforced nakedness 
might be different for women and men prisoners. There is thus another area of 
psycho-physical affliction which demands attention in this discussion. Scarry 
describes pain as the 'unmaking' of the detainee's world through being 
overwhelmed by bodily consciousness. The bodily discomfort of being 
positioned sexually, of being looked at and humiliated, could be said to be 
torturous and similarly destructive of one's ability to articulate oneself as subject. 
A previous chapter has focused on First's discomfort with the 'violent 
infringement of [her] privacy' which she suffers while in detention (29) and on the 
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part surveillance plays in penal practice. The strongest' language used by First, 
however, is in reference to the unwanted nocturnal visits from officers: 
· I hated the night inspections when officers came from the police barracks 
and sidled up to the peephole to see for themselves. Some of the 
wardresses shared my indignation for reasons of their own prudery. If 
men warders wanted to see women prisoners, they said, they should ask 
the wardress to unlock the door and herself see if it was 'safe' for a man to 
look. Only then should the officer be invited to make his inspections. 
(The Key Man, it was implied, should open the door with his eyes closed.) 
(29) 
The satirical tone with which this quotation ends belies her earlier candour: in 
fact she shares the misgivings of the wardresses, which she then dismisses as 
'prudery'. Her jibe at the impossibly contradictory criteria of the wardresses 
indicates her unease at the fact that there should be a 'Key Man' at all; it implies 
more than disapproval or mockery of their puritan sensibilities. She too does not 
want the men to peer into her cell. However, she cannot embrace the 
wardresses' sentiment as though it constituted a form of empathy or identification 
with her, because at other times they themselves assume the role of voyeurs in a 
dynamic of looking which is equally unnerving for First. The wardresses too are 
bearers of a penetrating, objectifying gaze designed to monitor her obedience to 
an oppressive system. 
The most unnerving voyeur is her interrogator, Lieutenant Viktor. Their 
interactions are steeped in sexual innuendo. When she abandons herself to 
'uncontrollable hysterical weeping' after her suicide attempt, Viktor ('snooping as 
usual') suddenly appears at her side offering her his handkerchief. Some days 
later she expresses her anger at the intimacy he assumes, coming into her cell 
while she is in bed. His sexually menacing response confirms the 
162 
appropriateness of her discomfort: he asks her whether she had been wearing a 
nightie or shortie pyjamas (131 ). He notices the one and only day she forgets to 
wear lipstick and asks her about it, censoring himself midway (but not before she 
had understood what he was thinking). At another point - and in response to 
her retort that he 'keep away from [her]' - he comments on her physical posture 
in a gesture which insinuates that his gaze can penetrate her psyche: 
'I've watched you when you walk out of here back to your cell, and your 
head drops and your shoulders slump as you go in.' (140) 
In the angry exchange which follows (regarding First's refusal to complete 
her statement), First imagines that he is about to hit her: 
For the first time I saw his temple throb and his hands clenched on the 
table between us in a fist which seemed to make a swift perhaps 
involuntary movement towards me. 'You've got a twisted mind,' he 
snarled. When his fist clenched I tilted my chin upwards in mock 
acceptance of the blow. He had regained control. 'I'd rather kiss it,' he 
said. (140) 
The account suggests a great deal of self-possession on the part of First, who 
scratches off the veneer of Viktor's role as 'nice guy'. However, she goes on to 
acknowledge her own disturbing ambivalence and the difficulty of maintaining a 
wary distance from the man as he disingenuously courts her trust (and desire): 
I loathed myself but it seemed I could not resist taking part in this 
exchange with anot.her human being ... ; he was exerting every muscle to 
prove that he was different, susceptible to me, so that I would prove 
susceptible to him. 
I was practising deceit but searching myself not to make it self-
deception. I had to admit that I was desperate for company, to be able to 
talk to someone, that I was enormously relieved that it was neither the 
deadly deliberation of Nel nor the showy bombast of Swanepoel. Viktor 
came laden with calculating charm and flattery thick with treacherous 
intent: could I see it clearly every time he turned on the charm? (140-1; 
emphasis added) · 
Even if his attention is at times welcome, his more overtly sexual gaze is horribly 
threatening to First. When she is given a thriller to read, the title articulates for 
her the dread (associated with being looked at) which his charm has not allowed 
her fully to recognise: 
The Night has a Thousand Eyes came, and for the first time in my life I 
was afraid of a book, because the thousand eyes were the force of 
telepathy and I felt the eery [sic] presence of Viktor's scrutiny continually 
at the back of my neck. (142) 
The power of his gaze goes beyond the opportunities he has actually to 
look at her (which are many, given that he has limitless access to her via the 
peephole). His gaze is, for First, always upon her. In a complex manoeuvre 
which is designed to break down her self-composure, Viktor establishes himself 
as having uncanny, ever-present in-sight into her: 'Viktor said he knew me better 
by then than I knew myself (144). He tries to make her emotionally dependent 
on him in ways that are suggestive of a father or lover: he is her source of 
comfort, bringing her homemade cookies, a handkerchief when she weeps; he 
calls her intimately by her first name, Ruth, and says with an air of authority that 
'[t]his is no place for you' (140). 
The relationship is thus more intricate, their sexualities invoked to a 
greater degree than is suggested simply by the figure of a man leering at the 
body of a woman. It is a perverted courtship, which at times First craves and at 
other times abhors. Certainly his hold over her is extensive, so that even on her 
release she has no faith in her abllity to be free of him: 'by the time I got home it 
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was lunch-time, though Viktor had brought his release order early that morning. 
When they left me in my own house at last I was convinced that it was not the 
end, that they would come again' (144). 
Her text, written at a (later) moment of greater composure, is the place 
where she is able to analyse the complex strategies of psychological abuse to 
which she is victim and in this way distance herself from the effects of it, what 
Scarry calls 'objectifying' the pain. First quotes J.A.C. Brown in The Techniques 
of Persuasion who argues that '"[p]olitical indoctrination depends as much upon 
sympathy on the part of the inquisitor as upon threats"' (First 1965, 137). 
Significantly, she then extends Brown's syntax to identify the strategies which 
were used against her, thus investing his comment with her personal experience 
and infusing her account with his scholarly authority: 
Friendliness instead of hostility. 'I'll never lose my temper with you,' 
Viktor told me repeatedly. 
The use of a friendly period to find out everything about the detainee 
and win his [sic] confidence. 'I know you better after a month than people 
who have known you your whole life,' said Viktor. (137) 
In moments such as this one First is able to expose, for herself and for the 
audience whose recognition is so crucial to her survival as a subject of her own 
construction, the reality of the pain she had experienced. Moreover, she asserts 
the astonishing fact of her having withstood it: in 'the depth of my agony I had 
won' (138; her emphasis). Through representing the events she is able to assert 
a control over Viktor, to undo his power over her and expose his manipulations 
through her own (textual) manipulations. By distinguishing between 'a younger 
(experiencing) self and 'the "mature" narrator' common in autobiography (Driver 
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1991, 339) she is able to assert a superior comprehension over her earlier, 
bullied self and thus rescue herselffrom Viktor's control. 
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In discussing 'poststructuralist insistence on due recognition of the 
differences between narrator, protagonist(s), implied author and real author', 
Judith Coullie puts it this way: 'the real author [Mashinini] is not simply an older 
version of the protagonist but someone who has experienced a period of 
rehabilitation in a Danish clinic for torture victims' (Coullie 1991, 5). Although 
First has not undergone 'rehabilitation', as such, she is able to restore a measure 
of control in producing herself- an,d Viktor himself - once outside the hostile 
environment in which Viktor's gaze is all-powerful. Writing itself is an agent of 
renewal. 
\ 
Concluding remarks: writing as an agent of renewal 
Scarry argues that the prisoner's articulations make possible a diminishment of 
the pain itself by reversing the negation of language and self which pain 
produces. 
To acknowledge the radical subjectivity of pain is to acknowledge the 
simple and absolute incompatibility of pain and the world. The survival of 
each depends on its separation from the other. To bring pain into the 
world by objectifying it in language, is to destroy one of them: either, as in 
the case of Amnesty International and parallel efforts in other areas, the 
pain is objectified, articulated, brought into the world in such a way that 
the pain itself is diminished and destroyed; or alternatively, as in torture 
and parallel forms of _sadism, the pain is at once objectified and falsified, 
articulated but made to refer to something else and in the process, the 
world, or some dramatized surrogate of the world, is destroyed. (50-51) 
There may be a danger in too glibly attributing the destruction of pain to the 
telling of it. Barbara Eckstein calls Scarry's book 'controversial' as a result 
(1990, 70). Pain and language (that is, representations of self) are wrongly set 
up in neat opposition. However, to objectify pain through naming it is in some 
way to contain it: the relief of having withstood institutionalised (and yet deeply 
intimate) psychological battery emanates from the pages of First's text. 
Don Foster, Dennis Davis and Diane Sandler's work on detention in_ South 
Africa suggests that what is at issue in recovery from torture is not language per 
se (or, retrieving one's voice) but re-establishing control (whether by personal 
testimony or by, more overtly political re-empowerment). Using data from 
concentration camp survivor studies they argue that 'the issue of control 
emerges as a crucial factor in the ability to survive the trauma' (Foster with Davis 
and Sandler 1987, 74). As part of the same phenomenon Foster, et al, cite the 
166 
ability to prepare oneself or to anticipate the trauma. With reference to 
laboratory studies carried out by psychologists they argue that 'it is not the 
trauma itself but the inability to control it that is responsible for the condition of 
helplessness' (1987, 81 ). While 'technical distinctions may be made .between 
predictability and controllability, the two are difficult to separate' (81 ). Certainly, 
their study argues convincingly that the unpredictability of unspecified periods of 
incarceration contributes significantly to the trauma of detention. 
First writes that the crux of her struggle in detention 'was the 
indefiniteness of it all' (75): 
I was convinced that everyone, myself included, could make an 
adjustment to a known situation .... But the greater part of this matter of 
adjustment is knowing to what to adjust. Deadly boredom can be 
withstood if there is an end in sight. A prisoner, even one facing a life 
term, has some security in the cessation of fear of the unknown. (75) 
' 
Her evocative descriptions of the horror of existing in a vacuum have already 
been discussed. Suffice it to say, then, that writing offers her the welcome 
opportunity to identify that horror and objectify it, to use Scarry's terms. Through 
writing she is able to impose a structure onto the limitless days - in .. exactly the 
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way her painstakingly stitched dressing-gown calendar is able to do, marking the· 
passage of time and in that way containing it. The stitches become 'certificates 
of endurance' (First 1965, 75) in a gesture which 'domesticate[s].the power of the 
totalitarian state' (Scott 1996, 10). The state's regulation of time is transformed 
into a familiar action (which is thus less frightening to her) and the pattern she 
imposes on the passing of days offers her a means of regulating the days. A 
similarly domestic act becomes the script of resistance in Makhoere's text when 
she recounts how a fellow prisoner, Thandi Madise, embroiders, as if in blood, 
her message of protest: 
We were still wearing. the vests. And we had these red and white 
bedspreads. Thandi pulled the red cotton from the bedspread, smuggled 
in a. needle - don't ask me how she managed. to do that - and 
embroidered on her vest 'FREE ME' in red. (88) 
Madise thus creates a means to articulate herself, overcoming the imposition of 
silence and obedience. To label herself as imprisoned and to demand freedom 
does not threaten her self-construction but produces a kind of freedom (of 
expression, at very least). For Mashinini it is different. Her anxious moment of 
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erasing the.signatures of other prisoners on the cell walls suggests what Scarry's 
neat opposition between language and pain is not able to do: prison writing itself 
(prisoners writing themselves, that is) threatens to produce them as prisoners 
even as it promises its subjects the freedom of self-expression. To speak is not . ' 
(necessarily) to abolish pain, at least not in what remains a hostile environment 
for Mashinini. 
The liberating potential of prison narratives is circumscribed by the 
conventions (and, simply, the name) of the genre. J.U. Jacobs comments on the 
privileging of some South African writers' prison identity in the labels they give to 
their texts. For to 'enter prison is to acquire a new language and a new name for 
the self, and thereby a new subjectivity' (1991 b, 7). Jacobs considers the 
significance of the signatures and titles of South African prison narratives and 
finds that the authors' 'subjectivity is forever attached to a prison identity' (13). 
He points out examples where writers (specifically, Moses Dlamini and lndres 
Naidoo) 'give prior status to their prison number's as the "name" of the author on 
the title-pages of their memoirs' (13).50 Jacobo Timerman identifies himself 
through his lack of identity: Prisoner Without a Name. Cell Without a Number. 
His text both reproduces that absence and challenges it, both by drawing 
attention to the namelessness in the title and by denying it (simply, by authoring 
the text). 
Previously I have spoken of written testimony as a means to achieve a 
'restoration of self. The process is more complicated than that phrase suggests, 
for writing does not 'restore' the pre-imprisonment subject but grants to the (ex-) 
prisoner a position as subject. Nonetheless, writing is also productive of power, 
as is evidenced in the state's refusal to allow prisoners access to reading and 
writing material and in the extensive censorship legislation enacted by 
repressive regimes, as argued earlier. 51 Barbara Harlow writes that the 
'authoritarian control over the "power of writing" is especially evident in the case 
of political prisoners in the ban on all writing and reading materials' ( 1987, 125). 
Having been detained as a result of the political activity associated with writing 
(in some cases, such as Ruth First), the prisoners are 'already a serious threat to 
the authorities' control over the "power of writing"' ( 125). 
50 lndres Naidoo's book, Island in Chains: Ten Years on Robben Island (1982), is the story of the 
ten years he spent on Robben Island (1963-1973) as told to Albie Sachs, which introduces a new 
dimension into the dynamic of representation, complicating the relationship of subject to 
signature. As Jacobs points out, Naidoo is author and subject, but 'it is only through the narrative 
intervention of Albie Sachs that he is realised as subject of a prison memoir .... In a real sense, 
this prison memoir is a collaborative undertaking' (1991 b, 13). 
51 Foster with Davis and Sandler (1987) quote the Appellate Division decision to reverse the 
more lenient ruling of a lower court granting detainees access to writing materials. The court 
concluded that 'it was not the intention of Parliament that detainees should as a right be 
permitted to relieve the tedium of their detention with reading matter or writing materials.' 
[Appellate Division in Rossouw v Sachs 1964(2) SA 551 (A) at 565. 
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Jamie S. Scott suggests that the 'oppressor knows that writing per se 
enacts resistance' and quotes one of Nawal el Sa'adawi's prison guards: 'writing 
' r 
is more serious than killing'.
52 
None of the writers studied in this project (unlike 
Breyten Breytenbach) were able to write while in prison and their narratives are 
written with an awareness that even outside prison writing and publishing are 
dangerous. Mashinini is told on her release 'never, never to speak about my 
detention': 
So whenever I spoke I was leaving something out. I was fearful, terribly 
fearful, that this would leak out and get to them, and I would be rearrested 
and charged for having spoken about things. (93) 
Ruth First, whose book was published in 1965, just two years after her release at 
a time of severe repression in South Africa, knew that the consequences of 
writing were potentially enormous. In the interview with the BBC referred to 
earlier she acknowledges having to censor herself for fear that her text might 
further incriminate her and other activists. When First lived in exile in London 
and Mozambique following her release from detention she continued to write and 
began also to teach, as Director of Research of the Centre for African Studies at 
the Eduardo Mondlane University in Maputo, Mozambique. Helena Dolny, wife 
of Joe Slovo, describes the centre as 'the major policy studies centre serving the 
Mozambican government' in her introduction to Sieve's The Unfinished 
Autobiography (1995, xi). 
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The most shocking evidence of the threat~ning power of (her) writing is the 
fact thatin August 1982 she was the victim of a letter-bomb attack which killed 
her. 'The letter bomb bore her name. The intent to kill was clearly personalised' 
J 
writes Helena Dolny (1995, xi). In analysing why she, an unlikely target for such 
an attack, was chosen, Joe Slovo writes in the introduction to 117 Days that she 
'was not associated with the planning or implementation of the type of resistance 
activity the authorities feared most - armed actions' (6). However, she 
continued to be outspoken and influential outside South Africa in an academic 
institution which was concerned, in part, with the construction of history and 
contributed to policy formation in Mozambique, a supporter of the resistance 
movement in South Africa. Most of First's writing, even when in exile, involved 
critiques of South Africa's destabilising role in the region, such as The Barrel of a 
Gun: Political Power in Africa and the Coup d'Etat (1970), a study of military rule 
in Africa, and South West Africa (1963). Perhaps most threatening to the 
Nationalist regime would have been her expose of covert international support of 
the regime in The South African Connection: Western Investment in Apartheid 
(1972). 
As a writer and intellectual, First's political challenge could not be (totally) 
dismissed despite the hysteria about communism in South Africa during the 
apartheid years. A prominent liberal Cape newspaper describes her as 
'Professor First' and gives precedence to-her identity as 'a well-known 
researcher' over the label 'communist' in its report of her death. A similar order 
is employed further into the article: 
To many she was the intellectual power behind the South African 
liberation movement - to others Ruth First was just a notorious 
communist, just Joe Slovo's wife. 
But the attractive dark-haired woman was respected internationally as a 
writer of rare perception. 53 . . 
For the authorities, First's representation of history was enormously 
powerful. (She herself and her books were banned in South Africa until 1990.) 
Although it may appear that in a political arena things tangible, and material are 
the objects of struggle, writing itself is considered dangerous. For to articulate 
one's own, dissenting truth is to challenge the realms of organised power or at 
very least the silence by which one is disempowered. Autobiography, and prison 
narratives in particular, represent the 'powerful and healing moment when a 
human voice reaches the person whose sole reality had become his own 
unthinkable isolation' (Scarry 1985, 50). For in that momentof even tentative 
articulation the inchoate force of the violated self is given expression. 
For those historical subjects who have found themselves without a legally 
valued identity and a platform from which to articulate the challenge of their 
experience, the process of writing autobiography, albeit constrained by the self-
evident limitedness aryd instability of such a project, may well offer an invaluable 
chance to assert a truth, to reclaim a self and a credibility and in that way to create a 
kind of freedom. 
53 
'Letter Bomb Kills ANC VIP Ruth First,' The Am us 18 Aug. 1982: N. pag. 
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